[PATCH v5 next 1/5] modules:capabilities: add request_module_cap()

[mcgrof@kernel.org (Luis R. Rodriguez)]

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:33:27PM +0100, Djalal Harouni wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:16 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> wrote:
> > On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 12:11:34PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 11:14 AM, Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> wrote:
> >> > kmod is just a helper to poke userpsace to load a module, that's it.
> >> >
> >> > The old init_module() and newer finit_module() do the real handy work or
> >> > module loading, and both currently only use may_init_module():
> >> >
> >> > static int may_init_module(void)
> >> > {
> >> >         if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE) || modules_disabled)
> >> >                 return -EPERM;
> >> >
> >> >         return 0;
> >> > }
> >> >
> >> > This begs the question:
> >> >
> >> >   o If userspace just tries to just use raw finit_module() do we want similar
> >> >     checks?
> >> >
> >> > Otherwise, correct me if I'm wrong this all seems pointless.
> >>
> >> Hm? That's direct-loading, not auto-loading. This series is only about
> >> auto-loading.
> >
> > And *all* auto-loading uses aliases? What's the difference between auto-loading
> > and direct-loading?
> 
> Not all auto-loading uses aliases, auto-loading is when kernel code
> calls request_module() to loads the feature that was not present, 

It seems the actual interest here is system call implicated request_module()
calls? Because there are uses of request_module() which may be module hacks,
and not implicated via system calls.

> and direct-loading in this thread is the direct syscalls like
> finit_module().

OK.

> >> We already have a global sysctl for blocking direct-loading (modules_disabled).
> >
> > My point was that even if you have a CAP_NET_ADMIN check on request_module(),
> > finit_module() will not check for it, so a crafty userspace could still try
> > to just finit_module() directly, and completely then bypass the CAP_NET_ADMIN
> > check.
> 
> The finit_module() uses CAP_SYS_MODULE which should allow all modules
> and in this context it should be more privileged than CAP_NET_ADMIN
> which is only for "netdev-%s" (to not load arbitrary modules with it).
> 
> finit_module() coming from request_module() always has the
> CAP_NET_ADMIN, hence the check is done before.

But since CAP_SYS_MODULE is more restrictive, what's the point in checking
for CAP_NET_ADMIN?

> > So unless I'm missing something, I see no point in adding extra checks for
> > request_module() but nothing for the respective load_module().
> 
> I see, request_module() is called from kernel context which runs in
> init namespace will full capabilities, the spawned userspace modprobe
> will get CAP_SYS_MODULE and all other caps, then after comes modprobe
> and load_module().

Right, so defining the gains of adding this extra check is not very clear
yet. It would seem a benefit exists, what is it?

> Btw as suggested by Linus I will update with request_module_cap() and > I can
> offer my help maintaining these bits too.

Can you start by extending lib/test_module.c and
tools/testing/selftests/kmod/kmod.sh with a proof of concept of the gains here,
as well as ensuring things work as expected ?

  Luis
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