From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-11.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0FE8DC2D0C3 for ; Tue, 24 Dec 2019 23:19:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CC49C206D3 for ; Tue, 24 Dec 2019 23:19:22 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=yahoo.com header.i=@yahoo.com header.b="qlfjAHZe" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726224AbfLXXTW (ORCPT ); Tue, 24 Dec 2019 18:19:22 -0500 Received: from sonic311-31.consmr.mail.ne1.yahoo.com ([66.163.188.212]:46355 "EHLO sonic311-31.consmr.mail.ne1.yahoo.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726250AbfLXXTW (ORCPT ); Tue, 24 Dec 2019 18:19:22 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=yahoo.com; s=s2048; t=1577229560; bh=+R0f5Pb+jzFZ/4+zq9nYc4/3+i9YVKFRUdvUCQRbbB4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:References:From:Subject; b=qlfjAHZeoF3qCbSRCU/gtdNcpenMVWgsLb9xy8+hafGv3D0Xc/XrDbzjPyk2f6+r+dKwHtn7mHSPudSSnAE7dqHBWjUujvlVKak1pJr69gUs9d70Lghcs/ikm3bWX+CgSLb4ekse93TYQydI3vj2treZoaFTbQpCozWElz24EJa1CjgU0uRnX1JBv4E6owB94fft+XSWVDy9JzrFkk1WpHZegP9Qx50yTwDi05zgX8z36y25W7e4HeYGwfoWFDx5S6Ex3LF+Yr89Sl+VYooBjLYmejZZ2bYXxmp57vIBfAHaVq6luKQW1RUvRi+aMXrEk+8Xp+D1/efgotcVVHUaUw== X-YMail-OSG: 7hnusrAVM1mxhUZRtBeHMfTSX04ANs304AF8n2G0akLCy4KcLe1lhPIh0R2S7PY ST3SMqH1PjLOrSg3QjSnFjvXIWlVxVuwqhegqoeYu8PCkRGUazojZ6TbeN_XtvPCnal4KElFlJ0o zZmwQLaozhZOYqQfwwP28QnBxmSWQg2Y87h3Gxpw.phlN1rOE2Zi8XrMkqjdWqtZn37tgvJ_pHBb upVAd1knEzgBN7.1GrxdfBGeARuPrG3OtJR5uat.GBHAbPmmrBwivcjhKZeVKxhwj3W1YT_eFUSK 85Bp6dHF2uQN3WGydkmbsNYddftY1_X5TfzGh6xJtHMMehZwi7FlTwd4fKVVXruHlRjfT0VE9h41 Txc4zAszLkUIOOdpw7u3kQVNtdWkbSgCSlqfhAealJT.amA1JkjgbQ4bG9zsjK95U67hqKEpUHlt 7YSVKFIJH1FcInf8EpVYXoF0cuHK1tdyPLbWsTtt52HEBZpx1IpHljSr27FgPMI5.64gIyFSuC3z 1hSTjoyRyVqeUsLpo083sELbyHWLeABw0alaSWpBX7SPJaMVfagvEf0r8rAP7s6tINHkS9GTtlTf r5ret9qWEGCXEHas_Dkv_mxX53tMmpf3ZMk0mQ1l8j5ewD9btyf56GiMSNaZWYDEsSxW5B1exOdc G49ou4sJ5f6Pyd3PwRTn1AluTmWYcUP1anaGfYrGc.mZZzVzzKMDcDEhNI_kN36p1SJIn6y_myyD d96MDhSsGcfR4ddRip7US5jDnBiJJB_W69KyuOfDPM9xLQIkUrfUVEiQc4Eu8LDSVKBEhl_EsrHq FY1oOYE8IOUfASGP9MMgl4QleLYpBpLX_vzXdtvbDpLCQz2FESvVFsFQ0dI5Z42rFFPYgjDUR9gO 0QIA8YayOPdx3_rG7q5Cl3M_prlTVL9DxjIdZKVqO5n57NzjGaeYpaDjJWSvqjloWoP3P98Ry31p F2rpsjm_TI6QVG3FcWWYNeSg77vgaN3NpKixoo.8ca_MF58RGNZLdoA_zkdnH9TzlxOMCr_EcuE_ aW6Dj936s2__ZiFoJFHnSkNc0E7vC7XGmRLkbV_3KLAv6rI862FXeHmygE_u0Gh5wwlDX8wdc9ob u1KUcaD4UgZ7tTjsQMZYHB7KT6c1iLkxhLJbqt6luM.yz38tRvSJSzzYDqYmU2JtbGgS5nFi1hAP ffmjATX4mMHpygrx2yuzNgqAPzxRCF4ShyMmyAXzFLT6V9gNuF3hyaoZ0iiyxEWV4TitpBtypaf2 wHxmFMjIgfW1WV8n6tFS7FoRV_fNfTdQNLKHBl4vQifh4Kiia4gNraqD06emFaD.7rPsUjT5EzIg fqFUdTw3fnRA1J2G4MTfgYpq_9KOEiUQSuMan3lj1rONef9aKnKUxs.utxOqPpF5kVORGRtt.1aj OTqsdb523ID5rIFEl6.JmOzG4narv51pMUrKeJosdZls- Received: from sonic.gate.mail.ne1.yahoo.com by sonic311.consmr.mail.ne1.yahoo.com with HTTP; Tue, 24 Dec 2019 23:19:20 +0000 Received: by smtp407.mail.gq1.yahoo.com (Oath Hermes SMTP Server) with ESMTPA ID 0cf5d1455933ac200e57b998822e3b74; Tue, 24 Dec 2019 23:19:17 +0000 (UTC) From: Casey Schaufler To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: [PATCH v12 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Date: Tue, 24 Dec 2019 15:18:50 -0800 Message-Id: <20191224231915.7208-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit References: <20191224231915.7208-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: This patchset provides the changes required for the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other. v12: Rebase to 5.5-rc1 Fixed a couple of incorrect contractions in the text. v11: Rebase to 5.4-rc6 Incorporate feedback from v10 - Disambiguate reading /proc/.../attr/display by restricting all use of the interface to the current process. - Fix a merge error in AppArmor's display attribute check v10: Ask the security modules if the display can be changed. v9: There is no version 9 v8: Incorporate feedback from v7 - Minor clean-up in display value management - refactor "compound" context creation to use a common append_ctx() function. v7: Incorporate feedback from v6 - Make setting the display a privileged operation. The availability of compound contexts reduces the need for setting the display. v6: Incorporate feedback from v5 - Add subj_= and obj_= fields to audit records - Add /proc/.../attr/context to get the full context in lsmname\0value\0... format as suggested by Simon McVittie - Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for getsockopt() to get the full context in the same format, also suggested by Simon McVittie. - Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_default to provide the display default value. v5: Incorporate feedback from v4 - Initialize the lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx() - Clear the lsmcontext in all security_release_secctx() cases - Don't use the "display" on strictly internal context interfaces. - The SELinux binder hooks check for cases where the context "display" isn't compatible with SELinux. v4: Incorporate feedback from v3 - Mark new lsm__alloc functions static - Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the slot value. - Validate slot values used in security.c - Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing. - fix display value check in dentry_init_security - Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting the audit log v3: Incorporate feedback from v2 - Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob". - Improve consistency of constant naming. - Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization. - Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding. - Rather than clutter security_getpeersec_dgram with otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor stub, which does nothing useful. Patche 0001 moves management of the sock security blob from the individual modules to the infrastructure. Patches 0002-0012 replace system use of a "secid" with a structure "lsmblob" containing information from the security modules to be held and reused later. At this point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot" for each of the security modules compiled into the kernel that used secids. A "slot" is allocated when a security module requests one. The infrastructure is changed to use the slot number to pass the correct secid to or from the security module hooks. It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places where it is used would have performance and/or locking issues with dynamic allocation. Patch 0013 provides a mechanism for a process to identify which security module's hooks should be used when displaying or converting a security context string. A new interface /proc/self/attr/display contains the name of the security module to show. Reading from this file will present the name of the module, while writing to it will set the value. Only names of active security modules are accepted. Internally, the name is translated to the appropriate "slot" number for the module which is then stored in the task security blob. Setting the display requires that all modules using the /proc interfaces allow the transition. The "display" of other processess can be neither read nor written. All suggested cases for reading the display of a different process have race conditions. Patch 0014 Starts the process of changing how a security context is represented. Since it is possible for a security context to have been generated by more than one security module it is now necessary to note which module created a security context so that the correct "release" hook can be called. There are several places where the module that created a security context cannot be inferred. This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure which contains the context string, its length and the "slot" number of the security module that created it. The security_release_secctx() interface is changed, replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext pointer. Patches 0015-0017 convert the security interfaces from (string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer. The slot number identifying the creating module is added by the infrastructure. Where the security context is stored for extended periods the data type is changed. The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures instead of secids in Patches 0018-0019. Patch 0020 adds checks to the binder hooks which verify that if both ends of a transaction use the same "display". Patches 0021-0022 add addition data to the audit records to identify the LSM specific data for all active modules. Patches 0023-0024 add new interfaces for getting the compound security contexts. Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks removed, Patch 0025 removes the exclusive bit from AppArmor. An unnecessary stub hook was also removed. The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of this patchset in their distribution to enable stacking for containers. Performance measurements to date have the change within the "noise". The sockperf and dbench results are on the order of 0.2% to 0.8% difference, with better performance being as common as worse. The benchmarks were run with AppArmor and Smack on Ubuntu. https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.4-rc6-v11-apparmor Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + drivers/android/binder.c | 26 +- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 6 +- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 22 +- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 20 +- fs/proc/base.c | 2 + include/linux/audit.h | 1 + include/linux/cred.h | 3 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 37 +- include/linux/security.h | 175 ++++++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +- include/net/scm.h | 15 +- include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h | 1 + kernel/audit.c | 72 +++- kernel/audit.h | 9 +- kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 1 + kernel/auditfilter.c | 10 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 127 ++++--- kernel/cred.c | 12 +- net/core/sock.c | 7 +- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 6 +- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 20 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 11 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 26 +- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 13 +- net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 5 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 97 +++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 + net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 + security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +- security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 117 +++---- security/commoncap.c | 7 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 15 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 11 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 42 +-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +- security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 1 + security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +- security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +- security/security.c | 593 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 109 +++--- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 + security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +- security/smack/smack.h | 6 + security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 124 ++++--- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 +- security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 +- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 +- 64 files changed, 1372 insertions(+), 560 deletions(-)