From: casey.schaufler@intel.com (Casey Schaufler)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 2/5] Smack: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 13:34:43 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180926203446.2004-3-casey.schaufler@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180926203446.2004-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com>
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
A ptrace access check with mode PTRACE_MODE_SCHED gets called
from process switching code. This precludes the use of audit,
as the locking is incompatible. Don't do audit in the PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
case.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 340fc30ad85d..ffa95bcab599 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -422,7 +422,8 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
struct task_smack *tsp;
struct smack_known *tracer_known;
- if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
+ if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0 &&
+ (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) == 0) {
smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
saip = &ad;
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-26 20:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-26 20:34 [PATCH v5 0/5] LSM: Support ptrace sidechannel access checks Casey Schaufler
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 1/5] AppArmor: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED Casey Schaufler
2018-09-26 21:16 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-26 21:18 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-26 22:47 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-26 20:34 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2018-09-26 21:30 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] Smack: " Jann Horn
2018-09-26 22:53 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-26 22:58 ` Jann Horn
2018-10-04 7:47 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-10-04 11:36 ` Jann Horn
2018-10-16 11:44 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] SELinux: " Casey Schaufler
2018-09-27 15:50 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-27 16:23 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] Capability: Complete PTRACE_MODE_SCHED Casey Schaufler
2018-09-26 21:26 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-26 22:24 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 5/5] sidechannel: Linux Security Module for sidechannel Casey Schaufler
2018-09-27 21:45 ` James Morris
2018-09-27 22:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-27 22:47 ` James Morris
2018-09-27 23:19 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-27 23:43 ` James Morris
2018-09-27 23:47 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-28 16:33 ` James Morris
2018-09-28 17:40 ` Schaufler, Casey
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