From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] lsm: security_task_getsecid_subj() -> security_current_getsecid_subj()
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2021 17:25:54 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211122232554.GA27944@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhREpJ3bkcU+cOz_Cg7KaF=QokngvXyhCpus--=d8HSP_g@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 06:12:19PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 19, 2021 at 5:52 PM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 29, 2021 at 3:17 PM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > The security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook invites misuse by allowing
> > > callers to specify a task even though the hook is only safe when the
> > > current task is referenced. Fix this by removing the task_struct
> > > argument to the hook, requiring LSM implementations to use the
> > > current task. While we are changing the hook declaration we also
> > > rename the function to security_current_getsecid_subj() in an effort
> > > to reinforce that the hook captures the subjective credentials of the
> > > current task and not an arbitrary task on the system.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> > > ---
> > > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 +--
> > > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 8 +++-----
> > > include/linux/security.h | 4 ++--
> > > kernel/audit.c | 4 ++--
> > > kernel/auditfilter.c | 3 +--
> > > kernel/auditsc.c | 10 +++++++++-
> > > net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 2 +-
> > > net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +-
> > > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 13 ++++++++++---
> > > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +-
> > > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 14 +++++++-------
> > > security/security.c | 6 +++---
> > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 19 +++----------------
> > > security/smack/smack.h | 16 ----------------
> > > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 9 ++++-----
> > > 15 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
> >
> > I never saw any comments, positive or negative, on this patch so I'll
> > plan on merging it early next week. If you've got objections, now is
> > the time to speak up.
>
> I just merged this patch, with the AppArmor tweak suggested by Serge,
> into selinux/next. Thanks everyone.
Thanks, Paul.
-serge
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-11-22 23:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-09-29 19:17 [PATCH] lsm: security_task_getsecid_subj() -> security_current_getsecid_subj() Paul Moore
2021-09-29 19:19 ` Paul Moore
2021-11-19 22:52 ` Paul Moore
2021-11-19 23:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-11-19 23:59 ` John Johansen
2021-11-20 15:04 ` Paul Moore
2021-11-20 0:42 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-11-20 15:06 ` Paul Moore
2021-11-20 17:54 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-11-22 23:12 ` Paul Moore
2021-11-22 23:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2021-11-23 0:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-11-23 3:14 ` Paul Moore
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