From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.5 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED, DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F24BCC433E1 for ; Fri, 21 Aug 2020 18:57:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CC64720714 for ; Fri, 21 Aug 2020 18:57:08 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="eIM0ewAL" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726435AbgHUS5G (ORCPT ); Fri, 21 Aug 2020 14:57:06 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57628 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726541AbgHUS5C (ORCPT ); Fri, 21 Aug 2020 14:57:02 -0400 Received: from mail-pg1-x549.google.com (mail-pg1-x549.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::549]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 566EFC061575 for ; Fri, 21 Aug 2020 11:57:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pg1-x549.google.com with SMTP id h36so1489033pgl.14 for ; Fri, 21 Aug 2020 11:57:02 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=sender:date:message-id:mime-version:subject:from:to:cc; bh=oWFdh/PRo3gGpAV+9k5dRsjIEptJbJCkCMmQ8ucgmPk=; b=eIM0ewALXtMVmYnzBh1gd4g4cgWboGe0k6p4lIbSnc4fQ9pdVfb/Lou19RPdZZRuvW LQ1XfkVQ7fNa7xZdIxLlxZVnD85d40wlITdn0IogFA8+wRa6Km6GAMS6AR77/FyVikhn k7I2TtjHFF28aa4JRfiYHZpYN13mSNw6UmnKj2E0VdZiuoz0P9iY12JQ0q2WtMJbiLKP ABwU3IpnqkAQwDr6il5lNzibh2vxu4CCl2w0fflGUVCCj5sOS2BZeOejFV49RTluCkBQ kINmFvUY++dvTYPkUrPciNOdDObE1Gk0zpF8P5GtYe2+xl0tMOJlJJ+70ilrXz9Bdt5/ h0YQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:sender:date:message-id:mime-version:subject:from :to:cc; bh=oWFdh/PRo3gGpAV+9k5dRsjIEptJbJCkCMmQ8ucgmPk=; b=S/dLSjUe0Kd5xctuHIxBFfKUfgAZiQkFY32LbiCWqHRLar7JWlM6iVqdwjA1vJLkPv SmMiDor5g633fUGjNyqJEoVOgW5825HdetaSS1rzAYZA41B7ygF/hHMm0xhxLvd3oyt0 iw1MiviDCJIl3wSXjXwJXLuXFKJaKB8LLIgPaxk1z5Qlj13Mhy0pQyK7Bx5hf+u9ar1x QE41k0CUEhA2zsPh0xiKF3fLoeu/IKxCMGlLv3iwJcZXkpemWj+KrqQyhu1w4akJ2WFK w+wmM2OE7FMwROEV7yz0W6fk+lMIVCjuAWJbeTB+8KZxo8U2f68tgbN/xOee4tBOisey rrcg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530gGi6fSHaACZ8PN8y6pSAsAZUE2GWAU6T69TsmXITvipbDG5ld HlKkwPPzdbqGNrOGvTlbOZF0WtRkrtqOocL8cw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyD3Yh3CAqaICxx5JQmoTQsRkSWlUNlrc+z2K5FgB5OskDZ16gE5AERUF9KvVPCjDJ27Vch2q4YlRDdaNWY1Q== X-Received: from lg.mtv.corp.google.com ([2620:15c:211:202:f693:9fff:fef4:29dd]) (user=lokeshgidra job=sendgmr) by 2002:a17:90a:9405:: with SMTP id r5mr3668948pjo.74.1598036220902; Fri, 21 Aug 2020 11:57:00 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2020 11:56:42 -0700 Message-Id: <20200821185645.801971-1-lokeshgidra@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0.297.g1956fa8f8d-goog Subject: [PATCH v7 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD From: Lokesh Gidra To: Alexander Viro , James Morris , Stephen Smalley , Casey Schaufler , Eric Biggers Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" , Paul Moore , Eric Paris , Lokesh Gidra , Daniel Colascione , Kees Cook , "Eric W. Biederman" , KP Singh , David Howells , Thomas Cedeno , Anders Roxell , Sami Tolvanen , Matthew Garrett , Aaron Goidel , Randy Dunlap , "Joel Fernandes (Google)" , YueHaibing , Christian Brauner , Alexei Starovoitov , Alexey Budankov , Adrian Reber , Aleksa Sarai , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, kaleshsingh@google.com, calin@google.com, surenb@google.com, nnk@google.com, jeffv@google.com, kernel-team@android.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: Userfaultfd in unprivileged contexts could be potentially very useful. We'd like to harden userfaultfd to make such unprivileged use less risky. This patch series allows SELinux to manage userfaultfd file descriptors and in the future, other kinds of anonymous-inode-based file descriptor. SELinux policy authors can apply policy types to anonymous inodes by providing name-based transition rules keyed off the anonymous inode internal name ( "[userfaultfd]" in the case of userfaultfd(2) file descriptors) and applying policy to the new SIDs thus produced. With SELinux managed userfaultfd, an admin can control creation and movement of the file descriptors. In particular, handling of a userfaultfd descriptor by a different process is essentially a ptrace access into the process, without any of the corresponding security_ptrace_access_check() checks. For privacy, the admin may want to deny such accesses, which is possible with SELinux support. Inside the kernel, a new anon_inode interface, anon_inode_getfd_secure, allows callers to opt into this SELinux management. In this new "secure" mode, anon_inodes create new ephemeral inodes for anonymous file objects instead of reusing the normal anon_inodes singleton dummy inode. A new LSM hook gives security modules an opportunity to configure and veto these ephemeral inodes. This patch series is one of two fork of [1] and is an alternative to [2]. The primary difference between the two patch series is that this partch series creates a unique inode for each "secure" anonymous inode, while the other patch series ([2]) continues using the singleton dummy anonymous inode and adds a way to attach SELinux security information directly to file objects. I prefer the approach in this patch series because 1) it's a smaller patch than [2], and 2) it produces a more regular security architecture: in this patch series, secure anonymous inodes aren't S_PRIVATE and they maintain the SELinux property that the label for a file is in its inode. We do need an additional inode per anonymous file, but per-struct-file inode creation doesn't seem to be a problem for pipes and sockets. The previous version of this feature ([1]) created a new SELinux security class for userfaultfd file descriptors. This version adopts the generic transition-based approach of [2]. This patch series also differs from [2] in that it doesn't affect all anonymous inodes right away --- instead requiring anon_inodes callers to opt in --- but this difference isn't one of basic approach. The important question to resolve is whether we should be creating new inodes or enhancing per-file data. Changes from the first version of the patch: - Removed some error checks - Defined a new anon_inode SELinux class to resolve the ambiguity in [3] - Inherit sclass as well as descriptor from context inode Changes from the second version of the patch: - Fixed example policy in the commit message to reflect the use of the new anon_inode class. Changes from the third version of the patch: - Dropped the fops parameter to the LSM hook - Documented hook parameters - Fixed incorrect class used for SELinux transition - Removed stray UFFD changed early in the series - Removed a redundant ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR()) Changes from the fourth version of the patch: - Removed an unused parameter from an internal function - Fixed function documentation Changes from the fifth version of the patch: - Fixed function documentation in fs/anon_inodes.c and include/linux/lsm_hooks.h - Used anon_inode_getfd_secure() in userfaultfd() syscall and removed owner from userfaultfd_ctx. Changed from the sixth version of the patch: - Removed definition of anon_inode_getfile_secure() as there are no callers. - Simplified function description of anon_inode_getfd_secure(). - Elaborated more on the purpose of 'context_inode' in commit message. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200211225547.235083-1-dancol@google.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20200213194157.5877-1-sds@tycho.nsa.gov/ [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/23f725ca-5b5a-5938-fcc8-5bbbfc9ba9bc@tycho.nsa.gov/ Daniel Colascione (3): Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Wire UFFD up to SELinux fs/anon_inodes.c | 148 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- fs/userfaultfd.c | 23 +++-- include/linux/anon_inodes.h | 13 +++ include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 ++ include/linux/security.h | 3 + security/security.c | 9 ++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 53 ++++++++++ security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 + 9 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) -- 2.28.0.297.g1956fa8f8d-goog