From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: gorcunov@gmail.com (Cyrill Gorcunov) Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2018 21:39:53 +0300 Subject: Leaking path for set_task_comm In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20180925183953.GI15710@uranus> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org On Tue, Sep 25, 2018 at 01:27:08PM -0400, Tong Zhang wrote: > Kernel Version: 4.18.5 > > Problem Description: > > When using prctl(PR_SET_NAME) to set the thread name, it is checked by security_task_prctl. > > We discovered a leaking path that can also use method implemented in > fs/proc/base.c:1526 comm_write(), to do similar thing without asking LSM?s decision. I don't understand how it is a problem. Could you please explain? procfs/comm is created with S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR permissions. So prctl and procfs are simply different interfaces.