From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
paul@paul-moore.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 03/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2019 15:47:51 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201912171547.7B4FED2@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5dca060d-da34-3460-ecf2-54d4a31266c4@schaufler-ca.com>
On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 02:01:19PM -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 12/17/2019 9:34 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On 12/16/19 5:35 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >> Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
> >> to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
> >> lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
> >>
> >> Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
> >> lsmblob instead of a u32. In some cases this requires a
> >> temporary conversion using lsmblob_init() that will go
> >> away when other interfaces get converted.
> >>
> >> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> >> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> >> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> >> ---
> >> include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
> >> kernel/auditfilter.c | 7 +++++--
> >> kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++----
> >> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++--
> >> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++--
> >> security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
> >> 6 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> >> index b74dc70088ca..9c6dbe248eaf 100644
> >> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> >> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> >> @@ -1837,7 +1837,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
> >> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> >> int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
> >> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
> >> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
> >> +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
> >> + void *lsmrule);
> >> void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
> >> #else
> >> @@ -1853,8 +1854,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> >> return 0;
> >> }
> >> -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> >> - void *lsmrule)
> >> +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
> >> + u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> >> {
> >> return 0;
> >> }
> >> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> >> index b0126e9c0743..356db1dd276c 100644
> >> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> >> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> >> @@ -1325,6 +1325,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
> >> struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
> >> pid_t pid;
> >> u32 sid;
> >> + struct lsmblob blob;
> >> switch (f->type) {
> >> case AUDIT_PID:
> >> @@ -1355,8 +1356,10 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
> >> case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> >> if (f->lsm_rule) {
> >> security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> >> - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
> >> - f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
> >> + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> >> + result = security_audit_rule_match(
> >> + &blob, f->type,
> >> + f->op, f->lsm_rule);
> >> }
> >> break;
> >> case AUDIT_EXE:
> >> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> >> index 4effe01ebbe2..7566e5b1c419 100644
> >> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> >> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> >> @@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> >> const struct cred *cred;
> >> int i, need_sid = 1;
> >> u32 sid;
> >> + struct lsmblob blob;
> >> unsigned int sessionid;
> >> cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
> >> @@ -643,7 +644,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> >> security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
> >> need_sid = 0;
> >> }
> >> - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
> >> + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> >> + result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
> >> + f->type,
> >> f->op,
> >> f->lsm_rule);
> >> }
> >> @@ -658,15 +661,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> >> if (f->lsm_rule) {
> >> /* Find files that match */
> >> if (name) {
> >> + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
> >> result = security_audit_rule_match(
> >> - name->osid,
> >> + &blob,
> >> f->type,
> >> f->op,
> >> f->lsm_rule);
> >> } else if (ctx) {
> >> list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> >> + lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> >> if (security_audit_rule_match(
> >> - n->osid,
> >> + &blob,
> >> f->type,
> >> f->op,
> >> f->lsm_rule)) {
> >> @@ -678,7 +683,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> >> /* Find ipc objects that match */
> >> if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
> >> break;
> >> - if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
> >> + lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
> >> + if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
> >> f->type, f->op,
> >> f->lsm_rule))
> >> ++result;
> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> >> index df4ca482fb53..d95b0ece7434 100644
> >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> >> @@ -381,8 +381,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> >> return -EINVAL;
> >> }
> >> -static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> >> - void *lsmrule)
> >> +static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
> >> + u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> >> {
> >> return -EINVAL;
> >> }
> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> >> index f19a895ad7cd..193ddd55420b 100644
> >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> >> @@ -414,6 +414,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> >> for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
> >> int rc = 0;
> >> u32 osid;
> >> + struct lsmblob blob;
> >> if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
> >> continue;
> >> @@ -423,7 +424,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> >> case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
> >> case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
> >> security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
> >> - rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
> >> + lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> >> + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
> >> rule->lsm[i].type,
> >> Audit_equal,
> >> rule->lsm[i].rule);
> >> @@ -431,7 +433,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> >> case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
> >> case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
> >> case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> >> - rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
> >> + lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> >> + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
> >> rule->lsm[i].type,
> >> Audit_equal,
> >> rule->lsm[i].rule);
> >> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> >> index a89634af639a..bfea9739c084 100644
> >> --- a/security/security.c
> >> +++ b/security/security.c
> >> @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
> >> /*
> >> * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
> >> */
> >> -static int lsm_slot __initdata;
> >> +static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
> >> /**
> >> * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> >> @@ -2412,9 +2412,21 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> >> call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
> >> }
> >> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> >> +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
> >> + void *lsmrule)
> >> {
> >> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> >> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> >> + int rc;
> >> +
> >> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
> >> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> >> + continue;
> >
> > Do you think we really need to retain these WARN_ON()s?
>
> Kees was especially keen on having the WARN_ON().
> I'd be fine with removing it.
It should really really never happen, so I like the WARN_ON staying.
-Kees
>
>
> > If not, then you could dispense with it now and leave lsm_slot as __initdata? Otherwise,
> > Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> >
> >> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> >> + field, op, lsmrule);
> >> + if (rc != 0)
> >> + return rc;
> >> + }
> >> + return 0;
> >> }
> >> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
> >>
> >
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-17 23:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20191216223621.5127-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-12-16 22:35 ` [PATCH v12 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-12-16 22:35 ` [PATCH v12 01/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-12-17 17:23 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:35 ` [PATCH v12 02/25] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-12-17 17:30 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-19 21:11 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-12-19 21:44 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-12-16 22:35 ` [PATCH v12 03/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-12-17 17:34 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-17 22:01 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-12-17 23:47 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-12-18 0:28 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-12-18 13:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 04/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-12-17 17:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 05/25] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking Casey Schaufler
2019-12-17 17:41 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 06/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-12-17 17:51 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 07/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-12-17 18:01 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 08/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-12-17 18:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 09/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-12-17 18:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-17 18:26 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 10/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-12-17 18:13 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 11/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-12-17 18:23 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 12/25] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2019-12-17 18:26 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 13/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2019-12-18 15:17 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-18 16:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 14/25] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2019-12-18 15:53 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 15/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-12-18 16:06 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-18 19:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 16/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-12-18 16:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 17/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-12-18 17:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 18/25] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2019-12-18 17:10 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 19/25] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2019-12-18 17:41 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 20/25] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler
2019-12-18 17:43 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 21/25] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary Casey Schaufler
2019-12-18 17:55 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 22/25] Audit: Include object data for all security modules Casey Schaufler
2019-12-18 18:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 23/25] NET: Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for multiple LSMs Casey Schaufler
2019-12-18 18:28 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-18 19:12 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-18 20:50 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-19 12:19 ` Simon McVittie
2019-12-19 13:47 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-19 15:00 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-19 16:48 ` Simon McVittie
2019-12-19 17:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-19 19:27 ` John Johansen
2019-12-19 20:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-12-19 21:41 ` John Johansen
2019-12-19 19:21 ` John Johansen
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 24/25] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2019-12-16 22:36 ` [PATCH v12 25/25] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2019-12-24 23:18 [PATCH v12 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-12-24 23:18 ` [PATCH v12 03/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-12-31 17:14 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-12-31 17:36 ` Casey Schaufler
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2019-12-16 22:33 [PATCH v12 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-12-16 22:33 ` [PATCH v12 03/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-12-16 22:24 [PATCH v12 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-12-16 22:24 ` [PATCH v12 03/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
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