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Date:   Wed, 2 Feb 2022 04:01:57 +0000
From:   Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
To:     James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc:     Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing
 secret area
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On Tue, Feb 01, 2022 at 09:24:50AM -0500, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Tue, 2022-02-01 at 14:50 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> > You all need to work together to come up with a unified place for
> > this and stop making it platform-specific.

We're talking about things that have massively different semantics. How 
do we expose that without an unwieldy API that has to try to be a 
superset of everything implemented, which then has to be extended when 
yet another implementation shows up with another behavioural quirk? EFI 
variables already need extremely careful handling to avoid rm -rf /sys 
bricking the system - should we impose that on everything, or should we 
allow the underlying implementation to leak through in some ways?