* [PATCH v7 1/7] security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook
2022-09-30 16:01 [PATCH v7 0/7] landlock: truncate support Günther Noack
@ 2022-09-30 16:01 ` Günther Noack
2022-09-30 16:01 ` [PATCH v7 2/7] landlock: Support file truncation Günther Noack
` (5 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Günther Noack @ 2022-09-30 16:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, James Morris, Paul Moore,
Serge E . Hallyn, linux-fsdevel, Konstantin Meskhidze,
Günther Noack, Tetsuo Handa, John Johansen
Like path_truncate, the file_truncate hook also restricts file
truncation, but is called in the cases where truncation is attempted
on an already-opened file.
This is required in a subsequent commit to handle ftruncate()
operations differently to truncate() operations.
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
fs/namei.c | 2 +-
fs/open.c | 2 +-
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 10 +++++++++-
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 6 ++++++
security/security.c | 5 +++++
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 13 +++++++++++++
8 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 53b4bc094db2..0e419bd30f8e 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -3211,7 +3211,7 @@ static int handle_truncate(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct file *filp)
if (error)
return error;
- error = security_path_truncate(path);
+ error = security_file_truncate(filp);
if (!error) {
error = do_truncate(mnt_userns, path->dentry, 0,
ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN,
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index cf7e5c350a54..0fa861873245 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small)
if (IS_APPEND(file_inode(f.file)))
goto out_putf;
sb_start_write(inode->i_sb);
- error = security_path_truncate(&f.file->f_path);
+ error = security_file_truncate(f.file);
if (!error)
error = do_truncate(file_mnt_user_ns(f.file), dentry, length,
ATTR_MTIME | ATTR_CTIME, f.file);
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 60fff133c0b1..dee35ab253ba 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_send_sigiotask, struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_receive, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_open, struct file *file)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_truncate, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_alloc, struct task_struct *task,
unsigned long clone_flags)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_free, struct task_struct *task)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 3aa6030302f5..4acc975f28d9 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -409,7 +409,9 @@
* @attr is the iattr structure containing the new file attributes.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @path_truncate:
- * Check permission before truncating a file.
+ * Check permission before truncating the file indicated by path.
+ * Note that truncation permissions may also be checked based on
+ * already opened files, using the @file_truncate hook.
* @path contains the path structure for the file.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @inode_getattr:
@@ -598,6 +600,12 @@
* to receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC.
* @file contains the file structure being received.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_truncate:
+ * Check permission before truncating a file, i.e. using ftruncate.
+ * Note that truncation permission may also be checked based on the path,
+ * using the @path_truncate hook.
+ * @file contains the file structure for the file.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @file_open:
* Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon
* file_permission, and recheck access if anything has changed
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 7bd0c490703d..f80b23382dd9 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -394,6 +394,7 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);
int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
int security_file_open(struct file *file);
+int security_file_truncate(struct file *file);
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags);
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
@@ -1011,6 +1012,11 @@ static inline int security_file_open(struct file *file)
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_file_truncate(struct file *file)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned long clone_flags)
{
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index e29cade7b662..98ecb7f221b8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -329,6 +329,11 @@ static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR);
}
+static int apparmor_file_truncate(struct file *file)
+{
+ return apparmor_path_truncate(&file->f_path);
+}
+
static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *old_name)
{
@@ -1232,6 +1237,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, apparmor_file_truncate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4b95de24bc8d..d73e423005c3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1650,6 +1650,11 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN);
}
+int security_file_truncate(struct file *file)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(file_truncate, 0, file);
+}
+
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 71e82d855ebf..af04a7b7eb28 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -134,6 +134,18 @@ static int tomoyo_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE, path, NULL);
}
+/**
+ * tomoyo_file_truncate - Target for security_file_truncate().
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_file_truncate(struct file *file)
+{
+ return tomoyo_path_truncate(&file->f_path);
+}
+
/**
* tomoyo_path_unlink - Target for security_path_unlink().
*
@@ -545,6 +557,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, tomoyo_bprm_check_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, tomoyo_file_fcntl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, tomoyo_file_open),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, tomoyo_file_truncate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, tomoyo_path_truncate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, tomoyo_path_unlink),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, tomoyo_path_mkdir),
--
2.37.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 2/7] landlock: Support file truncation
2022-09-30 16:01 [PATCH v7 0/7] landlock: truncate support Günther Noack
2022-09-30 16:01 ` [PATCH v7 1/7] security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook Günther Noack
@ 2022-09-30 16:01 ` Günther Noack
2022-09-30 16:01 ` [PATCH v7 3/7] selftests/landlock: Selftests for file truncation support Günther Noack
` (4 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Günther Noack @ 2022-09-30 16:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, James Morris, Paul Moore,
Serge E . Hallyn, linux-fsdevel, Konstantin Meskhidze,
Günther Noack
Introduce the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE flag for file truncation.
This flag hooks into the path_truncate LSM hook and covers file
truncation using truncate(2), ftruncate(2), open(2) with O_TRUNC, as
well as creat().
This change also increments the Landlock ABI version, updates
corresponding selftests, and updates code documentation to document
the flag.
The following operations are restricted:
open(): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right if a file gets
implicitly truncated as part of the open() (e.g. using O_TRUNC).
Notable special cases:
* open(..., O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC) can truncate files as well in Linux
* open() with O_TRUNC does *not* need the TRUNCATE right when it
creates a new file.
truncate() (on a path): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
right.
ftruncate() (on a file): requires that the file had the TRUNCATE right
when it was previously opened.
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 21 +++-
security/landlock/fs.c | 117 ++++++++++++++++++-
security/landlock/fs.h | 24 ++++
security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +-
security/landlock/setup.c | 1 +
security/landlock/syscalls.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 7 +-
8 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index 23df4e0e8ace..d830cdfdbe56 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -95,8 +95,19 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
* A file can only receive these access rights:
*
* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE: Execute a file.
- * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. Note that
+ * you might additionally need the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` right in
+ * order to overwrite files with :manpage:`open(2)` using `O_TRUNC` or
+ * :manpage:`creat(2)`.
* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE: Open a file with read access.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE: Truncate a file with :manpage:`truncate(2)`,
+ * :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`, :manpage:`creat(2)`, or :manpage:`open(2)` with
+ * `O_TRUNC`. Whether an opened file can be truncated with
+ * :manpage:`ftruncate(2)` is determined during :manpage:`open(2)`, in the
+ * same way as read and write permissions are checked during
+ * :manpage:`open(2)` using %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE and
+ * %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE. This access right is available since the
+ * third version of the Landlock ABI.
*
* A directory can receive access rights related to files or directories. The
* following access right is applied to the directory itself, and the
@@ -139,10 +150,9 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
*
* It is currently not possible to restrict some file-related actions
* accessible through these syscall families: :manpage:`chdir(2)`,
- * :manpage:`truncate(2)`, :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`,
- * :manpage:`chmod(2)`, :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`,
- * :manpage:`utime(2)`, :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`,
- * :manpage:`access(2)`.
+ * :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, :manpage:`chmod(2)`,
+ * :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, :manpage:`utime(2)`,
+ * :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, :manpage:`access(2)`.
* Future Landlock evolutions will enable to restrict them.
*/
/* clang-format off */
@@ -160,6 +170,7 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK (1ULL << 11)
#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM (1ULL << 12)
#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER (1ULL << 13)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE (1ULL << 14)
/* clang-format on */
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index a9dbd99d9ee7..2d0085bb5ed2 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
#define ACCESS_FILE ( \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
/* clang-format on */
/*
@@ -297,6 +298,18 @@ get_handled_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
return access_dom & LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;
}
+/*
+ * init_layer_masks - Populates @layer_masks such that for each access right in
+ * @access_request, the bits for all the layers are set where this access right
+ * is handled.
+ *
+ * @domain: The domain that defines the current restrictions.
+ * @access_request: The requested access rights to check.
+ * @layer_masks: The layer masks to populate.
+ *
+ * Returns: An access mask where each access right bit is set which is handled
+ * in any of the active layers in @domain.
+ */
static inline access_mask_t
init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
const access_mask_t access_request,
@@ -761,6 +774,47 @@ static bool collect_domain_accesses(
return ret;
}
+/**
+ * get_path_access - Returns the subset of access rights in access_request which
+ * are permitted for the given path.
+ *
+ * @domain: The domain that defines the current restrictions.
+ * @path: The path to get access rights for.
+ * @access_request: The rights we are interested in.
+ *
+ * Returns: The access mask of the rights that are permitted on the given path,
+ * which are also a subset of access_request (to save some calculation time).
+ */
+static inline access_mask_t
+get_path_access(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
+ const struct path *const path, access_mask_t access_request)
+{
+ layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
+ unsigned long access_bit, access_req;
+ access_mask_t effective_access_request;
+
+ effective_access_request =
+ init_layer_masks(domain, access_request, &layer_masks);
+ if (!check_access_path_dual(domain, path, effective_access_request,
+ &layer_masks, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {
+ /*
+ * Returns immediately for successful accesses and for cases
+ * where everything is permitted because the path belongs to an
+ * internal filesystem.
+ */
+ return access_request;
+ }
+
+ access_req = access_request;
+ for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req, ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)) {
+ if (layer_masks[access_bit]) {
+ /* If any layer vetoed the access right, remove it. */
+ access_request &= ~BIT_ULL(access_bit);
+ }
+ }
+ return access_request;
+}
+
/**
* current_check_refer_path - Check if a rename or link action is allowed
*
@@ -1142,9 +1196,19 @@ static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir,
return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR);
}
+static int hook_path_truncate(const struct path *const path)
+{
+ return current_check_access_path(path, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+}
+
/* File hooks */
-static inline access_mask_t get_file_access(const struct file *const file)
+/*
+ * get_required_file_open_access - Returns the access rights that are required
+ * for opening the file, depending on the file type and open mode.
+ */
+static inline access_mask_t
+get_required_file_open_access(const struct file *const file)
{
access_mask_t access = 0;
@@ -1164,17 +1228,56 @@ static inline access_mask_t get_file_access(const struct file *const file)
static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
{
+ access_mask_t access_request, access_rights;
+ const access_mask_t optional_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
landlock_get_current_domain();
- if (!dom)
+ if (!dom) {
+ /*
+ * Grants all access rights, even if most of them are not
+ * checked later on. It is more consistent.
+ */
+ landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;
return 0;
+ }
+
/*
- * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_file_access() may
- * return 0. This case will be handled with a future Landlock
+ * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_required_file_open_access()
+ * may return 0. This case will be handled with a future Landlock
* evolution.
*/
- return check_access_path(dom, &file->f_path, get_file_access(file));
+ access_request = get_required_file_open_access(file);
+ access_rights = get_path_access(dom, &file->f_path,
+ access_request | optional_access);
+ if (access_request & ~access_rights)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ /*
+ * For operations on already opened files (i.e. ftruncate()), it is the
+ * access rights at the time of open() which decide whether the
+ * operation is permitted. Therefore, we record the relevant subset of
+ * file access rights in the opened struct file.
+ */
+ landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = access_rights;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int hook_file_truncate(struct file *const file)
+{
+ /*
+ * Allows truncation if the truncate right was available at the time of
+ * opening the file, to get a consistent access check as for read, write
+ * and execute operations.
+ *
+ * Note: For checks done based on the file's Landlock rights, we enforce
+ * them independently of whether the current thread is in a Landlock
+ * domain, so that open files passed between independent processes
+ * retain their behaviour.
+ */
+ if (landlock_file(file)->allowed_access & LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
+ return 0;
+ return -EACCES;
}
static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1194,6 +1297,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, hook_path_symlink),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, hook_path_truncate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, hook_file_truncate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open),
};
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.h b/security/landlock/fs.h
index 8db7acf9109b..488e4813680a 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.h
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.h
@@ -36,6 +36,24 @@ struct landlock_inode_security {
struct landlock_object __rcu *object;
};
+/**
+ * struct landlock_file_security - File security blob
+ *
+ * This information is populated when opening a file in hook_file_open, and
+ * tracks the relevant Landlock access rights that were available at the time
+ * of opening the file. Other LSM hooks use these rights in order to authorize
+ * operations on already opened files.
+ */
+struct landlock_file_security {
+ /**
+ * @allowed_access: Access rights that were available at the time of
+ * opening the file. This is not necessarily the full set of access
+ * rights available at that time, but it's the necessary subset as
+ * needed to authorize later operations on the open file.
+ */
+ access_mask_t allowed_access;
+};
+
/**
* struct landlock_superblock_security - Superblock security blob
*
@@ -50,6 +68,12 @@ struct landlock_superblock_security {
atomic_long_t inode_refs;
};
+static inline struct landlock_file_security *
+landlock_file(const struct file *const file)
+{
+ return file->f_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
+}
+
static inline struct landlock_inode_security *
landlock_inode(const struct inode *const inode)
{
diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
index b54184ab9439..82288f0e9e5e 100644
--- a/security/landlock/limits.h
+++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS 16
#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES U32_MAX
-#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)
#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
index f8e8e980454c..3f196d2ce4f9 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.c
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false;
struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct landlock_cred_security),
+ .lbs_file = sizeof(struct landlock_file_security),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct landlock_inode_security),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
};
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 735a0865ea11..f4d6fc7ed17f 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
.write = fop_dummy_write,
};
-#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 2
+#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 3
/**
* sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
index da9290817866..72cdae277b02 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ TEST(abi_version)
const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
};
- ASSERT_EQ(2, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
+ ASSERT_EQ(3, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0,
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index 45de42a027c5..87b28d14a1aa 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -406,9 +406,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)
#define ACCESS_FILE ( \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
-#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
+#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
#define ACCESS_ALL ( \
ACCESS_FILE | \
@@ -422,7 +423,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | \
- ACCESS_LAST)
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)
/* clang-format on */
--
2.37.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 3/7] selftests/landlock: Selftests for file truncation support
2022-09-30 16:01 [PATCH v7 0/7] landlock: truncate support Günther Noack
2022-09-30 16:01 ` [PATCH v7 1/7] security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook Günther Noack
2022-09-30 16:01 ` [PATCH v7 2/7] landlock: Support file truncation Günther Noack
@ 2022-09-30 16:01 ` Günther Noack
2022-09-30 16:01 ` [PATCH v7 4/7] selftests/landlock: Test open() and ftruncate() in multiple scenarios Günther Noack
` (3 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Günther Noack @ 2022-09-30 16:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, James Morris, Paul Moore,
Serge E . Hallyn, linux-fsdevel, Konstantin Meskhidze,
Günther Noack
These tests exercise the following truncation operations:
* truncate() (truncate by path)
* ftruncate() (truncate by file descriptor)
* open with the O_TRUNC flag
* special case: creat(), which is open with O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC.
in the following scenarios:
* Files with read, write and truncate rights.
* Files with read and truncate rights.
* Files with the truncate right.
* Files without the truncate right.
In particular, the following scenarios are enforced with the test:
* open() with O_TRUNC requires the truncate right, if it truncates a file.
open() already checks security_path_truncate() in this case,
and it required no additional check in the Landlock LSM's file_open hook.
* creat() requires the truncate right
when called with an existing filename.
* creat() does *not* require the truncate right
when it's creating a new file.
* ftruncate() requires that the file was opened by a thread that had
the truncate right for the file at the time of open(). (The rights
are carried along with the opened file.)
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 287 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 287 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index 87b28d14a1aa..718543fd3dfc 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ static const char file1_s2d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/s2d3/f1";
static const char file2_s2d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/s2d3/f2";
static const char dir_s3d1[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1";
+static const char file1_s3d1[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/f1";
/* dir_s3d2 is a mount point. */
static const char dir_s3d2[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2";
static const char dir_s3d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d3";
@@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ static const char dir_s3d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d3";
* │ ├── f1
* │ └── f2
* └── s3d1
+ * ├── f1
* └── s3d2
* └── s3d3
*/
@@ -208,6 +210,7 @@ static void create_layout1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)
create_file(_metadata, file1_s2d3);
create_file(_metadata, file2_s2d3);
+ create_file(_metadata, file1_s3d1);
create_directory(_metadata, dir_s3d2);
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
ASSERT_EQ(0, mount("tmp", dir_s3d2, "tmpfs", 0, "size=4m,mode=700"));
@@ -230,6 +233,7 @@ static void remove_layout1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)
EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s2d2));
EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s2d1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s3d1));
EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(dir_s3d3));
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
umount(dir_s3d2);
@@ -3158,6 +3162,289 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe)
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(pipe_fds[1]));
}
+/* Invokes truncate(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_truncate(const char *const path)
+{
+ if (truncate(path, 10) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Invokes creat(2) and returns its errno or 0.
+ * Closes the opened file descriptor on success.
+ */
+static int test_creat(const char *const path)
+{
+ int fd = creat(path, 0600);
+
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return errno;
+
+ /*
+ * Mixing error codes from close(2) and creat(2) should not lead to any
+ * (access type) confusion for this test.
+ */
+ if (close(fd) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exercises file truncation when it's not restricted,
+ * as it was the case before LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE existed.
+ */
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate_unhandled)
+{
+ const char *const file_r = file1_s1d1;
+ const char *const file_w = file2_s1d1;
+ const char *const file_none = file1_s1d2;
+ const struct rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .path = file_r,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = file_w,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ /* Implicitly: No rights for file_none. */
+ {},
+ };
+
+ const __u64 handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE;
+ int ruleset_fd;
+
+ /* Enable Landlock. */
+ ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, handled, rules);
+
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ /*
+ * Checks read right: truncate and open with O_TRUNC work, unless the
+ * file is attempted to be opened for writing.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_r));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_r, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_r, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_creat(file_r));
+
+ /*
+ * Checks write right: truncate and open with O_TRUNC work, unless the
+ * file is attempted to be opened for reading.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_w));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_w, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_w, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_creat(file_w));
+
+ /*
+ * Checks "no rights" case: truncate works but all open attempts fail,
+ * including creat.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_none));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_none, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_none, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_creat(file_none));
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate)
+{
+ const char *const file_rwt = file1_s1d1;
+ const char *const file_rw = file2_s1d1;
+ const char *const file_rt = file1_s1d2;
+ const char *const file_t = file2_s1d2;
+ const char *const file_none = file1_s1d3;
+ const char *const dir_t = dir_s2d1;
+ const char *const file_in_dir_t = file1_s2d1;
+ const char *const dir_w = dir_s3d1;
+ const char *const file_in_dir_w = file1_s3d1;
+ const struct rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .path = file_rwt,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = file_rw,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = file_rt,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = file_t,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ },
+ /* Implicitly: No access rights for file_none. */
+ {
+ .path = dir_t,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = dir_w,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+ const __u64 handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+ int ruleset_fd;
+
+ /* Enable Landlock. */
+ ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, handled, rules);
+
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ /* Checks read, write and truncate rights: truncation works. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_rwt));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_rwt, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_rwt, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));
+
+ /* Checks read and write rights: no truncate variant works. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_truncate(file_rw));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_rw, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_rw, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));
+
+ /*
+ * Checks read and truncate rights: truncation works.
+ *
+ * Note: Files can get truncated using open() even with O_RDONLY.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_rt));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_rt, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_rt, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));
+
+ /* Checks truncate right: truncate works, but can't open file. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_t));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_t, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_t, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));
+
+ /* Checks "no rights" case: No form of truncation works. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_truncate(file_none));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_none, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_none, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));
+
+ /*
+ * Checks truncate right on directory: truncate works on contained
+ * files.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_in_dir_t));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_in_dir_t, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_in_dir_t, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));
+
+ /*
+ * Checks creat in dir_w: This requires the truncate right when
+ * overwriting an existing file, but does not require it when the file
+ * is new.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_creat(file_in_dir_w));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file_in_dir_w));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_creat(file_in_dir_w));
+}
+
+/* Invokes ftruncate(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_ftruncate(int fd)
+{
+ if (ftruncate(fd, 10) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, ftruncate)
+{
+ /*
+ * This test opens a new file descriptor at different stages of
+ * Landlock restriction:
+ *
+ * without restriction: ftruncate works
+ * something else but truncate restricted: ftruncate works
+ * truncate restricted and permitted: ftruncate works
+ * truncate restricted and not permitted: ftruncate fails
+ *
+ * Whether this works or not is expected to depend on the time when the
+ * FD was opened, not to depend on the time when ftruncate() was
+ * called.
+ */
+ const char *const path = file1_s1d1;
+ const __u64 handled1 = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE;
+ const struct rule layer1[] = {
+ {
+ .path = path,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+ const __u64 handled2 = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+ const struct rule layer2[] = {
+ {
+ .path = path,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+ const __u64 handled3 = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE;
+ const struct rule layer3[] = {
+ {
+ .path = path,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+ int fd_layer0, fd_layer1, fd_layer2, fd_layer3, ruleset_fd;
+
+ fd_layer0 = open(path, O_WRONLY);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd_layer0));
+
+ ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, handled1, layer1);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ fd_layer1 = open(path, O_WRONLY);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd_layer0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd_layer1));
+
+ ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, handled2, layer2);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ fd_layer2 = open(path, O_WRONLY);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd_layer0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd_layer1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd_layer2));
+
+ ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, handled3, layer3);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ fd_layer3 = open(path, O_WRONLY);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd_layer0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd_layer1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd_layer2));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_ftruncate(fd_layer3));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd_layer0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd_layer1));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd_layer2));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd_layer3));
+}
+
/* clang-format off */
FIXTURE(layout1_bind) {};
/* clang-format on */
--
2.37.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 4/7] selftests/landlock: Test open() and ftruncate() in multiple scenarios
2022-09-30 16:01 [PATCH v7 0/7] landlock: truncate support Günther Noack
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2022-09-30 16:01 ` [PATCH v7 3/7] selftests/landlock: Selftests for file truncation support Günther Noack
@ 2022-09-30 16:01 ` Günther Noack
2022-09-30 16:01 ` [PATCH v7 5/7] selftests/landlock: Test FD passing from a Landlock-restricted to an unrestricted process Günther Noack
` (2 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Günther Noack @ 2022-09-30 16:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, James Morris, Paul Moore,
Serge E . Hallyn, linux-fsdevel, Konstantin Meskhidze,
Günther Noack
This test uses multiple fixture variants to exercise a broader set of
scnenarios.
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 96 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index 718543fd3dfc..308f6f36e8c0 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -3445,6 +3445,102 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, ftruncate)
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd_layer3));
}
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE(ftruncate) {};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(ftruncate)
+{
+ prepare_layout(_metadata);
+ create_file(_metadata, file1_s1d1);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(ftruncate)
+{
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s1d1));
+ cleanup_layout(_metadata);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(ftruncate)
+{
+ const __u64 handled;
+ const __u64 permitted;
+ const int expected_open_result;
+ const int expected_ftruncate_result;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(ftruncate, w_w) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ .permitted = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ .expected_open_result = 0,
+ .expected_ftruncate_result = 0,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(ftruncate, t_t) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ .permitted = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ .expected_open_result = 0,
+ .expected_ftruncate_result = 0,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(ftruncate, wt_w) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ .permitted = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ .expected_open_result = 0,
+ .expected_ftruncate_result = EACCES,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(ftruncate, wt_wt) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ .permitted = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ .expected_open_result = 0,
+ .expected_ftruncate_result = 0,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(ftruncate, wt_t) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ .permitted = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ .expected_open_result = EACCES,
+};
+
+TEST_F_FORK(ftruncate, open_and_ftruncate)
+{
+ const char *const path = file1_s1d1;
+ const struct rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .path = path,
+ .access = variant->permitted,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+ int fd, ruleset_fd;
+
+ /* Enable Landlock. */
+ ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
+ EXPECT_EQ(variant->expected_open_result, (fd < 0 ? errno : 0));
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(variant->expected_ftruncate_result,
+ test_ftruncate(fd));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+ }
+}
+
/* clang-format off */
FIXTURE(layout1_bind) {};
/* clang-format on */
--
2.37.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 5/7] selftests/landlock: Test FD passing from a Landlock-restricted to an unrestricted process
2022-09-30 16:01 [PATCH v7 0/7] landlock: truncate support Günther Noack
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2022-09-30 16:01 ` [PATCH v7 4/7] selftests/landlock: Test open() and ftruncate() in multiple scenarios Günther Noack
@ 2022-09-30 16:01 ` Günther Noack
2022-09-30 18:32 ` Günther Noack
2022-09-30 16:01 ` [PATCH v7 6/7] samples/landlock: Extend sample tool to support LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE Günther Noack
2022-09-30 16:01 ` [PATCH v7 7/7] landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support Günther Noack
6 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Günther Noack @ 2022-09-30 16:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, James Morris, Paul Moore,
Serge E . Hallyn, linux-fsdevel, Konstantin Meskhidze,
Günther Noack
A file descriptor created in a restricted process carries Landlock
restrictions with it which will apply even if the same opened file is
used from an unrestricted process.
This change extracts suitable FD-passing helpers from base_test.c and
moves them to common.h. We use the fixture variants from the ftruncate
fixture to exercise the same scenarios as in the open_and_ftruncate
test, but doing the Landlock restriction and open() in a different
process than the ftruncate() call.
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 36 +----------
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
index 72cdae277b02..6d1b6eedb432 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
@@ -263,23 +263,6 @@ TEST(ruleset_fd_transfer)
.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR,
};
int ruleset_fd_tx, dir_fd;
- union {
- /* Aligned ancillary data buffer. */
- char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx))];
- struct cmsghdr _align;
- } cmsg_tx = {};
- char data_tx = '.';
- struct iovec io = {
- .iov_base = &data_tx,
- .iov_len = sizeof(data_tx),
- };
- struct msghdr msg = {
- .msg_iov = &io,
- .msg_iovlen = 1,
- .msg_control = &cmsg_tx.buf,
- .msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsg_tx.buf),
- };
- struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
int socket_fds[2];
pid_t child;
int status;
@@ -298,33 +281,20 @@ TEST(ruleset_fd_transfer)
&path_beneath_attr, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd));
- cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
- ASSERT_NE(NULL, cmsg);
- cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx));
- cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
- cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
- memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), &ruleset_fd_tx, sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx));
-
/* Sends the ruleset FD over a socketpair and then close it. */
ASSERT_EQ(0, socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0,
socket_fds));
- ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(data_tx), sendmsg(socket_fds[0], &msg, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, send_fd(socket_fds[0], ruleset_fd_tx));
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(socket_fds[0]));
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_tx));
child = fork();
ASSERT_LE(0, child);
if (child == 0) {
- int ruleset_fd_rx;
+ int ruleset_fd_rx = recv_fd(socket_fds[1]);
- *(char *)msg.msg_iov->iov_base = '\0';
- ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(data_tx),
- recvmsg(socket_fds[1], &msg, MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC));
- ASSERT_EQ('.', *(char *)msg.msg_iov->iov_base);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_rx);
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(socket_fds[1]));
- cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
- ASSERT_EQ(cmsg->cmsg_len, CMSG_LEN(sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx)));
- memcpy(&ruleset_fd_rx, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx));
/* Enforces the received ruleset on the child. */
ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
index 7ba18eb23783..8ec8971e9580 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <errno.h>
#include <linux/landlock.h>
#include <sys/capability.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
@@ -187,3 +188,69 @@ clear_cap(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, const cap_value_t caps)
{
_effective_cap(_metadata, caps, CAP_CLEAR);
}
+
+/* Receives an FD from a UNIX socket. Returns the received FD, -1 on error. */
+__maybe_unused static int recv_fd(int usock)
+{
+ int fd_rx;
+ union {
+ /* Aligned ancillary data buffer. */
+ char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(fd_rx))];
+ struct cmsghdr _align;
+ } cmsg_rx = {};
+ char data = '\0';
+ struct iovec io = {
+ .iov_base = &data,
+ .iov_len = sizeof(data),
+ };
+ struct msghdr msg = {
+ .msg_iov = &io,
+ .msg_iovlen = 1,
+ .msg_control = &cmsg_rx.buf,
+ .msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsg_rx.buf),
+ };
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+ int res;
+
+ res = recvmsg(usock, &msg, MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC);
+ if (res < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+ if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(fd_rx)))
+ return -1;
+
+ memcpy(&fd_rx, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(fd_rx));
+ return fd_rx;
+}
+
+/* Sends an FD on a UNIX socket. Returns 0 on success or -1 on error. */
+__maybe_unused static int send_fd(int usock, int fd_tx)
+{
+ union {
+ /* Aligned ancillary data buffer. */
+ char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(fd_tx))];
+ struct cmsghdr _align;
+ } cmsg_tx = {};
+ char data_tx = '.';
+ struct iovec io = {
+ .iov_base = &data_tx,
+ .iov_len = sizeof(data_tx),
+ };
+ struct msghdr msg = {
+ .msg_iov = &io,
+ .msg_iovlen = 1,
+ .msg_control = &cmsg_tx.buf,
+ .msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsg_tx.buf),
+ };
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+
+ cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(fd_tx));
+ cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
+ cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
+ memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), &fd_tx, sizeof(fd_tx));
+
+ if (sendmsg(usock, &msg, 0) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index 308f6f36e8c0..93ed80a25a74 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -3541,6 +3541,68 @@ TEST_F_FORK(ftruncate, open_and_ftruncate)
}
}
+TEST_F_FORK(ftruncate, open_and_ftruncate_in_different_processes)
+{
+ int child, fd, status;
+ int socket_fds[2];
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0,
+ socket_fds));
+
+ child = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+ if (child == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Enable Landlock in the child process, open a file descriptor
+ * where truncation is forbidden and send it to the
+ * non-landlocked parent process.
+ */
+ const char *const path = file1_s1d1;
+ const struct rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .path = path,
+ .access = variant->permitted,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+ int fd, ruleset_fd;
+
+ /* Enable Landlock. */
+ ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
+ ASSERT_EQ(variant->expected_open_result, (fd < 0 ? errno : 0));
+
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, send_fd(socket_fds[0], fd));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(socket_fds[0]));
+
+ _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ if (variant->expected_open_result == 0) {
+ fd = recv_fd(socket_fds[1]);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(variant->expected_ftruncate_result,
+ test_ftruncate(fd));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(socket_fds[0]));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(socket_fds[1]));
+}
+
/* clang-format off */
FIXTURE(layout1_bind) {};
/* clang-format on */
--
2.37.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 5/7] selftests/landlock: Test FD passing from a Landlock-restricted to an unrestricted process
2022-09-30 16:01 ` [PATCH v7 5/7] selftests/landlock: Test FD passing from a Landlock-restricted to an unrestricted process Günther Noack
@ 2022-09-30 18:32 ` Günther Noack
0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Günther Noack @ 2022-09-30 18:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, James Morris, Paul Moore,
Serge E . Hallyn, linux-fsdevel, Konstantin Meskhidze
On Fri, Sep 30, 2022 at 06:01:42PM +0200, Günther Noack wrote:
> A file descriptor created in a restricted process carries Landlock
> restrictions with it which will apply even if the same opened file is
> used from an unrestricted process.
>
> This change extracts suitable FD-passing helpers from base_test.c and
> moves them to common.h. We use the fixture variants from the ftruncate
> fixture to exercise the same scenarios as in the open_and_ftruncate
> test, but doing the Landlock restriction and open() in a different
> process than the ftruncate() call.
>
> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
> ---
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 36 +----------
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
> index 72cdae277b02..6d1b6eedb432 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
> @@ -263,23 +263,6 @@ TEST(ruleset_fd_transfer)
> .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR,
> };
> int ruleset_fd_tx, dir_fd;
> - union {
> - /* Aligned ancillary data buffer. */
> - char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx))];
> - struct cmsghdr _align;
> - } cmsg_tx = {};
> - char data_tx = '.';
> - struct iovec io = {
> - .iov_base = &data_tx,
> - .iov_len = sizeof(data_tx),
> - };
> - struct msghdr msg = {
> - .msg_iov = &io,
> - .msg_iovlen = 1,
> - .msg_control = &cmsg_tx.buf,
> - .msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsg_tx.buf),
> - };
> - struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
> int socket_fds[2];
> pid_t child;
> int status;
> @@ -298,33 +281,20 @@ TEST(ruleset_fd_transfer)
> &path_beneath_attr, 0));
> ASSERT_EQ(0, close(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd));
>
> - cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
> - ASSERT_NE(NULL, cmsg);
> - cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx));
> - cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
> - cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
> - memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), &ruleset_fd_tx, sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx));
> -
> /* Sends the ruleset FD over a socketpair and then close it. */
> ASSERT_EQ(0, socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0,
> socket_fds));
> - ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(data_tx), sendmsg(socket_fds[0], &msg, 0));
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, send_fd(socket_fds[0], ruleset_fd_tx));
> ASSERT_EQ(0, close(socket_fds[0]));
> ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_tx));
>
> child = fork();
> ASSERT_LE(0, child);
> if (child == 0) {
> - int ruleset_fd_rx;
> + int ruleset_fd_rx = recv_fd(socket_fds[1]);
>
> - *(char *)msg.msg_iov->iov_base = '\0';
> - ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(data_tx),
> - recvmsg(socket_fds[1], &msg, MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC));
> - ASSERT_EQ('.', *(char *)msg.msg_iov->iov_base);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_rx);
> ASSERT_EQ(0, close(socket_fds[1]));
> - cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
> - ASSERT_EQ(cmsg->cmsg_len, CMSG_LEN(sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx)));
> - memcpy(&ruleset_fd_rx, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx));
>
> /* Enforces the received ruleset on the child. */
> ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
> index 7ba18eb23783..8ec8971e9580 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
> @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
> #include <errno.h>
> #include <linux/landlock.h>
> #include <sys/capability.h>
> +#include <sys/socket.h>
> #include <sys/syscall.h>
> #include <sys/types.h>
> #include <sys/wait.h>
> @@ -187,3 +188,69 @@ clear_cap(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, const cap_value_t caps)
> {
> _effective_cap(_metadata, caps, CAP_CLEAR);
> }
> +
> +/* Receives an FD from a UNIX socket. Returns the received FD, -1 on error. */
> +__maybe_unused static int recv_fd(int usock)
Ah bummer, the definition of "__maybe_unused" is not visible here
(last minute change before sending it off...). Will fix it.
> +{
> + int fd_rx;
> + union {
> + /* Aligned ancillary data buffer. */
> + char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(fd_rx))];
> + struct cmsghdr _align;
> + } cmsg_rx = {};
> + char data = '\0';
> + struct iovec io = {
> + .iov_base = &data,
> + .iov_len = sizeof(data),
> + };
> + struct msghdr msg = {
> + .msg_iov = &io,
> + .msg_iovlen = 1,
> + .msg_control = &cmsg_rx.buf,
> + .msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsg_rx.buf),
> + };
> + struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
> + int res;
> +
> + res = recvmsg(usock, &msg, MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC);
> + if (res < 0)
> + return -1;
> +
> + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
> + if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(fd_rx)))
> + return -1;
> +
> + memcpy(&fd_rx, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(fd_rx));
> + return fd_rx;
> +}
> +
> +/* Sends an FD on a UNIX socket. Returns 0 on success or -1 on error. */
> +__maybe_unused static int send_fd(int usock, int fd_tx)
> +{
> + union {
> + /* Aligned ancillary data buffer. */
> + char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(fd_tx))];
> + struct cmsghdr _align;
> + } cmsg_tx = {};
> + char data_tx = '.';
> + struct iovec io = {
> + .iov_base = &data_tx,
> + .iov_len = sizeof(data_tx),
> + };
> + struct msghdr msg = {
> + .msg_iov = &io,
> + .msg_iovlen = 1,
> + .msg_control = &cmsg_tx.buf,
> + .msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsg_tx.buf),
> + };
> + struct cmsghdr *cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
> +
> + cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(fd_tx));
> + cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
> + cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
> + memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), &fd_tx, sizeof(fd_tx));
> +
> + if (sendmsg(usock, &msg, 0) < 0)
> + return -1;
> + return 0;
> +}
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> index 308f6f36e8c0..93ed80a25a74 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> @@ -3541,6 +3541,68 @@ TEST_F_FORK(ftruncate, open_and_ftruncate)
> }
> }
>
> +TEST_F_FORK(ftruncate, open_and_ftruncate_in_different_processes)
> +{
> + int child, fd, status;
> + int socket_fds[2];
> +
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0,
> + socket_fds));
> +
> + child = fork();
> + ASSERT_LE(0, child);
> + if (child == 0) {
> + /*
> + * Enable Landlock in the child process, open a file descriptor
> + * where truncation is forbidden and send it to the
> + * non-landlocked parent process.
> + */
> + const char *const path = file1_s1d1;
> + const struct rule rules[] = {
> + {
> + .path = path,
> + .access = variant->permitted,
> + },
> + {},
> + };
> + int fd, ruleset_fd;
> +
> + /* Enable Landlock. */
> + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
> +
> + fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
> + ASSERT_EQ(variant->expected_open_result, (fd < 0 ? errno : 0));
> +
> + if (fd >= 0) {
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, send_fd(socket_fds[0], fd));
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
> + }
> +
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(socket_fds[0]));
> +
> + _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
> + }
> +
> + if (variant->expected_open_result == 0) {
> + fd = recv_fd(socket_fds[1]);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(variant->expected_ftruncate_result,
> + test_ftruncate(fd));
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
> + }
> +
> + ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
> + ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
> + ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
> +
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(socket_fds[0]));
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(socket_fds[1]));
> +}
> +
> /* clang-format off */
> FIXTURE(layout1_bind) {};
> /* clang-format on */
> --
> 2.37.3
>
--
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 6/7] samples/landlock: Extend sample tool to support LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
2022-09-30 16:01 [PATCH v7 0/7] landlock: truncate support Günther Noack
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2022-09-30 16:01 ` [PATCH v7 5/7] selftests/landlock: Test FD passing from a Landlock-restricted to an unrestricted process Günther Noack
@ 2022-09-30 16:01 ` Günther Noack
2022-09-30 16:01 ` [PATCH v7 7/7] landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support Günther Noack
6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Günther Noack @ 2022-09-30 16:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, James Morris, Paul Moore,
Serge E . Hallyn, linux-fsdevel, Konstantin Meskhidze,
Günther Noack
Update the sandboxer sample to restrict truncate actions. This is
automatically enabled by default if the running kernel supports
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, except for the paths listed in the
LL_FS_RW environment variable.
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
index 3e404e51ec64..771b6b10d519 100644
--- a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
+++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)
#define ACCESS_FILE ( \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
/* clang-format on */
@@ -160,10 +161,8 @@ static int populate_ruleset(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | \
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)
-
-#define ACCESS_ABI_2 ( \
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
/* clang-format on */
@@ -226,11 +225,17 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
return 1;
}
/* Best-effort security. */
- if (abi < 2) {
- ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~ACCESS_ABI_2;
- access_fs_ro &= ~ACCESS_ABI_2;
- access_fs_rw &= ~ACCESS_ABI_2;
+ switch (abi) {
+ case 1:
+ /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER for ABI < 2 */
+ ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER;
+ __attribute__((fallthrough));
+ case 2:
+ /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */
+ ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
}
+ access_fs_ro &= ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs;
+ access_fs_rw &= ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs;
ruleset_fd =
landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
--
2.37.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 7/7] landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support
2022-09-30 16:01 [PATCH v7 0/7] landlock: truncate support Günther Noack
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2022-09-30 16:01 ` [PATCH v7 6/7] samples/landlock: Extend sample tool to support LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE Günther Noack
@ 2022-09-30 16:01 ` Günther Noack
6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Günther Noack @ 2022-09-30 16:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, James Morris, Paul Moore,
Serge E . Hallyn, linux-fsdevel, Konstantin Meskhidze,
Günther Noack
Use the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE flag in the tutorial.
Adapt the backwards compatibility example and discussion to remove the
truncation flag where needed.
Point out potential surprising behaviour related to truncate.
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
index b8ea59493964..408029b120bd 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control
=====================================
:Author: Mickaël Salaün
-:Date: May 2022
+:Date: September 2022
The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global
filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable
@@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
};
Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be
@@ -69,16 +70,27 @@ should try to protect users as much as possible whatever the kernel they are
using. To avoid binary enforcement (i.e. either all security features or
none), we can leverage a dedicated Landlock command to get the current version
of the Landlock ABI and adapt the handled accesses. Let's check if we should
-remove the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER` access right which is only supported
-starting with the second version of the ABI.
+remove the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` or ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE``
+access rights, which are only supported starting with the second and third
+version of the ABI.
.. code-block:: c
int abi;
abi = landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION);
- if (abi < 2) {
+ if (abi < 0) {
+ perror("The running kernel does not enable to use Landlock");
+ return 0; /* Degrade gracefully if Landlock is not handled. */
+ }
+ switch (abi) {
+ case 1:
+ /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER for ABI < 2 */
ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER;
+ __attribute__((fallthrough));
+ case 2:
+ /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */
+ ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
}
This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
@@ -127,8 +139,8 @@ descriptor.
It may also be required to create rules following the same logic as explained
for the ruleset creation, by filtering access rights according to the Landlock
-ABI version. In this example, this is not required because
-`LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER` is not allowed by any rule.
+ABI version. In this example, this is not required because all of the requested
+``allowed_access`` rights are already available in ABI 1.
We now have a ruleset with one rule allowing read access to ``/usr`` while
denying all other handled accesses for the filesystem. The next step is to
@@ -251,6 +263,37 @@ To be allowed to use :manpage:`ptrace(2)` and related syscalls on a target
process, a sandboxed process should have a subset of the target process rules,
which means the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer.
+Truncating files
+----------------
+
+The operations covered by ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE`` and
+``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` both change the contents of a file and sometimes
+overlap in non-intuitive ways. It is recommended to always specify both of
+these together.
+
+A particularly surprising example is :manpage:`creat(2)`. The name suggests
+that this system call requires the rights to create and write files. However,
+it also requires the truncate right if an existing file under the same name is
+already present.
+
+It should also be noted that truncating files does not require the
+``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE`` right. Apart from the :manpage:`truncate(2)`
+system call, this can also be done through :manpage:`open(2)` with the flags
+``O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC``.
+
+When opening a file, the availability of the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE``
+right is associated with the newly created file descriptor and will be used for
+subsequent truncation attempts using :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`. The behavior is
+similar to opening a file for reading or writing, where permissions are checked
+during :manpage:`open(2)`, but not during the subsequent :manpage:`read(2)` and
+:manpage:`write(2)` calls.
+
+As a consequence, it is possible to have multiple open file descriptors for the
+same file, where one grants the right to truncate the file and the other does
+not. It is also possible to pass such file descriptors between processes,
+keeping their Landlock properties, even when these processes do not have an
+enforced Landlock ruleset.
+
Compatibility
=============
@@ -397,6 +440,15 @@ Starting with the Landlock ABI version 2, it is now possible to securely
control renaming and linking thanks to the new `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`
access right.
+File truncation (ABI < 3)
+-------------------------
+
+File truncation could not be denied before the third Landlock ABI, so it is
+always allowed when using a kernel that only supports the first or second ABI.
+
+Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely control
+truncation thanks to the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` access right.
+
.. _kernel_support:
Kernel support
--
2.37.3
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