From: serge@hallyn.com (Serge E. Hallyn)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [manpages PATCH] capabilities.7: describe namespaced file capabilities
Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2018 19:04:38 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180420000438.GB8785@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <06189756-dbc5-ebd0-ccdd-d937d6198530@gmail.com>
Quoting Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) (mtk.manpages at gmail.com):
> Hello Serge, Jann,
>
> On 01/16/2018 06:26 PM, Jann Horn wrote:
> > On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 7:52 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> >> Update the capabilities(7) manpage with a description of the
> >> new-ish namespaced file capability support.
> >>
> >> A note on userspace tools: since the kernel will automatically
> >> convert between v2 and v3 xattrs, and translate nsroot between
> >> v3 xattrs, we can make do with the current getcap(8) and setcap(8)
> >> tools. I.e. a user on the host can create a transient user namespace
> >> with the appropriate mappings and run setcap(8) there. The kernel
> >> will automatically write a v3 xattr with the transient namespace's
> >> root user as nsroot.
>
> After a long gap, I have come back to the task of working up
> some text to describe file capability versioning and namespaced file
> capabilities.
>
> I still not convinced I've captured things correctly, and I still
> have a few questions (see below). But first, here's the text that
> I have so far (suggestions for improvements welcome). These changes
> have already been pushed to the Git repo.
>
> File capability mask versioning
> To allow extensibility, the kernel supports a scheme to encode
> a version number inside the security.capability extended
> attribute that is used to implement file capabilities. These
> version numbers are internal to the implementation, and not
> directly visible to user-space applications. To date, the fol?
> lowing versions are supported:
>
> VFS_CAP_REVISION_1
> This was the original file capability implementation,
> which supported 32-bit masks for file capabilities.
>
> VFS_CAP_REVISION_2 (since Linux 2.6.25)
> This version allows for file capability masks that are
> 64 bits in size, and was necessary as the number of sup?
> ported capabilities grew beyond 32. The kernel trans?
> parently continues to support the execution of files
> that have 32-bit version 1 capability masks, but when
> adding capabilities to files that did not previously
> have capabilities, or modifying the capabilities of
> existing files, it automatically uses the version 2
> scheme (or possibly the version 3 scheme, as described
> below).
>
> VFS_CAP_REVISION_3 (since Linux 4.14)
> Version 3 file capabilities are provided to support
> namespaced file capabilities (described below).
>
> As with version 2 file capabilities, version 3 capabil?
> ity masks are 64 bits in size. But in addition, the
> root user ID of namespace is encoded in the secu?
> rity.capability extended attribute. (A namespace's root
> user ID is the value that user ID 0 inside that names?
> pace maps to in the initial user namespace.)
>
> ["namespace root user ID" is my term for what Serge called nsroot.
> I think it's a little more meaningful, but I am also open to suggestions
> for a better term.]
"mapped root ID" maybe?
>
> Version 3 file capabilities are designed to coexist with
> version 2 capabilities; that is, on a modern Linux sys?
> tem, there may be some files with version 2 capabilities
> while others have version 3 capabilities.
>
> Before Linux 4.14, the only kind of capability mask that could
> be attached to a file was a VFS_CAP_REVISION_2 mask. Since
> Linux 4.14, the version of the capability mask that is attached
> to a file depends on the circumstances in which the secu?
> rity.capability extended attribute was created.
>
> Starting with Linux 4.14, a security.capability extended
> attribute is automatically created as (or converted to) a ver?
> sion 3 (VFS_CAP_REVISION_3) attribute if both of the following
> are true:
>
> (1) The thread writing the attribute resides in a noninitial
> namespace. (More precisely: the thread resides in a user
> namespace other than the one from which the underlying
> filesystem was mounted.)
>
> (2) The thread has the CAP_SETFCAP capability over the file
> inode, meaning that (a) the thread has the CAP_SETFCAP
> capability in its own user namespace; and (b) the UID and
> GID of the file inode have mappings in the writer's user
> namespace.
>
> ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
> ?FIXME ?
> ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
> ?Does there also need to be some kind of credential ?
> ?match between the file and the namespace creator ?
> ?UID? ?
> ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
>
> When a VFS_CAP_REVISION_3 security.capability extended
> attribute is created, the root user ID of the creating thread's
Importantly, that is only when a V3 is *automatically* created to replace
a V2. When a V3 is written, then the .rootid in the V3 is (mapped and)
written as specified.
For instance, root in a namespace can write a V3 xattr that only holds true
in a child namespace where its uid 100k (which could be 200k in the initial
userns) is mapped to root.
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-04-20 0:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-09 18:52 [manpages PATCH] capabilities.7: describe namespaced file capabilities Serge E. Hallyn
2018-01-14 9:40 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2018-01-15 4:31 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-01-16 17:26 ` Jann Horn
2018-01-16 17:38 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-01-17 23:44 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2018-04-13 19:29 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2018-04-15 19:22 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-04-22 16:46 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2018-04-23 17:57 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-04-24 15:13 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-13 19:26 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2018-04-16 14:10 ` Jann Horn
2018-04-19 23:57 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-05-04 15:10 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2018-04-20 0:04 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
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