From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: casey.schaufler@intel.com (Casey Schaufler) Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 13:34:45 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v5 4/5] Capability: Complete PTRACE_MODE_SCHED In-Reply-To: <20180926203446.2004-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com> References: <20180926203446.2004-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com> Message-ID: <20180926203446.2004-5-casey.schaufler@intel.com> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org From: Casey Schaufler Allow a complete ptrace access check with mode PTRACE_MODE_SCHED. Disable the inappropriate privilege check in the capability code that does incompatible locking. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- kernel/ptrace.c | 2 -- security/commoncap.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 99cfddde6a55..0b6a9df51c3b 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -331,8 +331,6 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode))) return -EPERM; - if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) - return 0; return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode); } diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 2e489d6a3ac8..e77457110d05 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns && cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps)) goto out; + if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) + goto out; if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto out; ret = -EPERM; -- 2.17.1