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Date:   Thu, 1 Aug 2019 19:38:39 +0300
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc:     Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
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        LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define
 enclave pages' protection bits
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On Mon, Jul 15, 2019 at 03:29:23PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> I would say it differently: regardless of exactly how /dev/sgx/enclave
> is wired up under the hood, we want a way that a process can be
> granted permission to usefully run enclaves without being granted
> permission to execute whatever bytes of code it wants.  Preferably
> without requiring LSMs to maintain some form of enclave signature
> whitelist.

Would it be better to have a signer whitelist instead or some
combination? E.g. you could whiteliste either by signer or
enclave signature.

/Jarkko