From: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
casey.schaufler@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
deneen.t.dock@intel.com, kristen@linux.intel.com,
arjan@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v6 0/5] LSM: Support ptrace sidechannel access checks
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 11:04:59 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181105190504.500-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com> (raw)
V6: Based on Tim Chen's "[Patch v4 00/18] Provide process property
based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection*"
patch set.
v5: Revamped to match Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Harden spectrev2 userspace-userspace protection v7
Fixed locking issues in the LSM code.
Dropped the new LSM hook and use a ptrace hook instead.
v4: select namespace checks if user namespaces are enabled
and credential checks are request.
v3: get_task_cred wasn't a good choice due to refcounts.
Use lower level protection instead
v2: SELinux access policy corrected.
Use real_cred instead of cred.
This patchset provide a mechanism by which a security module
can advise the system about potential side-channel vulnerabilities.
The existing security modules have been updated to avoid locking
issues in the face of PTRACE_MODE_SCHED. A new security
module is provided to make determinations regarding task attributes
including namespaces.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +++
kernel/ptrace.c | 2 -
security/Kconfig | 1 +
security/Makefile | 2 +
security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/ipc.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/ipc.c | 8 ++--
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 5 ++-
security/commoncap.c | 3 +-
security/security.c | 1 +
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +
security/sidechannel/Kconfig | 13 ++++++
security/sidechannel/Makefile | 1 +
security/sidechannel/sidechannel.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 +-
15 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
next reply other threads:[~2018-11-05 19:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-05 19:04 Casey Schaufler [this message]
2018-11-05 19:05 ` [PATCH v6 1/5] AppArmor: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED Casey Schaufler
2018-11-05 19:05 ` [PATCH v6 2/5] Smack: " Casey Schaufler
2018-11-05 19:05 ` [PATCH v6 3/5] SELinux: " Casey Schaufler
2018-11-05 19:05 ` [PATCH v6 4/5] Capability: Complete PTRACE_MODE_SCHED Casey Schaufler
2018-11-05 19:05 ` [PATCH v6 5/5] sidechannel: Linux Security Module for sidechannel Casey Schaufler
2018-11-05 19:52 ` Randy Dunlap
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