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From: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
To: unlisted-recipients:; (no To-header on input)
Cc: skhan@linuxfoundation.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com,
	dverkamp@chromium.org, hughd@google.com, jeffxu@google.com,
	jorgelo@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	jannh@google.com, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2022 18:39:49 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221216183949.169779-1-sj@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221209160453.3246150-4-jeffxu@google.com>

Hi Jeff,

> From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
> 
> The new MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC flags allows application to
> set executable bit at creation time (memfd_create).
> 
> When MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is set, memfd is created without executable bit
> (mode:0666), and sealed with F_SEAL_EXEC, so it can't be chmod to
> be executable (mode: 0777) after creation.
> 
> when MFD_EXEC flag is set, memfd is created with executable bit
> (mode:0777), this is the same as the old behavior of memfd_create.
> 
> The new pid namespaced sysctl vm.memfd_noexec has 3 values:
> 0: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like
>         MFD_EXEC was set.
> 1: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like
>         MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was set.
> 2: memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected.
> 
> The sysctl allows finer control of memfd_create for old-software
> that doesn't set the executable bit, for example, a container with
> vm.memfd_noexec=1 means the old-software will create non-executable
> memfd by default. Also, the value of memfd_noexec is passed to child
> namespace at creation time. For example, if the init namespace has
> vm.memfd_noexec=2, all its children namespaces will be created with 2.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
> Co-developed-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
> ---
[...]
> diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
> index f4f8cb0435b4..8a98b1af9376 100644
> --- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
>  #include <linux/sched/task.h>
>  #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
>  #include <linux/idr.h>
> +#include "pid_sysctl.h"
>  
>  static DEFINE_MUTEX(pid_caches_mutex);
>  static struct kmem_cache *pid_ns_cachep;
> @@ -110,6 +111,8 @@ static struct pid_namespace *create_pid_namespace(struct user_namespace *user_ns
>  	ns->ucounts = ucounts;
>  	ns->pid_allocated = PIDNS_ADDING;
>  
> +	initialize_memfd_noexec_scope(ns);
> +
>  	return ns;
>  
>  out_free_idr:
> @@ -455,6 +458,8 @@ static __init int pid_namespaces_init(void)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
>  	register_sysctl_paths(kern_path, pid_ns_ctl_table);
>  #endif
> +
> +	register_pid_ns_sysctl_table_vm();
>  	return 0;
>  }
[...]
>  
> diff --git a/kernel/pid_sysctl.h b/kernel/pid_sysctl.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..90a93161a122
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/kernel/pid_sysctl.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef LINUX_PID_SYSCTL_H
> +#define LINUX_PID_SYSCTL_H
> +
> +#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
> +
> +#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) && defined(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE)
> +static inline void initialize_memfd_noexec_scope(struct pid_namespace *ns)
[...]
> +static inline void register_pid_ns_sysctl_table_vm(void)
> +{
> +	register_sysctl_paths(vm_path, pid_ns_ctl_table_vm);
> +}
> +#else
> +static inline void set_memfd_noexec_scope(struct pid_namespace *ns) {}
> +static inline void register_pid_ns_ctl_table_vm(void) {}
> +#endif
[...]

I found this patch makes build fails whne CONFIG_SYSCTL or CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE
are not defined, as initialize_memfd_noexec_scope() and
register_pid_ns_sysctl_table_vm() are used from pid_namespace.c without the
configs protection.

I just posted a patch for that:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20221216183314.169707-1-sj@kernel.org/

Could you please check?


Thanks,
SJ

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-12-16 18:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-12-09 16:04 [PATCH v7 0/6] mm/memfd: introduce MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC jeffxu
2022-12-09 16:04 ` [PATCH v7 1/6] mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_EXEC jeffxu
2022-12-09 16:04 ` [PATCH v7 2/6] selftests/memfd: add tests for F_SEAL_EXEC jeffxu
2022-12-14 18:52   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-09 16:04 ` [PATCH v7 3/6] mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC jeffxu
2022-12-14 18:53   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-16 18:39   ` SeongJae Park [this message]
2022-12-16 19:03     ` Jeff Xu
2022-12-16 19:21       ` Andrew Morton
2022-12-16 19:31         ` SeongJae Park
2022-12-09 16:04 ` [PATCH v7 4/6] mm/memfd: Add write seals when apply SEAL_EXEC to executable memfd jeffxu
2022-12-09 16:04 ` [PATCH v7 5/6] selftests/memfd: add tests for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC jeffxu
2022-12-09 16:04 ` [PATCH v7 6/6] mm/memfd: security hook for memfd_create jeffxu
2022-12-09 17:02   ` Casey Schaufler
2022-12-09 18:29   ` Paul Moore
2022-12-13 15:00     ` Jeff Xu
2022-12-13 15:37       ` Casey Schaufler
2022-12-13 19:22       ` Paul Moore
2022-12-13 23:05         ` Jeff Xu
2025-09-20  5:54         ` Abhinav Saxena
2025-09-20 18:58           ` Jeff Xu
2022-12-09 18:15 ` [PATCH v7 0/6] mm/memfd: introduce MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC Paul Moore
2022-12-14 18:54 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-14 23:32   ` Jeff Xu
2022-12-15  0:08     ` Kees Cook
2022-12-15 16:55       ` Jeff Xu

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