From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 14/30] internal: add may_write_xattr()
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2022 13:56:44 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221018115700.166010-15-brauner@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221018115700.166010-1-brauner@kernel.org>
Split out the generic checks whether an inode allows writing xattrs. Since
security.* and system.* xattrs don't have any restrictions and we're going
to split out posix acls into a dedicated api we will use this helper to
check whether we can write posix acls.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
---
Notes:
/* v2 */
patch not present
/* v3 */
patch not present
/* v4 */
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>:
- Split out checks whether an inode can have xattrs written to into a helper.
/* v5 */
unchanged
fs/internal.h | 1 +
fs/xattr.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/internal.h b/fs/internal.h
index 6f0386b34fae..de43795ab7cd 100644
--- a/fs/internal.h
+++ b/fs/internal.h
@@ -234,3 +234,4 @@ int do_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
struct xattr_ctx *ctx);
ssize_t __kernel_write_iter(struct file *file, struct iov_iter *from, loff_t *pos);
+int may_write_xattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode);
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index 61107b6bbed2..31b5ac65ca34 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -80,6 +80,31 @@ xattr_resolve_name(struct inode *inode, const char **name)
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
+/**
+ * may_write_xattr - check whether inode allows writing xattr
+ * @mnt_userns: User namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @inode: the inode on which to set an xattr
+ *
+ * Check whether the inode allows writing xattrs. Specifically, we can never
+ * set or remove an extended attribute on a read-only filesystem or on an
+ * immutable / append-only inode.
+ *
+ * We also need to ensure that the inode has a mapping in the mount to
+ * not risk writing back invalid i_{g,u}id values.
+ *
+ * Return: On success zero is returned. On error a negative errno is returned.
+ */
+int may_write_xattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode)
+{
+ if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (IS_APPEND(inode))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(mnt_userns, inode))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Check permissions for extended attribute access. This is a bit complicated
* because different namespaces have very different rules.
@@ -88,20 +113,12 @@ static int
xattr_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
const char *name, int mask)
{
- /*
- * We can never set or remove an extended attribute on a read-only
- * filesystem or on an immutable / append-only inode.
- */
if (mask & MAY_WRITE) {
- if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
- return -EPERM;
- /*
- * Updating an xattr will likely cause i_uid and i_gid
- * to be writen back improperly if their true value is
- * unknown to the vfs.
- */
- if (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(mnt_userns, inode))
- return -EPERM;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = may_write_xattr(mnt_userns, inode);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
}
/*
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-18 11:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-18 11:56 [PATCH v5 00/30] acl: add vfs posix acl api Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 01/30] orangefs: rework posix acl handling when creating new filesystem objects Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 02/30] fs: pass dentry to set acl method Christian Brauner
2022-11-18 10:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-11-18 10:33 ` Christian Brauner
2022-11-18 12:32 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 03/30] fs: rename current get " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 04/30] fs: add new " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 05/30] cifs: implement " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 06/30] cifs: implement set " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 07/30] 9p: implement get " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 08/30] 9p: implement set " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 09/30] security: add get, remove and set acl hook Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 10/30] selinux: implement get, set and remove " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 11/30] smack: " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 12/30] integrity: implement get and set " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 19:17 ` Paul Moore
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 13/30] evm: add post " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 15/30] acl: add vfs_set_acl() Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 16/30] acl: add vfs_get_acl() Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 17/30] acl: add vfs_remove_acl() Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 18/30] ksmbd: use vfs_remove_acl() Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 19/30] ecryptfs: implement get acl method Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 20/30] ecryptfs: implement set " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 21/30] ovl: implement get " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 22/30] ovl: implement set " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 23/30] ovl: use posix acl api Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 24/30] xattr: " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 25/30] evm: remove evm_xattr_acl_change() Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 26/30] ecryptfs: use stub posix acl handlers Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 27/30] ovl: " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 28/30] cifs: " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 29/30] 9p: " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:57 ` [PATCH v5 30/30] acl: remove a slew of now unused helpers Christian Brauner
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