From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 2/4] selftests/landlock: Selftests for file truncation support
Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2022 21:26:01 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220814192603.7387-3-gnoack3000@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220814192603.7387-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
These tests exercise the following truncation operations:
* truncate() (truncate by path)
* ftruncate() (truncate by file descriptor)
* open with the O_TRUNC flag
* special case: creat(), which is open with O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC.
in the following scenarios:
* Files with read, write and truncate rights.
* Files with read and truncate rights.
* Files with the truncate right.
* Files without the truncate right.
In particular, the following scenarios are enforced with the test:
* The truncate right is required to use ftruncate,
even when the thread already has the right to write to the file.
* open() with O_TRUNC requires the truncate right, if it truncates a file.
open() already checks security_path_truncate() in this case,
and it required no additional check in the Landlock LSM's file_open hook.
* creat() requires the truncate right
when called with an existing filename.
* creat() does *not* require the truncate right
when it's creating a new file.
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 219 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 219 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index cb77eaa01c91..7a2ce6cd1a5a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ static const char file1_s2d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/s2d3/f1";
static const char file2_s2d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/s2d3/f2";
static const char dir_s3d1[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1";
+static const char file1_s3d1[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/f1";
/* dir_s3d2 is a mount point. */
static const char dir_s3d2[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2";
static const char dir_s3d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d3";
@@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ static const char dir_s3d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d3";
* │ ├── f1
* │ └── f2
* └── s3d1
+ * ├── f1
* └── s3d2
* └── s3d3
*/
@@ -208,6 +210,7 @@ static void create_layout1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)
create_file(_metadata, file1_s2d3);
create_file(_metadata, file2_s2d3);
+ create_file(_metadata, file1_s3d1);
create_directory(_metadata, dir_s3d2);
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
ASSERT_EQ(0, mount("tmp", dir_s3d2, "tmpfs", 0, "size=4m,mode=700"));
@@ -230,6 +233,7 @@ static void remove_layout1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)
EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s2d2));
EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s2d1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s3d1));
EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(dir_s3d3));
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
umount(dir_s3d2);
@@ -3023,6 +3027,221 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe)
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(pipe_fds[1]));
}
+/*
+ * Opens the file and invokes ftruncate(2).
+ *
+ * Returns the errno of ftruncate if ftruncate() fails.
+ * Returns EBADFD if open() or close() fail (should not happen).
+ * Returns 0 if ftruncate(), open() and close() were successful.
+ */
+static int test_ftruncate(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ const char *const path, int flags)
+{
+ int res, err, fd;
+
+ fd = open(path, flags | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return EBADFD;
+
+ res = ftruncate(fd, 10);
+ err = errno;
+
+ if (close(fd) != 0)
+ return EBADFD;
+
+ if (res < 0)
+ return err;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes truncate(2) and returns the errno or 0. */
+static int test_truncate(const char *const path)
+{
+ if (truncate(path, 10) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Invokes creat(2) and returns its errno or 0.
+ * Closes the opened file descriptor on success.
+ * Returns EBADFD if close() returns an error (should not happen).
+ */
+static int test_creat(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ const char *const path, mode_t mode)
+{
+ int fd = creat(path, mode);
+
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return errno;
+
+ if (close(fd) < 0)
+ return EBADFD;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate)
+{
+ const char *const file_rwt = file1_s1d1;
+ const char *const file_rw = file2_s1d1;
+ const char *const file_rt = file1_s1d2;
+ const char *const file_t = file2_s1d2;
+ const char *const file_none = file1_s1d3;
+ const char *const dir_t = dir_s2d1;
+ const char *const file_in_dir_t = file1_s2d1;
+ const char *const dir_w = dir_s3d1;
+ const char *const file_in_dir_w = file1_s3d1;
+ const struct rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .path = file_rwt,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = file_rw,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = file_rt,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = file_t,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ },
+ // Implicitly: No access rights for file_none.
+ {
+ .path = dir_t,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = dir_w,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+ const __u64 handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+ const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, handled, rules);
+
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ /*
+ * Checks read, write and truncate rights: truncation works.
+ *
+ * Note: Independent of Landlock, ftruncate(2) on read-only
+ * file descriptors never works.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(_metadata, file_rwt, O_WRONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, test_ftruncate(_metadata, file_rwt, O_RDONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_rwt));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_rwt, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_rwt, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+
+ /* Checks read and write rights: no truncate variant works. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_ftruncate(_metadata, file_rw, O_WRONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, test_ftruncate(_metadata, file_rw, O_RDONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_truncate(file_rw));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_rw, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_rw, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+
+ /*
+ * Checks read and truncate rights: truncation works.
+ *
+ * Note: Files opened in O_RDONLY can get truncated as part of
+ * the same operation.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_rt, O_RDONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_rt, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_rt, O_WRONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_rt, O_WRONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_rt));
+
+ /* Checks truncate right: truncate works, but can't open file. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_t, O_WRONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_t, O_RDONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_t, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_t, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_t));
+
+ /* Checks "no rights" case: No form of truncation works. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_none, O_WRONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_none, O_RDONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_none, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_none, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_truncate(file_none));
+
+ /* Checks truncate right on directory: truncate works on contained files */
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_in_dir_t, O_WRONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_in_dir_t, O_RDONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_in_dir_t, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_in_dir_t, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_in_dir_t));
+
+ /*
+ * Checks creat in dir_w: This requires the truncate right
+ * when overwriting an existing file, but does not require it
+ * when the file is new.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_creat(_metadata, file_in_dir_w, 0600));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file_in_dir_w));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_creat(_metadata, file_in_dir_w, 0600));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exercises file truncation when it's not restricted,
+ * as it was the case before LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE existed.
+ */
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate_unhandled)
+{
+ const char *const file_r = file1_s1d1;
+ const char *const file_w = file2_s1d1;
+ const char *const file_none = file1_s1d2;
+ const struct rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .path = file_r,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = file_w,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ // Implicitly: No rights for file_none.
+ {},
+ };
+ const __u64 handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE;
+ const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, handled, rules);
+
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ /* Checks read right: truncation should work through truncate and open. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_r));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_r, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_r, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));
+
+ /* Checks write right: truncation should work through truncate, ftruncate and open. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_w));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(_metadata, file_w, O_WRONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_w, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_w, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));
+
+ /* Checks "no rights" case: truncate works but all open attempts fail. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_none));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_none, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_none, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_none, O_WRONLY));
+}
+
/* clang-format off */
FIXTURE(layout1_bind) {};
/* clang-format on */
--
2.37.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-08-14 19:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-08-14 19:25 [PATCH v4 0/4] landlock: truncate support Günther Noack
2022-08-14 19:26 ` [PATCH v4 1/4] landlock: Support file truncation Günther Noack
2022-08-16 19:20 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-08-17 16:31 ` Günther Noack
2022-08-14 19:26 ` Günther Noack [this message]
2022-08-16 17:08 ` [PATCH v4 2/4] selftests/landlock: Selftests for file truncation support Mickaël Salaün
2022-08-17 18:00 ` Günther Noack
2022-08-17 19:35 ` Günther Noack
2022-08-18 11:26 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-08-14 19:26 ` [PATCH v4 3/4] samples/landlock: Extend sample tool to support LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE Günther Noack
2022-08-14 19:26 ` [PATCH v4 4/4] landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support Günther Noack
2022-08-16 19:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-08-17 18:21 ` Günther Noack
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