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From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
To: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>,
	Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@linux.ibm.com>,
	Jim Cadden <jcadden@ibm.com>,
	Daniele Buono <dbuono@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2022 15:31:28 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220202143128.jgadmr7tzetlobt7@sirius.home.kraxel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c7604c39-d6ca-f3b9-b1d8-fd0362216717@linux.ibm.com>

On Wed, Feb 02, 2022 at 01:08:43PM +0200, Dov Murik wrote:
> 
> 
> On 02/02/2022 10:47, Gerd Hoffmann wrote:
> > On Tue, Feb 01, 2022 at 12:44:12PM +0000, Dov Murik wrote:
> >> If the efi_secret module is built, register a late_initcall in the EFI
> >> driver which checks whether the EFI secret area is available and
> >> populated, and then requests to load the efi_secret module.
> > 
> >> +	area = memremap(efi.coco_secret, sizeof(*area), MEMREMAP_WB);
> >> +	if (!area) {
> >> +		pr_err("Failed to map confidential computing secret area descriptor\n");
> >> +		return -ENOMEM;
> >> +	}
> >> +	if (!area->base_pa || area->size < sizeof(*header_guid))
> >> +		goto unmap_desc;
> >> +
> >> +	header_guid = (void __force *)ioremap_encrypted(area->base_pa, sizeof(*header_guid));
> >> +	if (!header_guid) {
> >> +		pr_err("Failed to map secret area\n");
> >> +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> >> +		goto unmap_desc;
> >> +	}
> >> +	if (efi_guidcmp(*header_guid, EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID))
> >> +		goto unmap_encrypted;
> > 
> > Why these sanity checks are here and not in the efi_secret module?
> 
> The same checks indeed appear in the efi_secret module (see in patch 3:
> efi_secret_map_area() and the beginning of efi_secret_securityfs_setup()).
> 
> However, in the efi_secret module, the checks are noisy, because they
> expect the secret area to be populated.  For example:
> 
> +	if (efi.coco_secret == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
> +		pr_err("Secret area address is not available\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}

Note I explicitly excluded that check ;)

Checking whenever efi.coco_secret looks valid and only try load
efi_secret if that is the case (and otherwise stay silent) makes
perfect sense.  The other checks should be dropped IMHO.

> Another approach could be to just try to load the module anyway, and
> the module will fail (silently? noisily?) if there's no designated
> secret area or it's not populated.  I feel that will be harder to
> understand what's going on.

I think the module should fail noisily.  See above for autoload.  In
case the module is loaded (either manually by the admin, or because
efi.coco_secret != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) and it can't actually load
the secrets we want know why ...

take care,
  Gerd


  reply	other threads:[~2022-02-02 14:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-01 12:44 [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area Dov Murik
2022-02-01 12:44 ` [PATCH v7 1/5] efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area Dov Murik
2022-02-02  8:38   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-01 12:44 ` [PATCH v7 2/5] efi/libstub: Reserve confidential computing secret area Dov Murik
2022-02-02  8:41   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02 11:13     ` Dov Murik
2022-02-01 12:44 ` [PATCH v7 3/5] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets Dov Murik
2022-02-02  8:45   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02 10:55     ` Dov Murik
2022-02-01 12:44 ` [PATCH v7 4/5] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated Dov Murik
2022-02-02  8:47   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02 11:08     ` Dov Murik
2022-02-02 14:31       ` Gerd Hoffmann [this message]
2022-02-02 15:09         ` Dov Murik
2022-02-03  6:16           ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-03 11:03             ` Dov Murik
2022-02-03 12:11               ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-01 12:44 ` [PATCH v7 5/5] docs: security: Add coco/efi_secret documentation Dov Murik
2022-02-02  8:49   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02 11:19     ` Dov Murik
2022-02-01 13:50 ` [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area Greg KH
2022-02-01 14:24   ` James Bottomley
2022-02-01 14:41     ` Greg KH
2022-02-01 15:05       ` James Bottomley
2022-02-01 18:07     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-02-02  4:01     ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-02  6:10       ` Greg KH
2022-02-02  6:54         ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-02  7:05           ` Greg KH
2022-02-02  7:10             ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-02  7:22               ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-02  8:04                 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-02  8:25                   ` Greg KH
2022-02-09  0:25                     ` Nayna
2022-02-02  8:36                   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02  8:45                     ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-07 18:50                       ` Dov Murik

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