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From: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
To: kpsingh@kernel.org, revest@chromium.org, jackmanb@chromium.org,
	ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org,
	kafai@fb.com, songliubraving@fb.com, yhs@fb.com,
	john.fastabend@gmail.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
	paul@paul-moore.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
	eparis@parisplace.org, shuah@kernel.org, brauner@kernel.org,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-team@cloudflare.com, cgzones@googlemail.com,
	karl@bigbadwolfsecurity.com, tixxdz@gmail.com,
	Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
Subject: [PATCH v5 2/4] bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_userns_create() sleepable
Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 11:20:26 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220815162028.926858-3-fred@cloudflare.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220815162028.926858-1-fred@cloudflare.com>

Users may want to audit calls to security_create_user_ns() and access
user space memory. Also create_user_ns() runs without
pagefault_disabled(). Therefore, make bpf_lsm_userns_create() sleepable
for mandatory access control policies.

Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>

---
Changes since v4:
- None
Changes since v3:
- None
Changes since v2:
- Rename create_user_ns hook to userns_create
Changes since v1:
- None
---
 kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
index fa71d58b7ded..761998fda762 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
@@ -335,6 +335,7 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid_obj)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_prctl)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_setscheduler)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_to_inode)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_userns_create)
 BTF_SET_END(sleepable_lsm_hooks)
 
 bool bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(u32 btf_id)
-- 
2.30.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-08-15 16:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-08-15 16:20 [PATCH v5 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns() Frederick Lawler
2022-08-15 16:20 ` [PATCH v5 1/4] security, lsm: " Frederick Lawler
2022-08-15 16:20 ` Frederick Lawler [this message]
2022-08-15 16:20 ` [PATCH v5 3/4] selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm userns_create hook Frederick Lawler
2022-08-15 16:20 ` [PATCH v5 4/4] selinux: Implement " Frederick Lawler
2022-08-16 21:51 ` [PATCH v5 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns() Paul Moore
2022-08-17 15:07   ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-17 16:01     ` Paul Moore
2022-08-17 19:57       ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-17 20:13         ` Paul Moore
2022-08-17 20:56           ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-17 21:09             ` Paul Moore
2022-08-17 21:24               ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-17 21:50                 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-18  0:35                   ` Jonathan Chapman-Moore
2022-08-18 14:05                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-08-18 15:11                   ` Paul Moore
2022-08-19 14:45                     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-08-19 21:10                       ` Paul Moore
2022-08-25 18:15                         ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-25 19:19                           ` Paul Moore
2022-08-25 21:58                             ` Song Liu
2022-08-25 22:10                               ` Paul Moore
2022-08-25 22:42                                 ` Song Liu
2022-08-26 15:02                                   ` Paul Moore
2022-08-26 16:57                                     ` Song Liu
2022-08-26 15:24                               ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-08-26 17:00                                 ` Song Liu
2022-08-26 21:00                                   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-08-26 22:34                                     ` Song Liu
2022-08-29 15:33                                     ` Christian Brauner
2022-09-03  3:58                                       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-08-26  9:10                             ` Ignat Korchagin
2022-08-26 15:12                               ` Paul Moore
2022-08-26 15:23                           ` Serge E. Hallyn

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