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From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
To: <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>, <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<silviu.vlasceanu@huawei.com>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	<stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/3] evm: check hash algorithm passed to init_desc()
Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 15:30:33 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190529133035.28724-2-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190529133035.28724-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

This patch prevents memory access beyond the evm_tfm array by checking the
validity of the index (hash algorithm) passed to init_desc(). The hash
algorithm can be arbitrarily set if the security.ima xattr type is not
EVM_XATTR_HMAC.

Fixes: 5feeb61183dde ("evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index e11564eb645b..82a38e801ee4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
 		tfm = &hmac_tfm;
 		algo = evm_hmac;
 	} else {
+		if (hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
 		tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo];
 		algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo];
 	}
-- 
2.17.1


  reply	other threads:[~2019-05-29 13:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-29 13:30 [PATCH v2 0/3] ima/evm fixes for v5.2 Roberto Sassu
2019-05-29 13:30 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2019-05-30 11:53   ` [PATCH v2 1/3] evm: check hash algorithm passed to init_desc() Mimi Zohar
2019-05-29 13:30 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] ima: don't ignore INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN EVM status Roberto Sassu
2019-05-30 12:00   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-06-03  9:25     ` Roberto Sassu
2019-06-03 12:48       ` Mimi Zohar
2019-06-03 13:43       ` James Bottomley
2019-06-03 14:24         ` Chuck Lever
2019-06-03 14:29         ` Roberto Sassu
2019-06-03 14:31           ` James Bottomley
2019-06-03 14:44             ` Roberto Sassu
2019-06-04  8:57               ` James Bottomley
2019-05-29 13:30 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] ima: show rules with IMA_INMASK correctly Roberto Sassu
2019-05-30 11:53   ` Mimi Zohar

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