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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	patches@lists.linux.dev, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6.0 1012/1073] LoadPin: Ignore the "contents" argument of the LSM hooks
Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2022 15:43:20 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221228144355.655176782@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221228144328.162723588@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

[ Upstream commit 1a17e5b513ceebf21100027745b8731b4728edf7 ]

LoadPin only enforces the read-only origin of kernel file reads. Whether
or not it was a partial read isn't important. Remove the overly
conservative checks so that things like partial firmware reads will
succeed (i.e. reading a firmware header).

Fixes: 2039bda1fa8d ("LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook")
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Tested-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209195453.never.494-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 44521582dcba..d6767fddbd5a 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -120,21 +120,11 @@ static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
 	}
 }
 
-static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
-			     bool contents)
+static int loadpin_check(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
 	struct super_block *load_root;
 	const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
 
-	/*
-	 * If we will not know that we'll be seeing the full contents
-	 * then we cannot trust a load will be complete and unchanged
-	 * off disk. Treat all contents=false hooks as if there were
-	 * no associated file struct.
-	 */
-	if (!contents)
-		file = NULL;
-
 	/* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
 	if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) &&
 	    ignore_read_file_id[id]) {
@@ -190,9 +180,25 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+			     bool contents)
+{
+	/*
+	 * LoadPin only cares about the _origin_ of a file, not its
+	 * contents, so we can ignore the "are full contents available"
+	 * argument here.
+	 */
+	return loadpin_check(file, id);
+}
+
 static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
-	return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents);
+	/*
+	 * LoadPin only cares about the _origin_ of a file, not its
+	 * contents, so a NULL file is passed, and we can ignore the
+	 * state of "contents".
+	 */
+	return loadpin_check(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
 }
 
 static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
-- 
2.35.1




           reply	other threads:[~2022-12-28 16:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed
 [parent not found: <20221228144328.162723588@linuxfoundation.org>]

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