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From: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com>
To: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] apparmor: fix unsigned len comparison with less than zero
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 14:09:04 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190627130904.4775-1-colin.king@canonical.com> (raw)

From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>

The sanity check in macro update_for_len checks to see if len
is less than zero, however, len is a size_t so it can never be
less than zero, so this sanity check is a no-op.  Fix this by
making len a ssize_t so the comparison will work and add ulen
that is a size_t copy of len so that the min() macro won't
throw warnings about comparing different types.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Macro compares unsigned to 0")
Fixes: f1bd904175e8 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/label.c | 12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c
index 59f1cc2557a7..42e849ccb4b5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/label.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/label.c
@@ -1458,11 +1458,13 @@ static inline bool use_label_hname(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label,
 /* helper macro for snprint routines */
 #define update_for_len(total, len, size, str)	\
 do {					\
+	size_t ulen = len;		\
+					\
 	AA_BUG(len < 0);		\
-	total += len;			\
-	len = min(len, size);		\
-	size -= len;			\
-	str += len;			\
+	total += ulen;			\
+	len = min(ulen, size);		\
+	size -= ulen;			\
+	str += ulen;			\
 } while (0)
 
 /**
@@ -1597,7 +1599,7 @@ int aa_label_snxprint(char *str, size_t size, struct aa_ns *ns,
 	struct aa_ns *prev_ns = NULL;
 	struct label_it i;
 	int count = 0, total = 0;
-	size_t len;
+	ssize_t len;
 
 	AA_BUG(!str && size != 0);
 	AA_BUG(!label);
-- 
2.20.1


                 reply	other threads:[~2019-06-27 13:09 UTC|newest]

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