From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>,
Anna Schumaker <anna@kernel.org>,
Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, dwysocha@redhat.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init problem, preventing NFS sb sharing
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2022 16:13:44 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220901141344.wqnnemixrlb2b74g@wittgenstein> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <217595.1662033775@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
On Thu, Sep 01, 2022 at 01:02:55PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
>
> When NFS superblocks are created by automounting, their LSM parameters
> aren't set in the fs_context struct prior to sget_fc() being called,
> leading to failure to match existing superblocks.
>
> Fix this by adding a new LSM hook to load fc->security for submount
> creation when alloc_fs_context() is creating the fs_context for it.
>
> However, this uncovers a further bug: nfs_get_root() initialises the
> superblock security manually by calling security_sb_set_mnt_opts() or
> security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() - but then vfs_get_tree() calls
> security_sb_set_mnt_opts(), which can lead to SELinux, at least,
> complaining.
>
> Fix that by adding a flag to the fs_context that suppresses the
> security_sb_set_mnt_opts() call in vfs_get_tree(). This can be set by NFS
> when it sets the LSM context on the new superblock.
>
> The first bug leads to messages like the following appearing in dmesg:
>
> NFS: Cache volume key already in use (nfs,4.2,2,108,106a8c0,1,,,,100000,100000,2ee,3a98,1d4c,3a98,1)
>
> Changes
> =======
> ver #5)
> - Removed unused variable.
> - Only allocate smack_mnt_opts if we're dealing with a submount.
>
> ver #4)
> - When doing a FOR_SUBMOUNT mount, don't set the root label in SELinux or
> Smack.
>
> ver #3)
> - Made LSM parameter extraction dependent on fc->purpose ==
> FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT. Shouldn't happen on FOR_RECONFIGURE.
>
> ver #2)
> - Added Smack support
> - Made LSM parameter extraction dependent on reference != NULL.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Fixes: 9bc61ab18b1d ("vfs: Introduce fs_context, switch vfs_kern_mount() to it.")
> Fixes: 779df6a5480f ("NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode)
> Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
> cc: Anna Schumaker <anna@kernel.org>
> cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
> cc: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
> cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
> cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
> cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
> cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962680944.3334508.6610023900349142034.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962729225.3357250.14350728846471527137.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165970659095.2812394.6868894171102318796.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166133579016.3678898.6283195019480567275.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4
> ---
Acked-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-09-01 14:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-09-01 12:02 [PATCH v5] vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init problem, preventing NFS sb sharing David Howells
2022-09-01 14:13 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2022-09-06 15:48 ` Jeff Layton
2022-09-06 16:01 ` David Howells
2022-09-06 16:02 ` Jeff Layton
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2022-11-10 11:09 David Howells
2022-11-11 17:40 ` Paul Moore
2022-11-11 17:43 ` Paul Moore
2022-11-19 8:48 ` Al Viro
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