From: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
To: jmorris@namei.org, keescook@chromium.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Subject: [PATCH 09/10] LSM: SafeSetID: verify transitive constrainedness
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 09:56:19 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190410165619.212464-1-mortonm@chromium.org> (raw)
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Someone might write a ruleset like the following, expecting that it
securely constrains UID 1 to UIDs 1, 2 and 3:
1:2
1:3
However, because no constraints are applied to UIDs 2 and 3, an attacker
with UID 1 can simply first switch to UID 2, then switch to any UID from
there. The secure way to write this ruleset would be:
1:2
1:3
2:2
3:3
, which uses "transition to self" as a way to inhibit the default-allow
policy without allowing anything specific.
This is somewhat unintuitive. To make sure that policy authors don't
accidentally write insecure policies because of this, let the kernel verify
that a new ruleset does not contain any entries that are constrained, but
transitively unconstrained.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
---
security/safesetid/securityfs.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++
.../selftests/safesetid/safesetid-test.c | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c
index 7a08fff2bc14..3ec64487f0e9 100644
--- a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c
+++ b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c
@@ -77,6 +77,23 @@ static void release_ruleset(struct setuid_ruleset *pol)
call_rcu(&pol->rcu, __release_ruleset);
}
+static int verify_ruleset(struct setuid_ruleset *pol)
+{
+ int bucket;
+ struct setuid_rule *rule;
+
+ hash_for_each(pol->rules, bucket, rule, next) {
+ if (_setuid_policy_lookup(pol, rule->dst_uid, INVALID_UID) ==
+ SIDPOL_DEFAULT) {
+ pr_warn("insecure policy rejected: uid %d is constrained but transitively unconstrained through uid %d\n",
+ __kuid_val(rule->src_uid),
+ __kuid_val(rule->dst_uid));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static ssize_t handle_policy_update(struct file *file,
const char __user *ubuf, size_t len)
{
@@ -139,6 +156,10 @@ static ssize_t handle_policy_update(struct file *file,
goto out_free_buf;
}
+ err = verify_ruleset(pol);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free_buf;
+
/*
* Everything looks good, apply the policy and release the old one.
* What we really want here is an xchg() wrapper for RCU, but since that
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/safesetid/safesetid-test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/safesetid/safesetid-test.c
index 4f03813d1911..8f40c6ecdad1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/safesetid/safesetid-test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/safesetid/safesetid-test.c
@@ -144,7 +144,9 @@ static void write_policies(void)
{
static char *policy_str =
"1:2\n"
- "1:3\n";
+ "1:3\n"
+ "2:2\n"
+ "3:3\n";
ssize_t written;
int fd;
--
2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog
next reply other threads:[~2019-04-10 16:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-10 16:56 Micah Morton [this message]
2019-04-10 17:28 ` [PATCH 09/10] LSM: SafeSetID: verify transitive constrainedness Kees Cook
2019-04-10 17:36 ` Jann Horn
2019-04-10 18:17 ` Kees Cook
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