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From: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	casey.schaufler@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
	deneen.t.dock@intel.com, kristen@linux.intel.com,
	arjan@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v6 4/5] Capability: Complete PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
Date: Mon,  5 Nov 2018 11:05:03 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181105190504.500-5-casey.schaufler@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181105190504.500-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com>

From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Allow a complete ptrace access check with mode PTRACE_MODE_SCHED.
Disable the inappropriate privilege check in the capability code
that does incompatible locking.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
---
 kernel/ptrace.c      | 2 --
 security/commoncap.c | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 99cfddde6a55..0b6a9df51c3b 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -331,8 +331,6 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
 	     !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
 	    return -EPERM;
 
-	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED)
-		return 0;
 	return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 2e489d6a3ac8..70a7e3d19c16 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -152,7 +152,8 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 	if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
 	    cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps))
 		goto out;
-	if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+	if (!(mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) &&
+	    ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
 		goto out;
 	ret = -EPERM;
 out:
-- 
2.17.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-11-05 19:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-05 19:04 [PATCH v6 0/5] LSM: Support ptrace sidechannel access checks Casey Schaufler
2018-11-05 19:05 ` [PATCH v6 1/5] AppArmor: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED Casey Schaufler
2018-11-05 19:05 ` [PATCH v6 2/5] Smack: " Casey Schaufler
2018-11-05 19:05 ` [PATCH v6 3/5] SELinux: " Casey Schaufler
2018-11-05 19:05 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2018-11-05 19:05 ` [PATCH v6 5/5] sidechannel: Linux Security Module for sidechannel Casey Schaufler
2018-11-05 19:52   ` Randy Dunlap

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