From: dchinner@redhat.com (Dave Chinner)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v16 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2018 12:36:36 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180221013636.GE3728@rh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180220235600.GA3706@bombadil.infradead.org>
On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 03:56:00PM -0800, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 08:36:04AM +1100, Dave Chinner wrote:
> > FWIW, I'm not wanting to use it to replace static variables. All the
> > structures are dynamically allocated right now, and get assigned to
> > other dynamically allocated pointers. I'd likely split the current
> > structures into a "ro after init" structure and rw structure, so
> > how does the "__ro_after_init" attribute work in that case? Is it
> > something like this?
> >
> > struct xfs_mount {
> > struct xfs_mount_ro{
> > .......
> > } *ro __ro_after_init;
^^^^^^^^
pointer, not embedded structure....
> > ......
>
> No, you'd do:
>
> struct xfs_mount_ro {
> [...]
> };
>
> struct xfs_mount {
> const struct xfs_mount_ro *ro;
> [...]
> };
.... so that's pretty much the same thing :P
> > Also, what compile time checks are in place to catch writes to
> > ro structure members? Is sparse going to be able to check this sort
> > of thing, like is does with endian-specific variables?
>
> Just labelling the pointer const should be enough for the compiler to
> catch unintended writes.
Ok.
> > > I'd be interested to have your review of the pmalloc API, if you think
> > > something is missing, once I send out the next revision.
> >
> > I'll look at it in more depth when it comes past again. :P
>
> I think the key question is whether you want a slab-style interface
> or whether you want a kmalloc-style interface. I'd been assuming
> the former, but Igor has implemented the latter already.
Slabs are rally only useful when you have lots of a specific type of
object. I'm concerned mostly about one-off per-mount point
structures, of which there are relatively few. A heap-like pool per
mount is fine for this.
Cheers,
Dave.
--
Dave Chinner
dchinner at redhat.com
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-21 1:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-12 16:52 [RFC PATCH v16 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 23:52 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-20 17:07 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21 22:29 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-21 22:35 ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-02-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 23:50 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-20 16:59 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21 22:28 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-22 9:14 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-22 18:28 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:53 ` [PATCH 5/6] Pmalloc: self-test Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 23:43 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-20 16:40 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21 22:24 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-22 9:01 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:53 ` [PATCH 6/6] Documentation for Pmalloc Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 23:32 ` [RFC PATCH v16 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Kees Cook
2018-02-20 1:21 ` Dave Chinner
2018-02-20 18:03 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-20 21:36 ` Dave Chinner
2018-02-20 23:56 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-21 1:36 ` Dave Chinner [this message]
2018-02-21 9:56 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21 21:36 ` Dave Chinner
2018-02-22 8:58 ` Igor Stoppa
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