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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] structleak: disable BYREF_ALL in combination with KASAN_STACK
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 10:35:56 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <201906201034.9E44D8A2A8@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190618094731.3677294-1-arnd@arndb.de>

On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 11:47:13AM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> The combination of KASAN_STACK and GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
> leads to much larger kernel stack usage, as seen from the warnings
> about functions that now exceed the 2048 byte limit:

Is the preference that this go into v5.2 (there's not much time left),
or should this be v5.3? (You didn't mark it as Cc: stable?)

> one. I picked the dependency in GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL, as
> this option is designed to make uninitialized stack usage less harmful
> when enabled on its own, but it also prevents KASAN from detecting those
> cases in which it was in fact needed.

Right -- there's not much sense in both being enabled. I'd agree with
this rationale.

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2019-06-20 17:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-18  9:47 [PATCH] structleak: disable BYREF_ALL in combination with KASAN_STACK Arnd Bergmann
2019-06-20 17:35 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-06-21  9:43   ` Arnd Bergmann
2019-06-21 13:32     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-06-21 13:44       ` Arnd Bergmann
2019-06-21 13:50         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-06-22 20:26           ` Kees Cook
2019-06-25 15:01             ` Ard Biesheuvel

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