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From: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@gmail.com>
To: penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp
Cc: andreyknvl@google.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, mhocko@suse.com,
	serge@hallyn.com, snovitoll@gmail.com,
	syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 19:27:21 +0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210128132721.1111920-1-snovitoll@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5271074f-930a-46e9-8ece-2cc65d45dc19@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>

> >  	/*
> > +	 * No partial write.
> >  	 * Enough data must be present.
> >  	 */
> >  	if (*ppos != 0)
> >  		return -EINVAL;
> > +	if (count == 0 || count > PAGE_SIZE)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> >  
> >  	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
> >  	if (IS_ERR(data))
> > 
> 
> Doesn't this change break legitimate requests like
> 
>   char buffer[20000];
> 
>   memset(buffer, ' ', sizeof(buffer));
>   memcpy(buffer + sizeof(buffer) - 10, "foo", 3);
>   write(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
> 
> ?

It does, in this case. Then I need to patch another version with
whitespace stripping before, after label. I just followed the same thing
that I see in security/selinux/selinuxfs.c sel_write_enforce() etc.

It has the same memdup_user_nul() and count >= PAGE_SIZE check prior to that.

  reply	other threads:[~2021-01-28 13:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-24 14:36 [PATCH] smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
2021-01-25 18:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-01-25 22:42   ` Tetsuo Handa
2021-01-28 11:58     ` [PATCH v2] " Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
2021-01-28 12:59       ` Tetsuo Handa
2021-01-28 13:27         ` Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov [this message]
2021-01-28 14:24           ` Tetsuo Handa
2021-01-29  2:10             ` Casey Schaufler
2021-02-02 19:13               ` Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
2021-02-02 19:33                 ` Casey Schaufler

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