From: "Thomas Weißschuh" <linux@weissschuh.net>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"David Woodhouse" <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
"Eric Snowberg" <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: "Thomas Weißschuh" <linux@weissschuh.net>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Mark Pearson" <markpearson@lenovo.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/3] certs: Prevent spurious errors on repeated blacklisting
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2022 03:50:16 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221109025019.1855-1-linux@weissschuh.net> (raw)
When the blacklist keyring was changed to allow updates from the root
user it gained an ->update() function that disallows all updates.
When the a hash is blacklisted multiple times from the builtin or
firmware-provided blacklist this spams prominent logs during boot:
[ 0.890814] blacklist: Problem blacklisting hash (-13)
This affects the firmware of various vendors. Reported have been at least:
* Samsung: https://askubuntu.com/questions/1436856/
* Acer: https://ubuntuforums.org/showthread.php?t=2478840
* MSI: https://forum.archlabslinux.com/t/blacklist-problem-blacklisting-hash-13-errors-on-boot/6674/7
* Micro-Star: https://bbs.archlinux.org/viewtopic.php?id=278860
This series is an extension of the following single patch:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221104014704.3469-1-linux@weissschuh.net/
Only the first patch has been marked for stable as otherwise the whole of
key_create() would need to be applied to stable.
Thomas Weißschuh (3):
certs: log more information on blacklist error
KEYS: Add key_create()
certs: don't try to update blacklist keys
certs/blacklist.c | 23 ++++---
include/linux/key.h | 8 +++
security/keys/key.c | 149 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
3 files changed, 133 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
base-commit: f141df371335645ce29a87d9683a3f79fba7fd67
--
2.38.1
next reply other threads:[~2022-11-09 2:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-09 2:50 Thomas Weißschuh [this message]
2022-11-09 2:50 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] certs: log more information on blacklist error Thomas Weißschuh
2022-11-15 23:54 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-09 2:50 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] KEYS: Add key_create() Thomas Weißschuh
2022-11-16 0:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-09 2:50 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] certs: don't try to update blacklist keys Thomas Weißschuh
2022-11-15 23:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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