* [PATCH 1/4] LoadPin: Refactor read-only check into a helper
2022-12-09 19:57 [PATCH 0/4] LoadPin: Allow filesystem switch when not enforcing Kees Cook
@ 2022-12-09 19:57 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-09 19:57 ` [PATCH 2/4] LoadPin: Refactor sysctl initialization Kees Cook
` (3 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2022-12-09 19:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: Kees Cook, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, linux-security-module,
linux-kernel, linux-hardening
In preparation for allowing mounts to shift when not enforced, move
read-only checking into a separate helper.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 110a5ab2b46b..ca0eff3ce9d0 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -72,28 +72,21 @@ static struct ctl_table loadpin_sysctl_table[] = {
{ }
};
-/*
- * This must be called after early kernel init, since then the rootdev
- * is available.
- */
-static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
+static void report_writable(struct super_block *mnt_sb, bool writable)
{
- bool ro = false;
-
/*
* If load pinning is not enforced via a read-only block
* device, allow sysctl to change modes for testing.
*/
if (mnt_sb->s_bdev) {
- ro = bdev_read_only(mnt_sb->s_bdev);
pr_info("%pg (%u:%u): %s\n", mnt_sb->s_bdev,
MAJOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev),
MINOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev),
- ro ? "read-only" : "writable");
+ writable ? "writable" : "read-only");
} else
pr_info("mnt_sb lacks block device, treating as: writable\n");
- if (!ro) {
+ if (writable) {
if (!register_sysctl_paths(loadpin_sysctl_path,
loadpin_sysctl_table))
pr_notice("sysctl registration failed!\n");
@@ -103,12 +96,26 @@ static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n");
}
#else
-static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
+static void report_writable(struct super_block *mnt_sb, bool writable)
{
pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n");
}
#endif
+/*
+ * This must be called after early kernel init, since then the rootdev
+ * is available.
+ */
+static bool sb_is_writable(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
+{
+ bool writable = true;
+
+ if (mnt_sb->s_bdev)
+ writable = !bdev_read_only(mnt_sb->s_bdev);
+
+ return writable;
+}
+
static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
{
/*
@@ -126,6 +133,7 @@ static int loadpin_check(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
struct super_block *load_root;
const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
+ bool load_root_writable;
/* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) &&
@@ -146,6 +154,7 @@ static int loadpin_check(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
}
load_root = file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb;
+ load_root_writable = sb_is_writable(load_root);
/* First loaded module/firmware defines the root for all others. */
spin_lock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
@@ -162,7 +171,7 @@ static int loadpin_check(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
* enforcing. This would be purely cosmetic.
*/
spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
- check_pinning_enforcement(pinned_root);
+ report_writable(pinned_root, load_root_writable);
report_load(origin, file, "pinned");
} else {
spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* [PATCH 2/4] LoadPin: Refactor sysctl initialization
2022-12-09 19:57 [PATCH 0/4] LoadPin: Allow filesystem switch when not enforcing Kees Cook
2022-12-09 19:57 ` [PATCH 1/4] LoadPin: Refactor read-only check into a helper Kees Cook
@ 2022-12-09 19:57 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-09 19:57 ` [PATCH 3/4] LoadPin: Move pin reporting cleanly out of locking Kees Cook
` (2 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2022-12-09 19:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: Kees Cook, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, linux-security-module,
linux-kernel, linux-hardening
In preparation for shifting root mount when not enforcing, split sysctl
logic out into a separate helper, and unconditionally register the
sysctl, but only make it writable when the device is writable.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index ca0eff3ce9d0..5b15f8f7268d 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ static bool deny_reading_verity_digests;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
-
static struct ctl_path loadpin_sysctl_path[] = {
{ .procname = "kernel", },
{ .procname = "loadpin", },
@@ -66,18 +65,29 @@ static struct ctl_table loadpin_sysctl_table[] = {
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
- .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
+ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
{ }
};
-static void report_writable(struct super_block *mnt_sb, bool writable)
+static void set_sysctl(bool is_writable)
{
/*
* If load pinning is not enforced via a read-only block
* device, allow sysctl to change modes for testing.
*/
+ if (is_writable)
+ loadpin_sysctl_table[0].extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO;
+ else
+ loadpin_sysctl_table[0].extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE;
+}
+#else
+static inline void set_sysctl(bool is_writable) { }
+#endif
+
+static void report_writable(struct super_block *mnt_sb, bool writable)
+{
if (mnt_sb->s_bdev) {
pr_info("%pg (%u:%u): %s\n", mnt_sb->s_bdev,
MAJOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev),
@@ -86,21 +96,9 @@ static void report_writable(struct super_block *mnt_sb, bool writable)
} else
pr_info("mnt_sb lacks block device, treating as: writable\n");
- if (writable) {
- if (!register_sysctl_paths(loadpin_sysctl_path,
- loadpin_sysctl_table))
- pr_notice("sysctl registration failed!\n");
- else
- pr_info("enforcement can be disabled.\n");
- } else
+ if (!writable)
pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n");
}
-#else
-static void report_writable(struct super_block *mnt_sb, bool writable)
-{
- pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n");
-}
-#endif
/*
* This must be called after early kernel init, since then the rootdev
@@ -172,6 +170,7 @@ static int loadpin_check(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
*/
spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
report_writable(pinned_root, load_root_writable);
+ set_sysctl(load_root_writable);
report_load(origin, file, "pinned");
} else {
spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
@@ -259,6 +258,10 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
enforce ? "" : "not ");
parse_exclude();
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+ if (!register_sysctl_paths(loadpin_sysctl_path, loadpin_sysctl_table))
+ pr_notice("sysctl registration failed!\n");
+#endif
security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
return 0;
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3/4] LoadPin: Move pin reporting cleanly out of locking
2022-12-09 19:57 [PATCH 0/4] LoadPin: Allow filesystem switch when not enforcing Kees Cook
2022-12-09 19:57 ` [PATCH 1/4] LoadPin: Refactor read-only check into a helper Kees Cook
2022-12-09 19:57 ` [PATCH 2/4] LoadPin: Refactor sysctl initialization Kees Cook
@ 2022-12-09 19:57 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-09 19:57 ` [PATCH 4/4] LoadPin: Allow filesystem switch when not enforcing Kees Cook
2022-12-12 21:32 ` [PATCH 0/4] " Serge E. Hallyn
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2022-12-09 19:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: Kees Cook, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, linux-security-module,
linux-kernel, linux-hardening
Refactor the pin reporting to be more cleanly outside the locking. It
was already, but moving it around helps clear the path for the root to
switch when not enforcing.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 15 ++++++---------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 5b15f8f7268d..ef12d77548ae 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ static int loadpin_check(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
struct super_block *load_root;
const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
+ bool first_root_pin = false;
bool load_root_writable;
/* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
@@ -162,18 +163,14 @@ static int loadpin_check(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
*/
if (!pinned_root) {
pinned_root = load_root;
- /*
- * Unlock now since it's only pinned_root we care about.
- * In the worst case, we will (correctly) report pinning
- * failures before we have announced that pinning is
- * enforcing. This would be purely cosmetic.
- */
- spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
+ first_root_pin = true;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
+
+ if (first_root_pin) {
report_writable(pinned_root, load_root_writable);
set_sysctl(load_root_writable);
report_load(origin, file, "pinned");
- } else {
- spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
}
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) ||
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4/4] LoadPin: Allow filesystem switch when not enforcing
2022-12-09 19:57 [PATCH 0/4] LoadPin: Allow filesystem switch when not enforcing Kees Cook
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2022-12-09 19:57 ` [PATCH 3/4] LoadPin: Move pin reporting cleanly out of locking Kees Cook
@ 2022-12-09 19:57 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-12 21:32 ` [PATCH 0/4] " Serge E. Hallyn
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2022-12-09 19:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: Kees Cook, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, linux-security-module,
linux-kernel, linux-hardening
For LoadPin to be used at all in a classic distro environment, it needs
to allow for switching filesystems (from the initramfs to the "real"
root filesystem). To allow for this, if the "enforce" mode is not set at
boot, reset the pinned filesystem tracking when the pinned filesystem
gets unmounted instead of invalidating further loads. Once enforcement
is set, it cannot be unset, and the pinning will stick.
This means that distros can build with CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN=y, but with
CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE disabled, but after boot is running,
the system can enable enforcement:
$ sysctl -w kernel.loadpin.enforced=1
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index ef12d77548ae..d73a281adf86 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -119,11 +119,16 @@ static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
/*
* When unmounting the filesystem we were using for load
* pinning, we acknowledge the superblock release, but make sure
- * no other modules or firmware can be loaded.
+ * no other modules or firmware can be loaded when we are in
+ * enforcing mode. Otherwise, allow the root to be reestablished.
*/
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) && mnt_sb == pinned_root) {
- pinned_root = ERR_PTR(-EIO);
- pr_info("umount pinned fs: refusing further loads\n");
+ if (enforce) {
+ pinned_root = ERR_PTR(-EIO);
+ pr_info("umount pinned fs: refusing further loads\n");
+ } else {
+ pinned_root = NULL;
+ }
}
}
@@ -158,8 +163,9 @@ static int loadpin_check(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
/* First loaded module/firmware defines the root for all others. */
spin_lock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
/*
- * pinned_root is only NULL at startup. Otherwise, it is either
- * a valid reference, or an ERR_PTR.
+ * pinned_root is only NULL at startup or when the pinned root has
+ * been unmounted while we are not in enforcing mode. Otherwise, it
+ * is either a valid reference, or an ERR_PTR.
*/
if (!pinned_root) {
pinned_root = load_root;
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 0/4] LoadPin: Allow filesystem switch when not enforcing
2022-12-09 19:57 [PATCH 0/4] LoadPin: Allow filesystem switch when not enforcing Kees Cook
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2022-12-09 19:57 ` [PATCH 4/4] LoadPin: Allow filesystem switch when not enforcing Kees Cook
@ 2022-12-12 21:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2022-12-12 21:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, linux-hardening
On Fri, Dec 09, 2022 at 11:57:41AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Right now, LoadPin isn't much use on general purpose distros since modules
> tend to be loaded from multiple filesystems at boot (first initramfs,
> then real rootfs). Allow the potential mount pin to move when enforcement
> is not enabled.
>
> -Kees
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
to the set, thanks.
>
> Kees Cook (4):
> LoadPin: Refactor read-only check into a helper
> LoadPin: Refactor sysctl initialization
> LoadPin: Move pin reporting cleanly out of locking
> LoadPin: Allow filesystem switch when not enforcing
>
> security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
> 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
>
> --
> 2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread