From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.3 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0E10EC606D3 for ; Tue, 9 Jul 2019 01:03:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DBA062166E for ; Tue, 9 Jul 2019 01:03:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726279AbfGIBDQ (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Jul 2019 21:03:16 -0400 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:37831 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725935AbfGIBDP (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Jul 2019 21:03:15 -0400 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Jul 2019 18:03:15 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.63,468,1557212400"; d="scan'208";a="165614482" Received: from sjchrist-coffee.jf.intel.com (HELO linux.intel.com) ([10.54.74.165]) by fmsmga008.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 08 Jul 2019 18:03:15 -0700 Date: Mon, 8 Jul 2019 18:03:15 -0700 From: Sean Christopherson To: Cedric Xing Cc: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] x86/64: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module Message-ID: <20190709010314.GA24799@linux.intel.com> References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: On Sun, Jul 07, 2019 at 04:41:32PM -0700, Cedric Xing wrote: ... > @@ -575,6 +576,46 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr, > return ret; > } > > +static int sgx_encl_prepare_page(struct file *filp, unsigned long dst, > + unsigned long src, void *buf) > +{ > + struct vm_area_struct *vma; > + unsigned long prot; > + int rc; > + > + if (dst & ~PAGE_SIZE) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + rc = down_read_killable(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); > + if (rc) > + return rc; > + > + vma = find_vma(current->mm, dst); > + if (vma && dst >= vma->vm_start) > + prot = _calc_vm_trans(vma->vm_flags, VM_READ, PROT_READ) | > + _calc_vm_trans(vma->vm_flags, VM_WRITE, PROT_WRITE) | > + _calc_vm_trans(vma->vm_flags, VM_EXEC, PROT_EXEC); > + else > + prot = 0; > + > + vma = find_vma(current->mm, src); > + if (!vma || src < vma->vm_start || src + PAGE_SIZE > vma->vm_end) > + rc = -EFAULT; > + > + if (!rc && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC)) > + rc = -EACCES; Disallowing loading enclave *data* from a noexec file system is an arbitrary and weird restriction. > + > + if (!rc && copy_from_user(buf, (void __user *)src, PAGE_SIZE)) > + rc = -EFAULT; > + > + if (!rc) > + rc = security_enclave_load(filp, dst, PAGE_SIZE, prot, vma); > + > + up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); > + > + return rc; > +}