linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
	jarkko@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com
Cc: eric.snowberg@oracle.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, weiyongjun1@huawei.com,
	nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com, ardb@kernel.org,
	nramas@linux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@redhat.com, jason@zx2c4.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, pjones@redhat.com,
	konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Subject: [PATCH v7 08/17] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2021 19:15:36 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211116001545.2639333-9-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211116001545.2639333-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>

Currently both Secure Boot DB and Machine Owner Keys (MOK) go through
the same keyring handler (get_handler_for_db). With the addition of the
new machine keyring, the end-user may choose to trust MOK keys.

Introduce a new keyring handler specific for MOK keys.  If MOK keys are
trusted by the end-user, use the new keyring handler instead.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
---
v1: Initial version
v3: Only change the keyring handler if the secondary is enabled
v4: Removed trust_moklist check
v5: Rename to machine keyring
v7: Unmodified from v5
---
 .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c  | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
 .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h  |  5 +++++
 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c   |  4 ++--
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
index e9791be98fd9..4872850d081f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static __init void uefi_revocation_list_x509(const char *source,
 
 /*
  * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
- * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables.
+ * the UEFI db tables.
  */
 __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
 {
@@ -76,6 +76,21 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
+ * the MokListRT tables.
+ */
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING))
+			return add_to_machine_keyring;
+		else
+			return add_to_platform_keyring;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
  * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
index 2462bfa08fe3..284558f30411 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ void blacklist_binary(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
  */
 efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
 
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the mok.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
 /*
  * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
  */
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
index f290f78c3f30..c1bfd1cd7cc3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(void)
 		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT (MOKvar table)",
 					      mokvar_entry->data,
 					      mokvar_entry->data_size,
-					      get_handler_for_db);
+					      get_handler_for_mok);
 		/* All done if that worked. */
 		if (!rc)
 			return rc;
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(void)
 	mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status);
 	if (mok) {
 		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
-					      mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
+					      mok, moksize, get_handler_for_mok);
 		kfree(mok);
 		if (rc)
 			pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
-- 
2.18.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-11-16  0:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-16  0:15 [PATCH v7 00/17] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 01/17] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine Eric Snowberg
2021-11-17 13:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 02/17] integrity: Do not allow machine keyring updates following init Eric Snowberg
2021-11-17 13:18   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 03/17] KEYS: Create static version of public_key_verify_signature Eric Snowberg
2021-11-17 13:32   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-17 13:53     ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 04/17] X.509: Parse Basic Constraints for CA Eric Snowberg
2021-11-18 22:59   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-18 23:29     ` Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 05/17] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 06/17] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE to restrict_link_by_ca Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 07/17] integrity: Fix warning about missing prototypes Eric Snowberg
2021-11-17 15:16   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-16  0:15 ` Eric Snowberg [this message]
2021-11-19  0:05   ` [PATCH v7 08/17] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Mimi Zohar
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 09/17] KEYS: Rename get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-11-19  0:05   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 10/17] KEYS: add a reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 11/17] KEYS: Introduce link restriction for machine keys Eric Snowberg
2021-11-19  0:20   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-19  2:50     ` Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 12/17] KEYS: integrity: change link restriction to trust the machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-11-19  0:23   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 13/17] KEYS: link secondary_trusted_keys to machine trusted keys Eric Snowberg
2021-11-18 12:32   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-18 21:37     ` Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 14/17] integrity: store reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 15/17] efi/mokvar: move up init order Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 16/17] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 17/17] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16 16:00 ` [PATCH v7 00/17] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-11-16 16:18   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2021-11-16 16:24     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-11-16 16:39       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2021-11-17  7:50         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-11-17  7:51           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-11-17 17:02             ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2021-11-17 17:20               ` Eric Snowberg
2021-11-18  3:14                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20211116001545.2639333-9-eric.snowberg@oracle.com \
    --to=eric.snowberg@oracle.com \
    --cc=James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com \
    --cc=ardb@kernel.org \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=dwmw2@infradead.org \
    --cc=ebiggers@google.com \
    --cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
    --cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
    --cc=jason@zx2c4.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=konrad.wilk@oracle.com \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=lszubowi@redhat.com \
    --cc=nayna@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=nramas@linux.microsoft.com \
    --cc=pjones@redhat.com \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=weiyongjun1@huawei.com \
    --cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).