From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net,
linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, rjw@rjwysocki.net,
gwendal@chromium.org, apronin@chromium.org,
Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@aurora.tech>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, dlunev@google.com,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
Ben Boeckel <me@benboeckel.net>,
jarkko@kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 04/11] security: keys: trusted: Include TPM2 creation data
Date: Fri, 4 Nov 2022 11:33:54 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202211041132.E8CB636@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221103105558.v4.4.Ieb1215f598bc9df56b0e29e5977eae4fcca25e15@changeid>
On Thu, Nov 03, 2022 at 11:01:12AM -0700, Evan Green wrote:
> In addition to the private key and public key, the TPM2_Create
> command may also return creation data, a creation hash, and a creation
> ticket. These fields allow the TPM to attest to the contents of a
> specified set of PCRs at the time the trusted key was created. Encrypted
> hibernation will use this to ensure that PCRs settable only by the
> kernel were set properly at the time of creation, indicating this is an
> authentic hibernate key.
>
> Encode these additional parameters into the ASN.1 created to represent
> the key blob. The new fields are made optional so that they don't bloat
> key blobs which don't need them, and to ensure interoperability with
> old blobs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
There's a lot of open-coded math for the bounds checking. I didn't
immediately see any problems, but it'd be nice if there was a way to
hook a fuzzer up to this, or at least write some KUnit tests to check
boundary conditions explicitly.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-04 18:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-03 18:01 [PATCH v4 00/11] Encrypted Hibernation Evan Green
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 04/11] security: keys: trusted: Include TPM2 creation data Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:33 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2022-11-07 20:11 ` Evan Green
2022-11-10 0:29 ` Evan Green
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 05/11] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in " Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 06/11] security: keys: trusted: Verify " Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:35 ` Kees Cook
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