From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Smack: fix use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self()
Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2020 00:27:29 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200716002730.26E14206F5@mail.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200708201520.140376-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>
Hi
[This is an automated email]
This commit has been processed because it contains a "Fixes:" tag
fixing commit: 38416e53936e ("Smack: limited capability for changing process label").
The bot has tested the following trees: v5.7.8, v5.4.51, v4.19.132, v4.14.188, v4.9.230, v4.4.230.
v5.7.8: Build OK!
v5.4.51: Build OK!
v4.19.132: Failed to apply! Possible dependencies:
b17103a8b8ae9 ("Smack: Abstract use of cred security blob")
v4.14.188: Failed to apply! Possible dependencies:
03450e271a160 ("fs: add ksys_fchmod() and do_fchmodat() helpers and ksys_chmod() wrapper; remove in-kernel calls to syscall")
312db1aa1dc7b ("fs: add ksys_mount() helper; remove in-kernel calls to sys_mount()")
3a18ef5c1b393 ("fs: add ksys_umount() helper; remove in-kernel call to sys_umount()")
447016e968196 ("fs: add ksys_chdir() helper; remove in-kernel calls to sys_chdir()")
819671ff849b0 ("syscalls: define and explain goal to not call syscalls in the kernel")
9481769208b5e ("->file_open(): lose cred argument")
a16fe33ab5572 ("fs: add ksys_chroot() helper; remove-in kernel calls to sys_chroot()")
ae2bb293a3e8a ("get rid of cred argument of vfs_open() and do_dentry_open()")
af04fadcaa932 ("Revert "fs: fold open_check_o_direct into do_dentry_open"")
b17103a8b8ae9 ("Smack: Abstract use of cred security blob")
c7248321a3d42 ("fs: add ksys_dup{,3}() helper; remove in-kernel calls to sys_dup{,3}()")
d19dfe58b7ecb ("Smack: Privilege check on key operations")
dcb569cf6ac99 ("Smack: ptrace capability use fixes")
e3f20ae21079e ("security_file_open(): lose cred argument")
e7a3e8b2edf54 ("fs: add ksys_write() helper; remove in-kernel calls to sys_write()")
v4.9.230: Failed to apply! Possible dependencies:
078c73c63fb28 ("apparmor: add profile and ns params to aa_may_manage_policy()")
121d4a91e3c12 ("apparmor: rename sid to secid")
12557dcba21b0 ("apparmor: move lib definitions into separate lib include")
2bd8dbbf22fe9 ("apparmor: add ns being viewed as a param to policy_view_capable()")
5ac8c355ae001 ("apparmor: allow introspecting the loaded policy pre internal transform")
637f688dc3dc3 ("apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts")
73688d1ed0b8f ("apparmor: refactor prepare_ns() and make usable from different views")
9481769208b5e ("->file_open(): lose cred argument")
98849dff90e27 ("apparmor: rename namespace to ns to improve code line lengths")
9a2d40c12d00e ("apparmor: add strn version of aa_find_ns")
a6f233003b1af ("apparmor: allow specifying the profile doing the management")
b17103a8b8ae9 ("Smack: Abstract use of cred security blob")
cff281f6861e7 ("apparmor: split apparmor policy namespaces code into its own file")
d19dfe58b7ecb ("Smack: Privilege check on key operations")
dcb569cf6ac99 ("Smack: ptrace capability use fixes")
f28e783ff668c ("Smack: Use cap_capable in privilege check")
fd2a80438d736 ("apparmor: add ns being viewed as a param to policy_admin_capable()")
fe6bb31f590c9 ("apparmor: split out shared policy_XXX fns to lib")
v4.4.230: Failed to apply! Possible dependencies:
078c73c63fb28 ("apparmor: add profile and ns params to aa_may_manage_policy()")
121d4a91e3c12 ("apparmor: rename sid to secid")
12557dcba21b0 ("apparmor: move lib definitions into separate lib include")
2bd8dbbf22fe9 ("apparmor: add ns being viewed as a param to policy_view_capable()")
5ac8c355ae001 ("apparmor: allow introspecting the loaded policy pre internal transform")
637f688dc3dc3 ("apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts")
73688d1ed0b8f ("apparmor: refactor prepare_ns() and make usable from different views")
79be093500791 ("Smack: File receive for sockets")
9481769208b5e ("->file_open(): lose cred argument")
98849dff90e27 ("apparmor: rename namespace to ns to improve code line lengths")
9a2d40c12d00e ("apparmor: add strn version of aa_find_ns")
a6f233003b1af ("apparmor: allow specifying the profile doing the management")
b17103a8b8ae9 ("Smack: Abstract use of cred security blob")
c60b906673eeb ("Smack: Signal delivery as an append operation")
cff281f6861e7 ("apparmor: split apparmor policy namespaces code into its own file")
d19dfe58b7ecb ("Smack: Privilege check on key operations")
dcb569cf6ac99 ("Smack: ptrace capability use fixes")
f28e783ff668c ("Smack: Use cap_capable in privilege check")
fd2a80438d736 ("apparmor: add ns being viewed as a param to policy_admin_capable()")
fe6bb31f590c9 ("apparmor: split out shared policy_XXX fns to lib")
NOTE: The patch will not be queued to stable trees until it is upstream.
How should we proceed with this patch?
--
Thanks
Sasha
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-16 0:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-08 21:56 KASAN: use-after-free Read in smk_write_relabel_self syzbot
2020-07-08 20:15 ` [PATCH] Smack: fix use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self() Eric Biggers
2020-07-16 0:27 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2020-07-21 0:38 ` Eric Biggers
2020-07-21 0:57 ` Casey Schaufler
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