linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org,
	david.safford@ge.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
	silviu.vlasceanu@huawei.com, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: defer execution of TPM-specific code until key instantiate
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 16:56:19 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190325145619.GC29989@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190322180139.18856-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 07:01:39PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> Commit 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from
> tpm_default_chip()") changed the tpm_chip argument of every TPM function
> from NULL to a pointer that is retrieved at module initialization time.
> 
> Unlike before this patch, the trusted module cannot be loaded if no TPM is
> available. Unfortunately, this causes a dependency problem because the
> encrypted key type requires the 'key_type_trusted' symbol when
> CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS is defined.
> 
> This patch fixes the issue by deferring the execution of TPM-specific code
> until a new trusted key is instantiated: init_tpm(), to obtain a tpm_chip
> pointer; init_digests(), introduced by commit 0b6cf6b97b7e ("tpm: pass an
> array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()"), to get random
> bytes from the TPM to lock a PCR.
> 
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip()")
> Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

Definitive NAK for the release. Sorting out the dependency problem is
definitely out of scope for v5.1.

/Jarkko

      parent reply	other threads:[~2019-03-25 14:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-22 18:01 [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: defer execution of TPM-specific code until key instantiate Roberto Sassu
2019-03-22 18:49 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-25 14:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20190325145619.GC29989@linux.intel.com \
    --to=jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
    --cc=david.safford@ge.com \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=jejb@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=roberto.sassu@huawei.com \
    --cc=silviu.vlasceanu@huawei.com \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).