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[198.145.64.163]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id l1sm15844192pgi.91.2019.06.18.21.33.15 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Tue, 18 Jun 2019 21:33:15 -0700 (PDT) Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 21:33:14 -0700 From: Kees Cook To: Casey Schaufler Cc: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 15/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Message-ID: <201906182127.073A9D7@keescook> References: <20190618230551.7475-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> <20190618230551.7475-16-casey@schaufler-ca.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190618230551.7475-16-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 04:05:41PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: > Create a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling > which LSM security information is displayed for a process. > The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable > data may be written to "display" to set the value. The name of > the LSM currently in use can be read from "display". > At this point there can only be one LSM capable of display > active. > > This affects /proc/.../attr/current and SO_PEERSEC. What happened to creating /proc/$pid/lsm/$lsm_name/current for "modern" LSM libraries to start using (instead of possibly fighting over the /proc/$pid/attr/display)? (Obviously "display" is needed for "old" libraries, and I'm fine with it.) Similarly, is there something that can be done for SO_PEERSEC that doesn't require using "display" for "modern" libraries? -Kees > > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler > --- > fs/proc/base.c | 1 + > security/security.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- > 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c > index ddef482f1334..7bf70e041315 100644 > --- a/fs/proc/base.c > +++ b/fs/proc/base.c > @@ -2618,6 +2618,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { > ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666), > ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666), > ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666), > + ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666), > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK > DIR("smack", 0555, > proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops), > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 46f6cf21d33c..9cfdc664239e 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -46,7 +46,9 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; > static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; > > char *lsm_names; > -static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init; > +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { > + .lbs_task = sizeof(int), > +}; > > /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ > static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order; > @@ -578,6 +580,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) > */ > static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) > { > + int *display; > + > if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) { > task->security = NULL; > return 0; > @@ -586,6 +590,10 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) > task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL); > if (task->security == NULL) > return -ENOMEM; > + > + display = task->security; > + *display = LSMDATA_INVALID; > + > return 0; > } > > @@ -1574,14 +1582,27 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file) > > int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) > { > + int *odisplay = current->security; > + int *ndisplay; > int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); > > - if (rc) > + if (unlikely(rc)) > return rc; > + > rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags); > - if (unlikely(rc)) > + if (unlikely(rc)) { > security_task_free(task); > - return rc; > + return rc; > + } > + > + ndisplay = task->security; > + if (ndisplay == NULL) > + return 0; > + > + if (odisplay != NULL) > + *ndisplay = *odisplay; > + > + return 0; > } > > void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) > @@ -1967,10 +1988,28 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, > char **value) > { > struct security_hook_list *hp; > + int *display = current->security; > + > + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) { > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, > + list) { > + if (*display == LSMDATA_INVALID || > + hp->slot == *display) { > + *value = kstrdup(hp->lsm, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (*value) > + return strlen(hp->lsm); > + return -ENOMEM; > + } > + } > + return -EINVAL; > + } > > hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { > if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) > continue; > + if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMDATA_INVALID && > + *display != hp->slot) > + continue; > return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); > } > return -EINVAL; > @@ -1980,10 +2019,27 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, > size_t size) > { > struct security_hook_list *hp; > + int *display = current->security; > + int len; > + > + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) { > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, > + list) { > + len = strlen(hp->lsm); > + if (size >= len && !strncmp(value, hp->lsm, len)) { > + *display = hp->slot; > + return size; > + } > + } > + return -EINVAL; > + } > > hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { > if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) > continue; > + if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMDATA_INVALID && > + *display != hp->slot) > + continue; > return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); > } > return -EINVAL; > @@ -2002,38 +2058,41 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); > > int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) > { > + int *display = current->security; > struct security_hook_list *hp; > - int rc; > > - hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) { > - rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(l->secid[hp->slot], > - secdata, seclen); > - if (rc != 0) > - return rc; > - } > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) > + if (*display == LSMDATA_INVALID || *display == hp->slot) > + return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(l->secid[hp->slot], > + secdata, seclen); > return 0; > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx); > > int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, struct lsmblob *l) > { > + int *display = current->security; > struct security_hook_list *hp; > - int rc; > > lsmblob_init(l, 0); > - hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) { > - rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen, > - &l->secid[hp->slot]); > - if (rc != 0) > - return rc; > - } > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) > + if (*display == LSMDATA_INVALID || *display == hp->slot) > + return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen, > + &l->secid[hp->slot]); > return 0; > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid); > > void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) > { > - call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen); > + int *display = current->security; > + struct security_hook_list *hp; > + > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list) > + if (*display == LSMDATA_INVALID || *display == hp->slot) { > + hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen); > + return; > + } > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); > > @@ -2158,8 +2217,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb); > int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, > int __user *optlen, unsigned len) > { > - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, > - optval, optlen, len); > + int *display = current->security; > + struct security_hook_list *hp; > + > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream, > + list) > + if (*display == LSMDATA_INVALID || *display == hp->slot) > + return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval, > + optlen, len); > + return -ENOPROTOOPT; > } > > int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, > -- > 2.20.1 > -- Kees Cook