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[198.145.64.163]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id e22sm16913923pgb.9.2019.06.18.21.55.57 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Tue, 18 Jun 2019 21:55:57 -0700 (PDT) Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 21:55:57 -0700 From: Kees Cook To: Casey Schaufler Cc: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 05/25] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Message-ID: <201906182154.E9766F5@keescook> References: <20190618230551.7475-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> <20190618230551.7475-6-casey@schaufler-ca.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190618230551.7475-6-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 04:05:31PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: > Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match > to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the > lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook. > > Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the > lsmblob instead of a u32. In some cases this requires a > temporary conversion using lsmblob_init() that will go > away when other interfaces get converted. I like this much better with the LSM-infrastructure "slot" logic. I do think it's be easier to read if the lsmblob instances were called "blob" instead of "le" and "l"... -Kees > > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler > --- > include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- > kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +++- > kernel/auditsc.c | 13 +++++++++---- > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++-- > security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- > 6 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 28d074866895..067fabc63e51 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -1757,7 +1757,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY > int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); > int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); > -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule); > +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *l, u32 field, u32 op, > + void *lsmrule); > void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); > > #else > @@ -1773,8 +1774,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) > return 0; > } > > -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, > - void *lsmrule) > +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *l, u32 field, > + u32 op, void *lsmrule) > { > return 0; > } > diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c > index 63f8b3f26fab..934ceae1ff70 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c > +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c > @@ -1324,6 +1324,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) > struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; > pid_t pid; > u32 sid; > + struct lsmblob le; > > switch (f->type) { > case AUDIT_PID: > @@ -1354,7 +1355,8 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) > case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: > if (f->lsm_rule) { > security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); > - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, > + lsmblob_init(&le, sid); > + result = security_audit_rule_match(&le, > f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); > } > break; > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > index d1eab1d4a930..93c74205ef40 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > @@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, > const struct cred *cred; > int i, need_sid = 1; > u32 sid; > + struct lsmblob le; > unsigned int sessionid; > > cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); > @@ -630,7 +631,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, > security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); > need_sid = 0; > } > - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, > + lsmblob_init(&le, sid); > + result = security_audit_rule_match(&le, f->type, > f->op, > f->lsm_rule); > } > @@ -645,15 +647,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, > if (f->lsm_rule) { > /* Find files that match */ > if (name) { > + lsmblob_init(&le, name->osid); > result = security_audit_rule_match( > - name->osid, > + &le, > f->type, > f->op, > f->lsm_rule); > } else if (ctx) { > list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { > + lsmblob_init(&le, n->osid); > if (security_audit_rule_match( > - n->osid, > + &le, > f->type, > f->op, > f->lsm_rule)) { > @@ -665,7 +669,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, > /* Find ipc objects that match */ > if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) > break; > - if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, > + lsmblob_init(&le, ctx->ipc.osid); > + if (security_audit_rule_match(&le, > f->type, f->op, > f->lsm_rule)) > ++result; > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > index d213e835c498..fe5e921d621d 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > @@ -307,8 +307,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, > return -EINVAL; > } > > -static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, > - void *lsmrule) > +static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *l, u32 field, > + u32 op, void *lsmrule) > { > return -EINVAL; > } > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index e0cc323f948f..ae525a89e07f 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, > for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { > int rc = 0; > u32 osid; > + struct lsmblob le; > int retried = 0; > > if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) > @@ -337,7 +338,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, > case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: > case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: > security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); > - rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid, > + lsmblob_init(&le, osid); > + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le, > rule->lsm[i].type, > Audit_equal, > rule->lsm[i].rule); > @@ -345,7 +347,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, > case LSM_SUBJ_USER: > case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: > case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: > - rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid, > + lsmblob_init(&le, secid); > + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le, > rule->lsm[i].type, > Audit_equal, > rule->lsm[i].rule); > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 5aa3c052d702..45541053df89 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -2447,9 +2447,19 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) > call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); > } > > -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) > +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *l, u32 field, u32 op, > + void *lsmrule) > { > - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule); > + struct security_hook_list *hp; > + int rc; > + > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) { > + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(l->secid[hp->slot], field, > + op, lsmrule); > + if (rc != 0) > + return rc; > + } > + return 0; > } > #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ > > -- > 2.20.1 > -- Kees Cook