From: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
To: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Cc: "Christian Brauner" <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
"Eric Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Pavel Emelyanov" <ovzxemul@gmail.com>,
"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
"Dmitry Safonov" <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>,
"Andrei Vagin" <avagin@gmail.com>,
"Nicolas Viennot" <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>,
"Michał Cłapiński" <mclapinski@google.com>,
"Kamil Yurtsever" <kyurtsever@google.com>,
"Dirk Petersen" <dipeit@gmail.com>,
"Christine Flood" <chf@redhat.com>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
"Radostin Stoyanov" <rstoyanov1@gmail.com>,
"Serge Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
"Sargun Dhillon" <sargun@sargun.me>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
"Eric Paris" <eparis@parisplace.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2020 21:45:17 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200609184517.GL134822@grain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200603162328.854164-2-areber@redhat.com>
On Wed, Jun 03, 2020 at 06:23:26PM +0200, Adrian Reber wrote:
> This patch introduces CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, a new capability facilitating
> checkpoint/restore for non-root users.
>
> Over the last years, The CRIU (Checkpoint/Restore In Userspace) team has been
> asked numerous times if it is possible to checkpoint/restore a process as
> non-root. The answer usually was: 'almost'.
>
> The main blocker to restore a process as non-root was to control the PID of the
> restored process. This feature available via the clone3 system call, or via
> /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid is unfortunately guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
...
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index d86c0afc8a85..ce02f3a4b2d7 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2189,16 +2189,16 @@ struct map_files_info {
> };
>
> /*
> - * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN to follow the links, due to concerns about how the
> - * symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on ancestor directories in the
> - * path to the file in question.
> + * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to follow the links, due
> + * to concerns about how the symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on
> + * ancestor directories in the path to the file in question.
> */
> static const char *
> proc_map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
> struct inode *inode,
> struct delayed_call *done)
> {
> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (!(capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)))
> return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
First of all -- sorry for late reply. You know, looking into this code more
I think this CAP_SYS_ADMIN is simply wrong: for example I can't even fetch
links for /proc/self/map_files. Still /proc/$pid/maps (which as well points
to the files opened) test for ptrace-read permission. I think we need
ptrace-may-attach test here instead of these capabilities (if I can attach
to a process I can read any data needed, including the content of the
mapped files, if only I'm not missing something obvious).
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-09 18:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-03 16:23 [PATCH v2 0/3] capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE Adrian Reber
2020-06-03 16:23 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] " Adrian Reber
2020-06-03 17:01 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2020-06-09 3:42 ` Andrei Vagin
2020-06-09 7:44 ` Christian Brauner
2020-06-09 16:06 ` Andrei Vagin
2020-06-09 16:14 ` Christian Brauner
2020-06-10 7:59 ` Andrei Vagin
2020-06-10 15:41 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-06-10 15:48 ` Christian Brauner
2020-06-09 18:45 ` Cyrill Gorcunov [this message]
2020-06-09 20:09 ` Nicolas Viennot
2020-06-09 21:05 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-06-09 21:28 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2020-06-03 16:23 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] selftests: add clone3() CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE test Adrian Reber
2020-06-03 16:23 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] prctl: Allow ptrace capable processes to change exe_fd Adrian Reber
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