From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Konstantin Meskhidze" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 05/12] landlock: Move filesystem helpers and add a new one
Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2022 14:51:10 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220329125117.1393824-6-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220329125117.1393824-1-mic@digikod.net>
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Move the SB_NOUSER and IS_PRIVATE dentry check to a standalone
is_nouser_or_private() helper. This will be useful for a following
commit.
Move get_mode_access() and maybe_remove() to make them usable by new
code provided by a following commit.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220329125117.1393824-6-mic@digikod.net
---
Changes since v1:
* Move is_nouser_or_private() explanation up to a function header
comment block as suggested by Paul Moore.
* Add Reviewed-by: Paul Moore.
---
security/landlock/fs.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 461751c01726..57dc3fb0c557 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -257,6 +257,18 @@ static inline bool unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
return false;
}
+/*
+ * Allows access to pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable (e.g.
+ * sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through
+ * /proc/<pid>/fd/<file-descriptor>
+ */
+static inline bool is_nouser_or_private(const struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return (dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) ||
+ (d_is_positive(dentry) &&
+ unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))));
+}
+
static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
const struct path *const path,
const access_mask_t access_request)
@@ -270,14 +282,7 @@ static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
return 0;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain || !path))
return 0;
- /*
- * Allows access to pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable
- * (e.g. sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through
- * /proc/<pid>/fd/<file-descriptor> .
- */
- if ((path->dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) ||
- (d_is_positive(path->dentry) &&
- unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))))
+ if (is_nouser_or_private(path->dentry))
return 0;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
return -EACCES;
@@ -356,6 +361,39 @@ static inline int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path,
return check_access_path(dom, path, access_request);
}
+static inline access_mask_t get_mode_access(const umode_t mode)
+{
+ switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+ case S_IFLNK:
+ return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM;
+ case 0:
+ /* A zero mode translates to S_IFREG. */
+ case S_IFREG:
+ return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG;
+ case S_IFDIR:
+ return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR;
+ case S_IFCHR:
+ return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR;
+ case S_IFBLK:
+ return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK;
+ case S_IFIFO:
+ return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO;
+ case S_IFSOCK:
+ return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK;
+ default:
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline access_mask_t maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry)
+{
+ if (d_is_negative(dentry))
+ return 0;
+ return d_is_dir(dentry) ? LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR :
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE;
+}
+
/* Inode hooks */
static void hook_inode_free_security(struct inode *const inode)
@@ -549,31 +587,6 @@ static int hook_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *const old_path,
/* Path hooks */
-static inline access_mask_t get_mode_access(const umode_t mode)
-{
- switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
- case S_IFLNK:
- return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM;
- case 0:
- /* A zero mode translates to S_IFREG. */
- case S_IFREG:
- return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG;
- case S_IFDIR:
- return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR;
- case S_IFCHR:
- return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR;
- case S_IFBLK:
- return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK;
- case S_IFIFO:
- return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO;
- case S_IFSOCK:
- return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK;
- default:
- WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
/*
* Creating multiple links or renaming may lead to privilege escalations if not
* handled properly. Indeed, we must be sure that the source doesn't gain more
@@ -601,14 +614,6 @@ static int hook_path_link(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode));
}
-static inline access_mask_t maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry)
-{
- if (d_is_negative(dentry))
- return 0;
- return d_is_dir(dentry) ? LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR :
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE;
-}
-
static int hook_path_rename(const struct path *const old_dir,
struct dentry *const old_dentry,
const struct path *const new_dir,
--
2.35.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-29 12:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-29 12:51 [PATCH v2 00/12] Landlock: file linking and renaming support Mickaël Salaün
2022-03-29 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 01/12] landlock: Define access_mask_t to enforce a consistent access mask size Mickaël Salaün
2022-03-29 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 02/12] landlock: Reduce the maximum number of layers to 16 Mickaël Salaün
2022-03-29 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 03/12] landlock: Create find_rule() from unmask_layers() Mickaël Salaün
2022-03-29 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 04/12] landlock: Fix same-layer rule unions Mickaël Salaün
2022-03-29 12:51 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2022-03-29 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 06/12] LSM: Remove double path_rename hook calls for RENAME_EXCHANGE Mickaël Salaün
2022-04-08 1:19 ` Paul Moore
2022-03-29 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 07/12] landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER Mickaël Salaün
2022-04-08 1:42 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-08 16:07 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-04-08 17:13 ` Paul Moore
2022-03-29 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 08/12] selftest/landlock: Add 11 new test suites dedicated to file reparenting Mickaël Salaün
2022-03-29 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 09/12] samples/landlock: Add support for " Mickaël Salaün
2022-03-29 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 10/12] landlock: Document LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER and ABI versioning Mickaël Salaün
2022-03-29 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 11/12] landlock: Document good practices about filesystem policies Mickaël Salaün
2022-03-29 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 12/12] landlock: Add design choices documentation for filesystem access rights Mickaël Salaün
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