From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_NEOMUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EC0C2C04EB8 for ; Tue, 4 Dec 2018 09:46:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BEE8B2082D for ; Tue, 4 Dec 2018 09:46:54 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org BEE8B2082D Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725770AbeLDJqy (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Dec 2018 04:46:54 -0500 Received: from mga17.intel.com ([192.55.52.151]:33153 "EHLO mga17.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725613AbeLDJqy (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Dec 2018 04:46:54 -0500 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by fmsmga107.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 04 Dec 2018 01:46:53 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.56,313,1539673200"; d="scan'208";a="280782949" Received: from black.fi.intel.com ([10.237.72.28]) by orsmga005.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 04 Dec 2018 01:46:48 -0800 Received: by black.fi.intel.com (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 95A8D22D; Tue, 4 Dec 2018 11:46:47 +0200 (EET) Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 12:46:47 +0300 From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" To: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Alison Schofield , dhowells@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de, jmorris@namei.org, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com, jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/13] Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME) Message-ID: <20181204094647.tjsvwjgp3zq6yqce@black.fi.intel.com> References: <20181204092550.GT11614@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20181204092550.GT11614@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> User-Agent: NeoMutt/20170714-126-deb55f (1.8.3) Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: On Tue, Dec 04, 2018 at 09:25:50AM +0000, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Mon, Dec 03, 2018 at 11:39:47PM -0800, Alison Schofield wrote: > > (Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption) > > I think that MKTME is a horrible name, and doesn't appear to accurately > describe what it does either. Specifically the 'total' seems out of > place, it doesn't require all memory to be encrypted. MKTME implies TME. TME is enabled by BIOS and it encrypts all memory with CPU-generated key. MKTME allows to use other keys or disable encryption for a page. But, yes, name is not good. -- Kirill A. Shutemov