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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
	paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
Date: Sat, 22 Jun 2019 16:12:02 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <201906221611.88844FB@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190621185233.6766-22-casey@schaufler-ca.com>

On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 11:52:30AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the audit code to store full lsmblob data instead of
> a single u32 secid. This allows for multiple security modules
> to use the audit system at the same time. It also allows the
> removal of scaffolding code that was included during the
> revision of LSM interfaces.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
>  kernel/audit.h   |  6 +++---
>  kernel/auditsc.c | 38 +++++++++++---------------------------
>  2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index 29e29c6f4afb..a8dd479e9556 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct audit_names {
>  	kuid_t			uid;
>  	kgid_t			gid;
>  	dev_t			rdev;
> -	u32			osid;
> +	struct lsmblob		olsm;
>  	struct audit_cap_data	fcap;
>  	unsigned int		fcap_ver;
>  	unsigned char		type;		/* record type */
> @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context {
>  	kuid_t		    target_auid;
>  	kuid_t		    target_uid;
>  	unsigned int	    target_sessionid;
> -	struct lsmblob   target_lsm;
> +	struct lsmblob	    target_lsm;
>  	char		    target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
>  
>  	struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
> @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ struct audit_context {
>  			kuid_t			uid;
>  			kgid_t			gid;
>  			umode_t			mode;
> -			u32			osid;
> +			struct lsmblob		olsm;
>  			int			has_perm;
>  			uid_t			perm_uid;
>  			gid_t			perm_gid;
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 0478680cd0a8..d3ad13f11788 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -646,17 +646,15 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  			if (f->lsm_rule) {
>  				/* Find files that match */
>  				if (name) {
> -					lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
>  					result = security_audit_rule_match(
> -								&blob,
> +								&name->olsm,
>  								f->type,
>  								f->op,
>  								f->lsm_rule);
>  				} else if (ctx) {
>  					list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> -						lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
>  						if (security_audit_rule_match(
> -								&blob,
> +								&n->olsm,
>  								f->type,
>  								f->op,
>  								f->lsm_rule)) {
> @@ -668,8 +666,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  				/* Find ipc objects that match */
>  				if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
>  					break;
> -				lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
> -				if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
> +				if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.olsm,
>  							      f->type, f->op,
>  							      f->lsm_rule))
>  					++result;
> @@ -1187,21 +1184,18 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>  				context->socketcall.args[i]);
>  		break; }
>  	case AUDIT_IPC: {
> -		u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
> +		struct lsmblob *olsm = &context->ipc.olsm;
>  
>  		audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
>  				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
>  				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
>  				 context->ipc.mode);
> -		if (osid) {
> +		if (lsmblob_is_set(olsm)) {
>  			struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> -			struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> -			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
> -				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);

Should this (and the other) audit_log_format() calls actually be
removed?

-Kees

> +			if (security_secid_to_secctx(olsm, &lsmcxt))
>  				*call_panic = 1;
> -			} else {
> +			else {
>  				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
>  				security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
>  			}
> @@ -1346,13 +1340,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
>  				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
>  				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
>  				 MINOR(n->rdev));
> -	if (n->osid != 0) {
> -		struct lsmblob blob;
> +	if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->olsm)) {
>  		struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>  
> -		lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
> -			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->olsm, &lsmctx)) {
>  			if (call_panic)
>  				*call_panic = 2;
>  		} else {
> @@ -1906,17 +1897,13 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
>  void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
>  		      struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
>  {
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
> -
>  	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
>  	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
>  	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
>  	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
>  	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
>  	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
> -	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding until osid is updated */
> -	name->osid = blob.secid[0];
> +	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->olsm);
>  	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
>  		name->fcap_ver = -1;
>  		return;
> @@ -2266,14 +2253,11 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
>  void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
>  {
>  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
>  	context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
>  	context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
>  	context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
> -	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding on the [0] - change "osid" to a lsmblob */
> -	context->ipc.osid = blob.secid[0];
> +	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.olsm);
>  	context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
>  }
>  
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2019-06-22 23:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-21 18:52 [PATCH v3 00/24] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 01/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 18:31   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 02/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 18:33   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 03/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 18:33   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 04/24] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:42   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:38   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 05/24] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:43   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:39   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 06/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:43   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:38   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 07/24] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:43   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:39   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 08/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:44   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:38   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 09/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:44   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:39   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 10/24] Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:48   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 16:39     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 17:20       ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 21:09       ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:39   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 11/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:49   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:40   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 12/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:49   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:40   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 13/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:50   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:40   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 14/24] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:51   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:40   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 15/24] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:51   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:48   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 16/24] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:52   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:46   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 17/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:52   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:46   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 18/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:54   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:46   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 19/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:56   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:46   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 20/24] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:57   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:47   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 23:12   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-06-24 21:33   ` John Johansen
2019-06-25  1:01     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-25  1:46       ` Paul Moore
2019-06-25  2:14         ` John Johansen
2019-06-25  2:42           ` Paul Moore
2019-06-25 15:30             ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 22/24] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 23:13   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:39     ` John Johansen
2019-06-24 21:50       ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:53       ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 21:47   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 23/24] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 23:15   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:44   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 24/24] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 23:15   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:45   ` John Johansen

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