From: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
Chris von Recklinghausen <crecklin@redhat.com>,
Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/2] KEYS: Read keys to internal buffer & then copy to userspace
Date: Sun, 8 Mar 2020 13:04:08 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200308170410.14166-1-longman@redhat.com> (raw)
v2:
- Handle NULL buffer and buflen properly in patch 1.
- Fix a bug in big_key.c.
- Add patch 2 to handle arbitrary large user-supplied buflen.
The current security key read methods are called with the key semaphore
held. The methods then copy out the key data to userspace which is
subjected to page fault and may acquire the mmap semaphore. That can
result in circular lock dependency and hence a chance to get into
deadlock.
To avoid such a deadlock, an internal buffer is now allocated for getting
out the necessary data first. After releasing the key semaphore, the
key data are then copied out to userspace sidestepping the circular
lock dependency.
The keyutils test suite was run and the test passed with these patchset
applied without any falure.
Waiman Long (2):
KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore
KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read
include/linux/key-type.h | 2 +-
security/keys/big_key.c | 11 ++---
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 7 ++-
security/keys/keyctl.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/keys/keyring.c | 6 +--
security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 7 ++-
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 14 +-----
security/keys/user_defined.c | 5 +--
8 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
--
2.18.1
next reply other threads:[~2020-03-08 17:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-03-08 17:04 Waiman Long [this message]
2020-03-08 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore Waiman Long
2020-03-13 1:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-03-13 13:29 ` Waiman Long
2020-03-13 15:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-03-13 16:57 ` Waiman Long
2020-03-08 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read Waiman Long
2020-03-09 16:32 ` David Howells
2020-03-10 15:45 ` Waiman Long
2020-03-10 15:58 ` Waiman Long
2020-03-10 17:12 ` David Howells
2020-03-11 15:33 ` Waiman Long
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