From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A2E81C41537 for ; Tue, 20 Nov 2018 23:12:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6C4132147A for ; Tue, 20 Nov 2018 23:12:28 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 6C4132147A Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725903AbeKUJoF (ORCPT ); Wed, 21 Nov 2018 04:44:05 -0500 Received: from mga11.intel.com ([192.55.52.93]:6210 "EHLO mga11.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725889AbeKUJoF (ORCPT ); Wed, 21 Nov 2018 04:44:05 -0500 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga002.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.26]) by fmsmga102.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 20 Nov 2018 15:12:27 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.56,258,1539673200"; d="scan'208";a="106326623" Received: from drhumphr-mobl.ger.corp.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.249.254.165]) by fmsmga002.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 20 Nov 2018 15:12:23 -0800 Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 01:12:22 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: James Bottomley Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, monty.wiseman@ge.com, Monty Wiseman , Matthew Garrett Subject: Re: Documenting the proposal for TPM 2.0 security in the face of bus interposer attacks Message-ID: <20181120231222.GH8391@linux.intel.com> References: <1542648844.2910.9.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <20181120111049.GC14594@linux.intel.com> <1542734581.2814.28.camel@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1542734581.2814.28.camel@HansenPartnership.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 09:23:01AM -0800, James Bottomley wrote: > On Tue, 2018-11-20 at 13:10 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > [...] > > This is basically rewrite of TPM genie paper with extras. just > > shorten it to include the proposed architecture and point to the TPM > > Genie paper (which is not in the references at all ATM). > > I really don't think so. The paper only gives details of bound > authorization sessions for TPM 2.0 which suffer from no to weak entropy > problems. The reason for using salted ones in the document, which > aren't mentioned at all in the genie paper, is so we have a high > entropy cryptographically unguessable HMAC and encryption key. Point taken. I will re-read the paper with care as soon as I have time and give better feedback. > Only if you have some type of security seal, which most laptops don't > have. Agreed went over the top on this one. /Jarkko