From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.5 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0489FC169C4 for ; Tue, 29 Jan 2019 20:43:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D25802087E for ; Tue, 29 Jan 2019 20:43:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727630AbfA2UnJ (ORCPT ); Tue, 29 Jan 2019 15:43:09 -0500 Received: from mga02.intel.com ([134.134.136.20]:35531 "EHLO mga02.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726945AbfA2UnJ (ORCPT ); Tue, 29 Jan 2019 15:43:09 -0500 X-Amp-Result: UNSCANNABLE X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga007.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.58]) by orsmga101.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 29 Jan 2019 12:43:08 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.56,538,1539673200"; d="scan'208";a="110815225" Received: from rkazants-mobl.ccr.corp.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.249.254.212]) by orsmga007.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 29 Jan 2019 12:43:01 -0800 Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 22:43:07 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Roberto Sassu , dhowells@redhat.com, James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, david.safford@ge.com, monty.wiseman@ge.com, matthewgarrett@google.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, silviu.vlasceanu@huawei.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 6/7] KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip() Message-ID: <20190129204307.GE11615@linux.intel.com> References: <20190124154910.29948-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> <20190124154910.29948-7-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190124154910.29948-7-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 04:49:09PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > When crypto agility support will be added to the TPM driver, users of the > driver have to retrieve the allocated banks from chip->allocated_banks and > use this information to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures to be > passed to tpm_pcr_extend(). > > This patch retrieves a tpm_chip pointer from tpm_default_chip() so that the > pointer can be used to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures. > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu > --- > security/keys/trusted.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- > 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c > index 4d98f4f87236..1a20a9692fef 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted.c > +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c > @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ > > static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)"; > static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1"; > +static struct tpm_chip *chip; > > struct sdesc { > struct shash_desc shash; > @@ -362,7 +363,7 @@ int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen) > int rc; > > dump_tpm_buf(cmd); > - rc = tpm_send(NULL, cmd, buflen); > + rc = tpm_send(chip, cmd, buflen); > dump_tpm_buf(cmd); > if (rc > 0) > /* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */ > @@ -384,10 +385,10 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) > > if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > return -EPERM; > - ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); > + ret = tpm_get_random(chip, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); > if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) > return ret; > - return tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0; > + return tpm_pcr_extend(chip, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0; > } > > /* > @@ -400,7 +401,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, > unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; > int ret; > > - ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); > + ret = tpm_get_random(chip, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); > if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) > return ret; > > @@ -496,7 +497,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, > if (ret < 0) > goto out; > > - ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); > + ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); > if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) > goto out; > ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL); > @@ -606,7 +607,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, > > ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); > keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE); > - ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); > + ret = tpm_get_random(chip, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); > if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) { > pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); > return ret; > @@ -751,7 +752,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > int i; > int tpm2; > > - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL); > + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); > if (tpm2 < 0) > return tpm2; > > @@ -920,7 +921,7 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) > struct trusted_key_options *options; > int tpm2; > > - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL); > + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); > if (tpm2 < 0) > return NULL; > > @@ -970,7 +971,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, > size_t key_len; > int tpm2; > > - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL); > + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); > if (tpm2 < 0) > return tpm2; > > @@ -1011,7 +1012,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, > switch (key_cmd) { > case Opt_load: > if (tpm2) > - ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(NULL, payload, options); > + ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); > else > ret = key_unseal(payload, options); > dump_payload(payload); > @@ -1021,13 +1022,13 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, > break; > case Opt_new: > key_len = payload->key_len; > - ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, payload->key, key_len); > + ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len); > if (ret != key_len) { > pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); > goto out; > } > if (tpm2) > - ret = tpm_seal_trusted(NULL, payload, options); > + ret = tpm_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); > else > ret = key_seal(payload, options); > if (ret < 0) > @@ -1225,17 +1226,26 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void) > { > int ret; > > + chip = tpm_default_chip(); > + if (!chip) > + return -ENOENT; > ret = trusted_shash_alloc(); > if (ret < 0) > - return ret; > + goto out_put; > ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); > if (ret < 0) > - trusted_shash_release(); > + goto out_release; > + return 0; > +out_release: > + trusted_shash_release(); > +out_put: > + put_device(&chip->dev); > return ret; > } Since the labels are *only* used for exception fallbacks, I'd prefer err_release and err_put. Other than that, LGTM. Unrelated side-note: I think the TPM subsystem starts to be soon in a shape that TPM 2.0 trusted keys code could be eventually moved to security/keys/trusted2.c, and TPM 1.2 trusted keys code could start to use tpm_buf to build its commands. /Jarkko