From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2828FC43441 for ; Wed, 21 Nov 2018 09:14:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ED4A321479 for ; Wed, 21 Nov 2018 09:14:42 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org ED4A321479 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729247AbeKUTsX (ORCPT ); Wed, 21 Nov 2018 14:48:23 -0500 Received: from mga09.intel.com ([134.134.136.24]:7169 "EHLO mga09.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726665AbeKUTsW (ORCPT ); Wed, 21 Nov 2018 14:48:22 -0500 X-Amp-Result: UNSCANNABLE X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 21 Nov 2018 01:14:41 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.56,260,1539673200"; d="scan'208";a="88095330" Received: from ncanderx-mobl.ger.corp.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.249.254.86]) by fmsmga008.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 21 Nov 2018 01:14:37 -0800 Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 11:14:35 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Jason Gunthorpe Cc: James Bottomley , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, monty.wiseman@ge.com, Monty Wiseman , Matthew Garrett Subject: Re: Documenting the proposal for TPM 2.0 security in the face of bus interposer attacks Message-ID: <20181121091435.GA10223@linux.intel.com> References: <1542648844.2910.9.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <20181120111049.GC14594@linux.intel.com> <20181120124116.GA8813@linux.intel.com> <1542734743.2814.31.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <20181120231320.GI8391@linux.intel.com> <20181121054201.GB17002@ziepe.ca> <20181121071819.GD3640@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20181121071819.GD3640@linux.intel.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 09:18:19AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 10:42:01PM -0700, Jason Gunthorpe wrote: > > > Why you wouldn't use DMA to spy the RAM? > > > > The platform has to use IOMMU to prevent improper DMA access from > > places like PCI-E slots if you are using measured boot and want to > > defend against HW tampering. > > Yes. This is what I wanted to point out. Windows 10 has VBS to > achieve something like this. > > https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-vbs Some trials like Qubes are in existence (uses Xen). I've been thinking should Linux have a thin hypervisor solely for VBS like use in order to gain wider adoption. /Jarkko