From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 15/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 21:33:14 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201906182127.073A9D7@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190618230551.7475-16-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 04:05:41PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling
> which LSM security information is displayed for a process.
> The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable
> data may be written to "display" to set the value. The name of
> the LSM currently in use can be read from "display".
> At this point there can only be one LSM capable of display
> active.
>
> This affects /proc/.../attr/current and SO_PEERSEC.
What happened to creating /proc/$pid/lsm/$lsm_name/current for "modern"
LSM libraries to start using (instead of possibly fighting over the
/proc/$pid/attr/display)? (Obviously "display" is needed for "old"
libraries, and I'm fine with it.)
Similarly, is there something that can be done for SO_PEERSEC that
doesn't require using "display" for "modern" libraries?
-Kees
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
> security/security.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index ddef482f1334..7bf70e041315 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2618,6 +2618,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
> ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666),
> ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
> ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
> + ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666),
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
> DIR("smack", 0555,
> proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 46f6cf21d33c..9cfdc664239e 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -46,7 +46,9 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
> static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
>
> char *lsm_names;
> -static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lbs_task = sizeof(int),
> +};
>
> /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
> static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
> @@ -578,6 +580,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
> */
> static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
> {
> + int *display;
> +
> if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
> task->security = NULL;
> return 0;
> @@ -586,6 +590,10 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
> task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (task->security == NULL)
> return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + display = task->security;
> + *display = LSMDATA_INVALID;
> +
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -1574,14 +1582,27 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
>
> int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
> {
> + int *odisplay = current->security;
> + int *ndisplay;
> int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
>
> - if (rc)
> + if (unlikely(rc))
> return rc;
> +
> rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
> - if (unlikely(rc))
> + if (unlikely(rc)) {
> security_task_free(task);
> - return rc;
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + ndisplay = task->security;
> + if (ndisplay == NULL)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (odisplay != NULL)
> + *ndisplay = *odisplay;
> +
> + return 0;
> }
>
> void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> @@ -1967,10 +1988,28 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> char **value)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int *display = current->security;
> +
> + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx,
> + list) {
> + if (*display == LSMDATA_INVALID ||
> + hp->slot == *display) {
> + *value = kstrdup(hp->lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (*value)
> + return strlen(hp->lsm);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> + }
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
> if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
> continue;
> + if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMDATA_INVALID &&
> + *display != hp->slot)
> + continue;
> return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
> }
> return -EINVAL;
> @@ -1980,10 +2019,27 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> size_t size)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int *display = current->security;
> + int len;
> +
> + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx,
> + list) {
> + len = strlen(hp->lsm);
> + if (size >= len && !strncmp(value, hp->lsm, len)) {
> + *display = hp->slot;
> + return size;
> + }
> + }
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
> if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
> continue;
> + if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMDATA_INVALID &&
> + *display != hp->slot)
> + continue;
> return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
> }
> return -EINVAL;
> @@ -2002,38 +2058,41 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>
> int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> {
> + int *display = current->security;
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> - int rc;
>
> - hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
> - rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(l->secid[hp->slot],
> - secdata, seclen);
> - if (rc != 0)
> - return rc;
> - }
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list)
> + if (*display == LSMDATA_INVALID || *display == hp->slot)
> + return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(l->secid[hp->slot],
> + secdata, seclen);
> return 0;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
>
> int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, struct lsmblob *l)
> {
> + int *display = current->security;
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> - int rc;
>
> lsmblob_init(l, 0);
> - hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
> - rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> - &l->secid[hp->slot]);
> - if (rc != 0)
> - return rc;
> - }
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list)
> + if (*display == LSMDATA_INVALID || *display == hp->slot)
> + return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> + &l->secid[hp->slot]);
> return 0;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
>
> void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
> {
> - call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
> + int *display = current->security;
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
> + if (*display == LSMDATA_INVALID || *display == hp->slot) {
> + hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> + return;
> + }
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
>
> @@ -2158,8 +2217,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
> int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
> - optval, optlen, len);
> + int *display = current->security;
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
> + list)
> + if (*display == LSMDATA_INVALID || *display == hp->slot)
> + return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
> + optlen, len);
> + return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> }
>
> int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> --
> 2.20.1
>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-19 4:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-18 23:05 [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 01/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 02/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 03/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 04/25] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 4:52 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-19 6:17 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-19 16:34 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 05/25] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 4:55 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 06/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 07/25] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 4:59 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-19 16:42 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 08/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 09/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 5:03 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 10/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 11/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 12/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 13/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 5:11 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 14/25] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 15/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 4:33 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-06-19 15:33 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 5:28 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-19 17:00 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 16/25] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 5:34 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-19 17:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 17/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 5:36 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 18/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 5:41 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-19 17:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-20 17:25 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 19/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 20/25] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 21/25] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 22/25] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 23/25] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 24/25] Fix slotted list and getpeersec_d Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 5:50 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-19 17:36 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 25/25] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 4:34 ` [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Kees Cook
2019-06-19 15:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 20:08 ` James Morris
2019-06-20 17:33 ` Stacked LSMs (was Re: [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor) Kees Cook
2019-06-22 14:15 ` Mickaël Salaün
2019-06-19 5:21 ` [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Kees Cook
2019-06-19 16:48 ` Casey Schaufler
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=201906182127.073A9D7@keescook \
--to=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=casey.schaufler@intel.com \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp \
--cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).