From: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Security Module list
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@chromium.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 0/8] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI)
Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2020 01:07:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200329000738.GA230422@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACYkzJ4v_X87-+GCE++g0_BkcJWFhbNePAMQmH8Ccgq7id-akA@mail.gmail.com>
On 28-Mar 23:30, KP Singh wrote:
> On Sat, Mar 28, 2020 at 10:50 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Sat, Mar 28, 2020 at 08:56:36PM +0100, KP Singh wrote:
> > > Since the attachment succeeds and the hook does not get called, it
> > > seems like "bpf" LSM is not being initialized and the hook, although
> > > present, does not get called.
> > >
> > > This indicates that "bpf" is not in CONFIG_LSM. It should, however, be
> > > there by default as we added it to default value of CONFIG_LSM and
> > > also for other DEFAULT_SECURITY_* options.
> > >
> > > Let me know if that's the case and it fixes it.
> >
> > Is the selftest expected to at least fail cleanly (i.e. not segfault)
>
> I am not sure where the crash comes from, it does not look like it's test_lsm,
> it seems to happen in test_overhead. Both seem to run fine for me.
So I was able to reproduce the crash:
* Remove "bpf" from CONFIG_LSM
./test_progs -n 66,67
test_test_lsm:PASS:skel_load 0 nsec
test_test_lsm:PASS:attach 0 nsec
test_test_lsm:PASS:exec_cmd 0 nsec
test_test_lsm:FAIL:bprm_count bprm_count = 0
test_test_lsm:FAIL:heap_mprotect want errno=EPERM, got 0
#66 test_lsm:FAIL
Caught signal #11!
Stack trace:
./test_progs(crash_handler+0x1f)[0x55b7f9867acf]
/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0(+0x13520)[0x7fcf1467e520]
/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x15f73d)[0x7fcf1460a73d]
/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_calloc+0x2ca)[0x7fcf1453286a]
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libelf.so.1(+0x37
[snip]
* The crash went away when I removed the heap_mprotect call, now the BPF
hook attached did not allow this operation, so it had no side-effects.
Which lead me to believe the crash could be a side-effect of this
operation. So I did:
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_lsm.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_lsm.c
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ int heap_mprotect(void)
if (buf == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- ret = mprotect(buf, sz, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC);
+ ret = mprotect(buf, sz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC);
free(buf);
return ret;
}
and the crash went away. Which made me realize that the free
operation does not like memory without PROT_WRITE, So I did this:
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_lsm.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_lsm.c
index fcd839e88540..78f125cc09b3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_lsm.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_lsm.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ int heap_mprotect(void)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = mprotect(buf, sz, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC);
- free(buf);
+ // free(buf);
return ret;
}
and the crash went away as well. So it indeed was a combination of:
* CONFIG_LSM not enabling the hook
* mprotect marking the memory as non-writeable
* free being called on the memory.
I will send a v9 which has the PROT_WRITE on the mprotect. Thanks
for noticing this!
- KP
>
> - KP
>
> > when the BPF LSF is not built into the kernel?
> >
> > --
> > Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-03-29 0:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-03-27 19:28 [PATCH bpf-next v8 0/8] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI) KP Singh
2020-03-27 19:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 1/8] bpf: Introduce BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM KP Singh
2020-03-27 19:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 2/8] security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks KP Singh
2020-03-27 19:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 3/8] bpf: lsm: provide attachment points for BPF LSM programs KP Singh
2020-03-27 19:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 4/8] bpf: lsm: Implement attach, detach and execution KP Singh
2020-03-28 1:08 ` James Morris
2020-03-27 19:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 5/8] bpf: lsm: Initialize the BPF LSM hooks KP Singh
2020-03-27 19:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 6/8] tools/libbpf: Add support for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM KP Singh
2020-03-27 19:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 7/8] bpf: lsm: Add selftests " KP Singh
2020-03-27 19:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 8/8] bpf: lsm: Add Documentation KP Singh
2020-03-28 17:18 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 0/8] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI) Daniel Borkmann
2020-03-28 19:56 ` KP Singh
2020-03-28 21:50 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-28 22:30 ` KP Singh
2020-03-29 0:07 ` KP Singh [this message]
2020-03-29 0:15 ` Daniel Borkmann
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