From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.3 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 202B8C73C59 for ; Tue, 9 Jul 2019 16:22:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EE30821707 for ; Tue, 9 Jul 2019 16:22:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726324AbfGIQWN (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Jul 2019 12:22:13 -0400 Received: from mga18.intel.com ([134.134.136.126]:54281 "EHLO mga18.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726133AbfGIQWL (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Jul 2019 12:22:11 -0400 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga006.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.20]) by orsmga106.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 09 Jul 2019 09:22:10 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.63,470,1557212400"; d="scan'208";a="364637562" Received: from mmaitert-mobl2.ger.corp.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.249.34.54]) by fmsmga006.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 09 Jul 2019 09:22:04 -0700 Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2019 19:22:03 +0300 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Sean Christopherson Cc: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, Bill Roberts , Casey Schaufler , James Morris , Dave Hansen , Cedric Xing , Andy Lutomirski , Jethro Beekman , "Dr . Greg Wettstein" , Stephen Smalley Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Message-ID: <20190709162203.gzyvulah5u7eksip@linux.intel.com> References: <20190619222401.14942-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> <20190705160549.tzsck5ho5kvtdhit@linux.intel.com> <20190708172930.GA20791@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190708172930.GA20791@linux.intel.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: NeoMutt/20180716 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: On Mon, Jul 08, 2019 at 10:29:30AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > On Fri, Jul 05, 2019 at 07:05:49PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Wed, Jun 19, 2019 at 03:23:49PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > > > I still don't get why we need this whole mess and do not simply admit > > that there are two distinct roles: > > > > 1. Creator > > 2. User > > Because SELinux has existing concepts of EXECMEM and EXECMOD. What is the official documentation for those? I've only found some explanations from discussions and some RHEL sysadmin guides. > That being said, we can do so without functional changes to the SGX uapi, > e.g. add reserved fields so that the initial uapi can be extended *if* we > decide to go with the "userspace provides maximal protections" path, and > use the EPCM permissions as the maximal protections for the initial > upstreaming. > > That'd give us a minimal implemenation for initial upstreaming and would > eliminate Cedric's blocking complaint. The "whole mess" of whitelisting, > blacklisting and SGX2 support would be deferred until post-upstreaming. I'd like that approach more too. /Jarkko