From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1AE72C433E6 for ; Sun, 7 Mar 2021 15:20:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E84F065106 for ; Sun, 7 Mar 2021 15:20:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232307AbhCGPTg (ORCPT ); Sun, 7 Mar 2021 10:19:36 -0500 Received: from mga12.intel.com ([192.55.52.136]:15647 "EHLO mga12.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232033AbhCGPTV (ORCPT ); Sun, 7 Mar 2021 10:19:21 -0500 IronPort-SDR: rcwVF1zsDWWfeydQ/onW8Q1t7k1DFqOO6V6HjdFh7is5vmZLV2snJ1iMeExH8+32o6TV9mDP9Z 8Nx8zFLfjWrA== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9916"; a="167172190" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,230,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="167172190" Received: from orsmga008.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.65]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Mar 2021 07:19:21 -0800 IronPort-SDR: VBQ85G5YYI/WVTz2b41mxqzXqF0+ssZMx7MQbDyrg3QsWTdTEwQLosgUq9Ov6r51Cb94QFKhyQ E0ZQT8/IMYEw== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,230,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="409008502" Received: from tassilo.jf.intel.com ([10.54.74.11]) by orsmga008-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Mar 2021 07:19:21 -0800 Date: Sun, 7 Mar 2021 07:19:20 -0800 From: Andi Kleen To: John Wood Cc: Kees Cook , Jann Horn , Randy Dunlap , Jonathan Corbet , James Morris , Shuah Khan , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM Message-ID: <20210307151920.GR472138@tassilo.jf.intel.com> References: <20210227153013.6747-1-john.wood@gmx.com> <20210227153013.6747-8-john.wood@gmx.com> <878s78dnrm.fsf@linux.intel.com> <20210302183032.GA3049@ubuntu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20210302183032.GA3049@ubuntu> Precedence: bulk List-ID: Sorry for the late answer. I somehow missed your email earlier. > As a mitigation method, all the offending tasks involved in the attack are > killed. Or in other words, all the tasks that share the same statistics > (statistics showing a fast crash rate) are killed. So systemd will just restart the network daemon and then the attack works again? Or if it's a interactive login you log in again. I think it might be useful even with these limitations, but it would be good to spell out the limitations of the method more clearly. I suspect to be useful it'll likely need some user space configuration changes too. -Andi