From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
To: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, ardb@kernel.org,
jarkko@kernel.org
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com,
nayna@linux.ibm.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, weiyongjun1@huawei.com,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, pjones@redhat.com,
konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Subject: [PATCH v10 3/8] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys
Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 21:58:29 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220126025834.255493-4-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220126025834.255493-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Currently both Secure Boot DB and Machine Owner Keys (MOK) go through
the same keyring handler (get_handler_for_db). With the addition of the
new machine keyring, the end-user may choose to trust MOK keys.
Introduce a new keyring handler specific for MOK keys. If MOK keys are
trusted by the end-user, use the new keyring handler instead.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
v1: Initial version
v3: Only change the keyring handler if the secondary is enabled
v4: Removed trust_moklist check
v5: Rename to machine keyring
v7: Unmodified from v5
v8: Code unmodified from v7 added Mimi's Reviewed-by
v9: Unmodified from v8
v10: Added Jarkko's Reviewed-by and Mimi's Tested-by
---
.../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
.../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 5 +++++
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
index e9791be98fd9..4872850d081f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static __init void uefi_revocation_list_x509(const char *source,
/*
* Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
- * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables.
+ * the UEFI db tables.
*/
__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
{
@@ -76,6 +76,21 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
+ * the MokListRT tables.
+ */
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+ if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING))
+ return add_to_machine_keyring;
+ else
+ return add_to_platform_keyring;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
* the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
index 2462bfa08fe3..284558f30411 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ void blacklist_binary(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
*/
efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the mok.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
/*
* Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
*/
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
index 08b6d12f99b4..5f45c3c07dbd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(void)
rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT (MOKvar table)",
mokvar_entry->data,
mokvar_entry->data_size,
- get_handler_for_db);
+ get_handler_for_mok);
/* All done if that worked. */
if (!rc)
return rc;
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(void)
mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status);
if (mok) {
rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
- mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
+ mok, moksize, get_handler_for_mok);
kfree(mok);
if (rc)
pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
--
2.18.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-01-26 3:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-01-26 2:58 [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26 2:58 ` [PATCH v10 1/8] integrity: Fix warning about missing prototypes Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26 2:58 ` [PATCH v10 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26 2:58 ` Eric Snowberg [this message]
2022-01-26 2:58 ` [PATCH v10 4/8] KEYS: store reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26 2:58 ` [PATCH v10 5/8] KEYS: Introduce link restriction for machine keys Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26 2:58 ` [PATCH v10 6/8] efi/mokvar: move up init order Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26 2:58 ` [PATCH v10 7/8] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26 2:58 ` [PATCH v10 8/8] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true Eric Snowberg
2022-04-11 11:06 ` Michal Suchánek
2022-04-11 16:39 ` Eric Snowberg
2022-04-11 17:24 ` Michal Suchánek
2022-04-11 20:34 ` Eric Snowberg
2022-04-11 21:35 ` Michal Suchánek
2022-01-26 13:43 ` [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-26 13:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-26 22:06 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-02-08 9:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-08 15:26 ` MAINTAINERS update suggestion (subject change) Mimi Zohar
2022-02-20 19:00 ` [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-22 11:59 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-02-22 12:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-22 12:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-02-23 15:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-22 13:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-02-23 15:33 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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