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There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- include/linux/security.h | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-- kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 ++- kernel/auditsc.c | 13 +++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++-- security/security.c | 48 ++--------------------------- 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index fb19f41d630b..ea2c6c4e88db 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -93,6 +93,45 @@ static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l) memset(l, 0, sizeof(*l)); } +/** + * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export + * @data: the containing data structure + * @secid: where to put the one that matters. + * + * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done. + */ +static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid) +{ + switch (data->flags) { + case LSM_EXPORT_NONE: + *secid = 0; + break; + case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX: + *secid = data->selinux; + break; + case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK: + *secid = data->smack; + break; + case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR: + *secid = data->apparmor; + break; + default: + pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__, + data->flags); + *secid = 0; + break; + } +} + +static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid) +{ + data->selinux = secid; + data->smack = secid; + data->apparmor = secid; + data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK | + LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR; +} + /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, unsigned int opts); @@ -1712,7 +1751,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op, + void *lsmrule); void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); #else @@ -1728,8 +1768,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) return 0; } -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void *lsmrule) +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, + u32 op, void *lsmrule) { return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 63f8b3f26fab..15771102919d 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1324,6 +1324,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; pid_t pid; u32 sid; + struct lsm_export le; switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_PID: @@ -1354,7 +1355,8 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: if (f->lsm_rule) { security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, + lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match(&le, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); } break; diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index d1eab1d4a930..822ba35e4e64 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; u32 sid; + struct lsm_export le; unsigned int sessionid; cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); @@ -630,7 +631,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); need_sid = 0; } - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, + lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match(&le, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); } @@ -645,15 +647,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, if (f->lsm_rule) { /* Find files that match */ if (name) { + lsm_export_to_all(&le, name->osid); result = security_audit_rule_match( - name->osid, + &le, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + lsm_export_to_all(&le, n->osid); if (security_audit_rule_match( - n->osid, + &le, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule)) { @@ -665,7 +669,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, /* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) break; - if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, + lsm_export_to_all(&le, ctx->ipc.osid); + if (security_audit_rule_match(&le, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule)) ++result; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index e0cc323f948f..090ef8ceb116 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { int rc = 0; u32 osid; + struct lsm_export le; int retried = 0; if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) @@ -337,7 +338,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); - rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid, + lsm_export_to_all(&le, osid); + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule); @@ -345,7 +347,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid, + lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid); + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 1645ebe06715..1e819ecf26ff 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -712,45 +712,6 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb) RC; \ }) -/** - * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export - * @data: the containing data structure - * @secid: where to put the one that matters. - * - * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done. - */ -static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid) -{ - switch (data->flags) { - case LSM_EXPORT_NONE: - *secid = 0; - break; - case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX: - *secid = data->selinux; - break; - case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK: - *secid = data->smack; - break; - case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR: - *secid = data->apparmor; - break; - default: - pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__, - data->flags); - *secid = 0; - break; - } -} - -static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid) -{ - data->selinux = secid; - data->smack = secid; - data->apparmor = secid; - data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK | - LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR; -} - /* Security operations */ int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr) @@ -2482,14 +2443,11 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); } -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op, + void *lsmrule) { - int rc; - struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE }; - rc = call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, &data, field, op, lsmrule); - lsm_export_secid(&data, &secid); - return rc; + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, l, field, op, lsmrule); } #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ -- 2.19.1